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influence in America.
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CHAPTER I
THE WORLD IN WHICH BOWNE LIVED
No man lives in a vacuum. He is a part of the community
in which he lives. Whether his thinking is a reaction from his
environment or a product of it, it is necessary to understand
the environment to understand the man. The purpose of this
chapter is to give a brief sketch of the world in which
Borden Parker Bowne lived.
In the summer of 1850, Americans looked upon their
country with eyes that glowed with pride and confidence.
"Manifest Destiny" had been realized; the flag had been born
in triumph to the Rio Grande and to the Pacific shore. The
mountains of the Par West had loosed a mighty stream of gold,
and the construction of railroads welded the East and West in
a growing community of interest. The flood tide of westward
movement continued and in the next decade the population of
the United States increased from twenty-three million to
nearly thirty-one million."1*
Factory production, introducing new and efficient
methods of manufacturing, increasingly replaced the handi¬
crafts. Huge fortunes were made rapidly—some by fraud and
^ A. C. Cole, The Irrepressible Conflict. 1850-1865,
p. 1.
2
corruption. Fundamentally, however, the economic expansion
was derived from access to sources of raw materials not pre¬
viously available and from more efficient methods of exploi¬
tation and communication. It was a decade of fast living,
dissipation and extravagance, but it was also a period of an
awakening interest in cultural values. "While the 'frantic
scramble for a share in the teeming prosperity1 completely
2
contradicted the romantic dream of Transcendentalism, this
period nevertheless showed the beginnings of a new national
3
culture."
1 £bid., p. 28.
2
Cf. 0. B. Frothingham, The Transcendentalism of
Hew England. p. 150. When the romantic revolution in art and
philosophy that had made such vast strides in Europe finally
broke in upon the Puritan mind of America, the result was a
unique venture in speculative philosophy and semireligious
faith. The principal theme around which the whole movement
centered was "self-culture" i.e., the perfect unfolding of
our individual nature. These Transcendentalists believed in
man's ability to apprehend absolute Truth, absolute Justice,
absolute Rectitude, absolute Goodness. They spoke of The
Right, The True, The Beautiful as eternal realities which man
can discover in the world and which he can incorporate into
his life. They were convinced of the unlimited perfectibility
of man. They were satisfied with nothing so long as it did
not correspond to the ideal in the enlightened soul. Dis¬
satisfied with men as they are, they were enthusiastic reform¬
ers. Their method followed from their world view, i.e., the
method of individual awakening and regeneration. This was to
be conducted through the simplest ministries of family, neigh¬
borhood fraternity, quite wide of associations and institutions.
^ W. H. Werkmeister, A History of Philosophical Ideas
in America, p. 55*
A. THE ST. LOUIS MOVEMENT
3
The new cultural interests were not restricted to the
eastern part of America. As the city of St. Louis grew in
numbers, wealth, prestige, and culture, it gave rise to a
vigorous and influential philosophical movement. The
beginnings of this movement may be traced to a chance meeting
in 1858 of William T. Harris and Henry C. Brokmeyer.
Brokmeyer heard Harris give a lecture on some philosophical
subject at the St. Louis Theosophical Society. After the
lecture the two men met and Brokmeyer tried to convince Harris
that the questions raised by his lecture and left unanswered
had actually been answered—completely and definitively—by
the German philosopher Hegel; "that Hegel was the last word
in philosophy, and that his position provided the key to the
1
correct solution of all problems." And so began a friendship
"that was destined to exert a profound influence upon the
2
intellectual life of St. Louis and of America as a whole."
Under the dominant influence of Brokmeyer and Harris
the "St. Louis Movement" sold the philosophy of Hegel to the
thinking people of St. Louis and America. As we have men¬






impressed the American mind, "In the triadic movement of
Hegel's dialectic they found a ready-made formula for their
understanding of the conflicting trends in American culture
and of the tragedy of the civil war."1
The practical application of Hegelian philosophy was
extensive because of its relation to the public school.
Harris, himself, became superintendent of schools. As a
result the whole school system of St. Louis was permeated
with Hegelian philosophy. "We used it," says Harris, "to
solve all problems connected with school-teaching and school
2
management."
B. WAR OF SECESSION AND AFTERMATH
Actual hostilities broke out in i860 although the
tension between the North and the South had been growing for
a number of years. At the very time when the tidal wave of
population moved westward across the American continent, the
heart of the South "shifted with the culture of cotton to the
3
Gulf States." The states of north and south were no longer
bound together by a common frontier experience. "The barrier
1 Ibid., p. 58.
2
G. R. Dodson (Schaub. editor), "The St. Louis
Philosophical Movement," William Torrev Harris« p. 27.
^ Cole, op. cit., p. 100.
5
between the 'free states' and 'slave states' became increas¬
ingly effective and was soon more formidable than the moun¬
tain barrier between the East and the West,"1
Fort Sumter was fired on and the war began. The next
few years saw bloodshed cut across the course of normal
development in the United States. These years marked the end
of one epoch and the beginning of a new one in the history of
the continent; for, "measured in terms of cultural achievement,
the Union which arose from the ruins of that war had little in
2
common with the nation that existed before the war." The War
of Secession broke down the barriers which up to that time
had slowed the pace of nation-wide readjustment and it opened
the floodgates wide to the surging forces of the new order.
The postwar America that emerged was soon in the midst of an
economic revolution which deeply affected the whole nation
in all phases of its existence. Within a single generation
the United States changed from a predominantly agrarian coun¬
try which imported its goods from abroad, to an industrialized
nation which sold the products of its own factories and mills
in various parts of the world. The American mind was
possessed with a new dream of empire building. An early
manifestation of the new forces at work was the amazingly




swift settlement of the vast West."1" The revolution in mining,
2
transportation, and manufacturing was even more astounding.
The dynamic modern city became the nerve center of the rising
industrial order. In the city the forces that shaped and
determined the new order were concentrated. "Everywhere an
intensely materialistic spirit reigned—the urge to exploit
new sources of wealth, to make fortunes, to grasp power."
Strong industrial centers sprang up across the nation and
fabulous riches were acquired in a short time. The character
of the "newly rich" who moved into the eastern cities is
pictured by Werkmeister as:
... 1 self-made' men and women who brought with
them the spirit and taste of the market place
and whose cultural interests were measured in
dollars and cents. A 'parody on sober good
sense' masqueraded as genteel manners and cul¬
tural achievement. The 'poison idle wealth*
corrupted all appreciation of cultural values,
and the men and women of the 'Gilded Age' sub¬
stituted 'high living and plain thinking' for
the old ideal of 'plain living and high think¬
ing.4
But not all were rich even during the "Gilded Age."
In the back streets the slums could be found. There the
^ A. M. Schlesinger, Political and Social Growth of
the American People. 1865-19^0. p. 55,
2





Werkmeister, op. cit.. pp. 62-63.
7
large urban masses of factory workers and coal miners lived.
In squalor, dirt, and disease the congregated hordes of new
immigrants from Europe were herded together. The masses were
kept pacified with vaudeville shows, prize fights, circuses,
dime museums, cheap theaters, and other forms of entertain-
1
ment.
Individualism, at this time, had become a matter of
the "acquisitive instinct"—a matter of the "inalienable
right to pre-empt, to exploit, and to squander." In such a
society measuring all values in monetary terms, it was only
a person possessing sufficient determination and self-
assertion who could rise to the highest positions. "A sense
2
of power and a spirit of arrogant self-assurance reigned."
American society was dominated by "strong, capable men, self¬
ish, unenlightened, amoral." It provided "an excellent
example of what human nature will do with undisciplined free¬
dom.
C. NEW CULTURAL INTERESTS
But despite these maladies, American life in Bowne*s
^ C. A. and M. R. Beard, The Rise of American Civiliza
tion, H, p. 397.
p
Schlesinger, op. cit.. p. 3.
3 V. L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought,
III, p. 17. - - ,
8
day was fundamentally progressive and fruitful. There were
new cultural interests being developed. The American educa¬
tional system was transformed and in two decades its institu¬
tions had achieved a respectable place in the world's educa¬
tion. A great revolution was carried through in medicine and
the sciences. A new and critical approach to American history
was developed, and the socio-economic conditions of the nation
were critically handled by trained scholars. From 1876 on,
public libraries were organized in all regions of the country.
There was the development of the newspaper, and the more seri¬
ous magazine such as Harper's Monthly. The Atlantic. The
1
Century. Serious drama was probably never better presented.
Also in this period we see the rapid rise of the American
playwright, the Symphony Orchestra, and American art. It was
during this period that American philosophy received a new
impetus and became an independent discipline. The intensely
religious life of that day could hardly be considered a "new
cultural interest." America was intensely religious from the
beginning. This religious intensity brought by the early
immigrants did not diminish. Under the leadership of men such
as Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, George Whitefield, Charles
Finney, and Dwight L. Moody, the nation was repeatedly swept
by a revival spirit. It was this religious spirit that
Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 198.
9
inspired men to build colleges, seminaries, and universities
to train Christian leaders and perpetuate the faith. For the
most part, the theology propounded was a strict orthodoxy
with an unquestioned reliance on the Bible as the very word
of God. Andrew Landale Drummond gives something of the
theological picture:
American Protestantism was overwhelmingly con¬
servative in theological orientation when the
Civil War closed in 1865. The Presbyterians
might be Calvinists and the Methodists Arminians,
but both were united by a common belief in a
literally inspired Bible, and, like the Baptists,
feared lest any presumptious hand touch the ark
of the Covenant.1
D. THE IMPACT OF DARWIN'S THEORY
In 1859 the theory of evolution dropped like a bomb¬
shell into the materialistic, yet intensely religious,
American republic. This startling event shocked the church
and stampeded its leaders to mental activity. The impact of
Darwin's theory and the mental activity it generated is one
of the most significant epochs in the history of American
thought and demands our attention.
The economic and social transformation of the United
States which culminated in the Gilded Age was accompanied in
1 Andrew Landale Drummond, Story of American Protes¬
tantism. 19*+9, p. S'+O. See also Dean Sperry, Religion in
America: Winfield Burggraeff, The Rise and Development of
Liberal Theology in America.
10
the intellectual sphere by a new trend towards naturalism and
materialism. The natural sciences played a major part in
this transition. The American mind, however, was agitated
not so much by the methods and procedures of the various
sciences themselves as by certain postulates and broad prin¬
ciples assumed or implied by the sciences, and by the
philosophies presumably derived from or justified by them.
"Foremost among the ideas of greatest significance were the
Newtonian system of classical mechanics and the more recent
theories of evolution."^"
In New England the religious leaders regarded the
Newtonian system as disclosing the greater glory and mag¬
nificence of God in His creation. The Deists claimed that
the same system gave additional support for the argument
from design. Even Lamarck's views on evolution were not
regarded particularly disturbing.
When, in the midst of these controversies, Darwin's
theory became known in America, it was made an issue between
the "diversionists" and the "unitarians." Agassiz, for
example, who supported the heterodox thesis of "original
varieties" of mankind, attacked the Darwinian ideas, while
Asa Gray, who upheld the orthodox thesis of "original unity
Werkmeister, op. cit., p. 80.
11
of mankind," came out in their favor—and this despite his
theistic position. Thus it seemed that the real import of
Darwin*s work was lost in the much more narrowly conceived
question of "one or many original human races." A review of
Darwin's book which appeared in i860 in The North American
1
Review, however, showed that the real import of Darwin's
work had not been entirely lost.
Professor Francis Bowen (Harvard University), author of
this review, pointed out that—-
. . • the theory [of evolution] if accepted at all,
must be accepted as a whole. • . .Mr. Darwin is
bound to account for the origin of the human species
just as much as for that of the lowest insect. ...
He is bound ... to find the means of bridging over
by imperceptibly fine gradations, the immense gap
which now separates man from the animals most nearly
allied to him.2
These implications of Darwin's theory, however, were not
generally understood until the publication of Darwin's own
3
book, The Descent of Man (1871). "Then the storm broke."
The reactions of American scientists to the new ideas
b
were varied; but the reactions of theologians, as might have
^




Werkmeister, op. cit., p. 81.
k
Cf. Bert J. Loewenberg, "The Reaction of American
Scientists to Darwin," American Historical Review. XXXVIII
(1932-1933), pp. 657-670; Sidney Ratner, "Evolution and the
Rise of the Scientific Spirit in America," Philosophy of
(Continued on the following page)
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been expected, were sharply divided and violently partisan.
Some of the theologians condemned the new theory as atheistic
heresy, while others attempted to reconcile it with the doc¬
trine of the church. The literature of the time reflects how
1
completely the new theory dominated the American mind.
k
(Continued)
Science. Ill (1936), pp. 10*4—122; Francis Bowen, "The Latest
Form of the Development Theory," North American Review. XC
(i860), pp. *4-7*4—506; Asa Gray, "Darwin and His Reviewers,"
Atlantic Monthly. VI (i860), pp. **06-*4-25; Louis Agassiz,
"Prof. Agassiz on the Origin of Species," American Journal of
Science and ^rts. XXX (i860), pp. l*4-2-l5*»-; Abbot Ellingwood,
"Philosophical Biology," North American Review. CVII (1868)5
Louis Agassiz, "Evolution and the Permanence of Type," Atlantic
Monthly. XXXIII (187*4-), pp. 92-101.
^ Cf. Arthur M. Schlesinger, "A Critical Period in
American Religion," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society. LXIV (1932), pp. 525-727; Bert J. Loewenberg, "The
Controversy over Evolution in New England," New England
Quarterly. VIII (1935), pp. 232-257; Bert J. Loewenberg,
"Darwinism Comes to America, 1859-1900," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XXVIII (19**1), pp. 339-368; Frank Hugh Foster,
The Modern Movement in American Theology. 1939, Ch. Ill, "The
Reception of Evolution by Theologians"; Daniel Day Williams,
The Andover Liberals: a Study in American Theology. 19**1, Ch.
II, "Evolutionary Philosophies," Ch. Ill, "Ethics and Evolution,"
Ch. V, "Evolution and Historical Criticism"; D. R. Goodwin,
"Darwin on the Origin of Species," American Theological Review.
II (i860), pp. 326-33*4-; John A. Lowell, "Darwin on the Origin
of the Species," Christian Examiner. LXVIII (i860), pp. M+9-
*4-6*4-; W. C. Wilson, "Darwin on the Origin of Species," Methodist
Quarterly Review. XLIII (i860), pp. 605-625; John Bascom,
"Darwin's Theory of the Origin of Species," American Presby¬
terian Review (3rd Ser.), Ill (1871), pp. 3^9-379; John Bascom,
Science. Philosophy and Religion, New York, 1871; J. B. Tyler,
"Evolution in Natural History as Related to Christianity,"
New Englander. XXX (1871), pp. *4-6*4—*4-70: Frederick Gardner,
"Darwinism," Bibliotheca Sara. XXIX (1872), pp. 2*4-0-289;
S. R. Calthorp, "Religion and Evolution," Religious Magazine
and Monthly Review. L (1873), PP« 193-213; Monot J. Savage,
The Religion of Evolution. I870; G. E. Wright, "Recent Works
(Continued on the following page)
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Prior to 1859 men had sought for the evidence of design
in nature and had therein found proof not only of the exist¬
ence of God but of His providential plans as well. This whole
conception was now challenged. Darwin's theory seemed to show
that blind nature was working out its destiny through the
chance results of a relentless struggle for existence. Thus
the very foundations of Christian faith seemed to be
threatened.
At first the doctrine of evolution shocked not only
the theologians but the scientists as well. It was denounced
vigorously by Jean Louis Agassiz, the distinguished Harvard
zoologist. He denounced the theory almost as vigorously as
did Charles Hodge, who declared "that a more absolutely
incredible theory was never propounded for acceptance among
men.""'* Agassiz, whose Platonism undoubtedly colored his
(Continued)
Bearing on the Relation of Science to Religion," Bibliotheca
Sacra. XXXIII (1876), pp. M*8-*f93; 656-69^5 John T. Duffield,
"Evolution Respecting Man and the Bible," Princeton Review,
LIV (1878), pp. 150-177; F. Gardner, "The Bearing of Recent
Scientific Thought upon Theology," Bibliotheca Sacra. XXXVI
(1880), pp. MS-76; Henry Ward Beecher, Evolution and Religion,
New York, 1888; James McCosh, The Religious Aspects of Evolu¬
tion. New York, 1888: Lyman Abbott, The Theology of an Evolu¬
tionist. Boston, 189/; James T. Bixby, The Ethics of Evolution.
Boston, 1900; Windsor Hall Roberts, The Reaction of American
Protestant Churches to the Darwinian Philosophy, 1860-1900,
Chicago, 1938*
1 Charles Hodge, What Is Darwinism? New York, 1871*.
1**
scientific work, denied that one species can change into
another and asserted that all observable deviations from the
true character of a species are but ephemeral aberrations
possessing no particular significance. On the other hand,
Asa Gray, the renowned botanist, accepted evolution as a well-
1
established fact of nature; and Chauncey Wright, Darwin's
first enthusiastic disciple in America, "conceived a new type
of science of the mind, a new teleology, which would evaluate
consciousness, habits, manners, morals in terms of their
utility for the survival of the race," and which would consti-
2
tute "a synthesis of utilitarianism and Darwinism." Wright's
premature death prevented the completion of this project.
A number of American scientists accepted the theory of
evolution and expanded it into a general philosophical doc¬
trine. One of these men, Alexander Winchell,
... succeeded in telling the whole tale of evolu¬
tion in terms of a Universal Intelligence and Will,
so that the discovery of relentless law in nature
came, not as a shock, but as evidence of God's
Intelligence in choosing an orderly method of crea¬
tion from among 'the infinite storehouse of
1
Cf. Philip P. Wiener, Chauncey Wright, "Darwin, and
Scientific Neutrality," The Journal of the History of Ideas.
VI (19^5)> Chauncey Wright, Philosophical Discussions.
New York, 1877; John Fiske, Darwinism and Other Essays. 1878,
Ch. II, "Chauncey Wright."
2
Herbert W. Schneider, 4 History of American Philoso¬
phy, pp. 3^8-351#
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possible plans under which the Supreme Power
might have proceeded.'-1-
Winehell was particularly impressed by those "facts which show
the ideas of the far-off coming ages wandering in advance of
their time among the creations of an existing world, like
2
streaks of morning light," It is, he says,
• . • as if the thoughts of the Creator were
busied with the plans of the distant future,
while his hands are occupied with the work of
today. Thus were incorporated in the organisms
of one age hints of the features which were to
blossom and unfold in the dominant ideas of the
following one. Thus grew into being those
'prophetic types' which show that One Intelligence
has ordered creation—an intelligence,to which the
past and the future are both present,-5
"Pointing out the improbability of many organisms varying
together in such a manner as to make Darwinian natural selec¬
tion operative," Winchell argued that "natural selection
itself must have been designed"; and emphasizing the fact
that "natural selection is merely 'residual effect,' not
'an innate impulse,'" and that it is "a truism to assert that
'the weakest go under,"' he maintained that "it is not the
struggle itself but some other cause which makes animals fit
Ibid.T p. 353• See also Alexander Winchell, Sketches
of Creation. New York, 1870; Alexander Winchell, The Doctrine
of Evolution. New York, 187m-; Alexander Winchell, Walks and
Talks in the Geological Field. 1886.
2
Winchell, Sketches of Creation, pp. 319-320.
3 Loc. cit.
16
to survive in the struggle."1 The "other cause," says
Winchell, Is that "Being whose existence is before all," that
2
"Supreme Intelligence," the "Author of Nature"—God.
Winchell believes that this "Supreme Intelligence"
permeates the whole of nature; for "Nature has not only antic¬
ipated the coming of man, but has contemplated the exercise
of human intelligence. How few of the benefits which Nature
affords have been reached without study and thought!"^ Matter
was "endowed with all its capacities of benefit to the human
race," but not without "design that those benefits should be
secured and enjoyed." According to Winchell, "this is tanta¬
mount to saying that the provisions of Nature prophesy a
reasoning mind." Thus, Winchell continues,
We may venture to go much farther than this and
assert that the material of thought which Nature
furnishes is correlated to the thinking principle
of man. When the Creator adopted an intelligent
method in the ordinations of the material world, it
was equivalent to a declaration of purpose to intro¬
duce an intelligent being. And when the Creator had
stocked the world with the materials of thought, and
had planted in it a being capable of understanding
Nature, it was the obvious purpose of the Deity that
Nature should be investigated, and that, by such
investigations, man should become not only wiser,
but more reverent, religious and happy.4"
1 Schneider, op. cit.. pp. 356-357*
2 Winchell, Walks and Talks. p. 316.
3 Winchell, Sketches of Creation, p. 336.
h
Ibid., p. 337.
E. HITCHCOCK, MCCOSH, AND BASCOM
During I872-I873 Tyndall was invited to lecture in
America by the advocates of the doctrine of evolution.
Thomas H. Huxley came over from England in 1876, and Herbert
Spencer arrived in 1882. With increasing volume evolution
became a topic that was discussed everywhere in America.
Two distinct points of view became increasingly dis¬
cernible as the controversy advanced. On the one hand,
interest in physics began to encroach upon the interest in
biology;1 and wherever this happened "the leadership in
speculation based on scientific findings passed from Spencer
to Ernst Haeckel." Purpose "disappeared from the grim face
of the material universe," and "the benevolent evolutionism
of Spencer" gave way to "the mechanistic materialism of
2
Haeckel." Disillusionment and pessimism followed.
In America, however, the overwhelming trend pointed in
the opposite direction. James McCosh of Princeton saw in
3
evolution God's continuous act of creation, and John Bascom
rejoiced in the breadth of view and boundless hope with which
1
Parrington, ojd. cit.. II, p. 202.
p
Loc. cit.
3 J. McCosh, Religious Aspects of Evolution, p.
"It makes God continue the work of creation, and if God's
creation be a good work, why should He not continue it?"
18
1
the doctrine of evolution invests its believer.
The general point of view of these religious
thinkers had been foreshadowed by Edward
Hitchcock, professor of natural history and
chemistry at Amherst College, who in 1857 pub¬
lished a book entitled Religious Truth, Illus¬
trated from Science.2
In a chapter dealing with "The Relations and Mutual Duties
between the Philosopher and the Theologian,"^ he said:
The grand distinction between the Bible and
all other professed revelations is, not that has
anticipated scientific discoveries, but that
there is nothing in its statements which those
discoveries contradict or invalidate.
True there seemed to be irreconcilable conflicts between
science and religion but,
Christianity stands on too firm and broad a
base to be overturned by one or a hundred such
blows as have hitherto been aimed against it.
The true policy is to wait for a time, to see
whether we fully understand the new views, and
whether they conflict^with the letter or the
spirit of revelation.5
Suppose it should happen, continues Hitchcock, that the
empirical evidence relied upon in the sciences leads to con¬
clusions which, on the face of it, contradict statements in
^ J. Bascom, Evolution and Religion, or Faith as £
Part of a Complete Cosmic System. 1897.
2
Werkmeister, og. cit., p. 85.
3 Written in 1852.
** E. Hitchcock, Religious Truth. Illustrated from
Science, p. 67*
5 Ibid.T p. 80.
19
the Bible.
Is it quite certain that we must give up
the Bible, or its more important doctrines?
Would the discrepancy appear so great as it
did when the Copernican system was first
announced? Shame on us, that we feel so fear¬
ful in respect to God's Word, and those eternal
truths that form the groundwork of the scheme
of salvation!1
In 1888 James MeCosh published his Bedell Lectures
under the title The Religious Aspects of Evolution. As
McCosh sees it, the "problem" of evolution is ultimately not
the alternative, God or not-God, but the alternative, "God
working without means or by means, the means being created
2
by God and working for him." He finds that "there is nothing
atheistic in the creed that God proceeds by instruments.""^
Furthermore, McCosh at once transcends the biological theory
of evolution and interprets the new doctrine in its cosmic
sweep, accepting the Kant-Laplace "nebular hypothesis" con¬
cerning the origin of the earth and tracing in broad outline
the development from primordial nebular mass to the appearance
of man on a firm earth. He says: "In all this God is working,
not by special interferences, but by the natural causes which
h
develop into effects—in other words, by evolution."
1 IM£., P. 93.
^ McCosh, The Religious Aspects of Evolution, p. 3»




In the process as a whole "there is what scientists call a
system, what Platonists call an idea, what theologians call
1 2
design or purpose." "It is produced by God."
McCosh urges emphatically that his readers "look on
3
evolution simply as the method by which God works" because,
says he:
God executes his purposes by agents, which, it
should be observed, he has himself appointed, we
are not therefore to argue that he does not con¬
tinue to act, that he does not now act. ... He
is still in his works, which not only were created
by him but have no power without his indwelling.
Though an event may have been ordained from all
eternity, God is as much concerned in it as if he
only ordained it now. God acts in his works now
quite as much as he did in their original creation.
The effects follow, the product is evolved.4-
McCosh points out that evolution is a method "not
5
unworthy of God." He finds that it is "suited to man's
6
nature," and that "it accomplishes some good ends." Moreover
it secures order and adaption in nature and assures progres¬
sion. He is confident that:
The theory of Evolution does not undermine or
interfere in any way with the ordinary doctrine of
1 Ibid.. d. 33
2 Loc. cit.
3 Ibid., d. 58
h Ibid.. t>. 59
5 Ibid., d. 62
6 Loc. cit.
Final Cause. The adaption of one object or
agent to another and their cooperation to
accomplish a good end, to give life and plan
to the plant and comfort to the animal, are
fondly believed by the great body of mankind
to be a proof of design and of a designing
mind. The force of the argument is not
lessend by the circumstance that the skillful
structures have been inherited.^
McCosh is not prepared to "employ an argument from
Evolution as furnishing the primary proof of the existence
2
of God"; but he is certain that "those who believe in God
on other grounds may trace in the development of Nature evi¬
dence of his wisdom and goodness.Therefore, evolution
does not undermine the Christian's faith in God but is "in
thorough harmony with all the other operations of Nature,
showing the evidently designed adaptions of one thing to
if
another in the past and in the present." We see in it
"certain subordinate ends planned and executed, always under
the highest end, the manifestation of the wisdom and goodness
5
of God."
Hoe does man fit into this evolutionary scheme of
nature? McCosh replies: "Man is undoubtedly an animal. • •
But he is higher than the animal, and is allied to
1 Ibid., p. 69.
2 Ibid.j p. 70.
3 Loc. cit.





If anyone ask me if I believe man's body to
have come from a brute, I answer that I know
not. I believe in revelation, I believe in
science, but neither has revealed this to me;
and I restrain the weak curiosity which would
tempt me to inquire into what cannot be known.
Meanwhile I am sure, and I assert, that man's 2 3
soul is of a higher origin and of a nobler type. '
James McCosh's view was defended by other religious
leaders of the time. Henry Ward Beecher, for example, argued
in much the same vein as did McCosh that evolution is merely
"the deciphering of God's thought as revealed in the structure
if
of the world." These religious leaders, men like McCosh and
Beecher, were satisfied that evolution as God's method of
creation was perfectly reconcilable with religion, i.e., with
traditional Christianity. But these men and others like them
forgot only too readily the radical change in the conception
of nature which the theory of evolution entailed. They were
concerned only with the preservation and defense of orthodox
tenets of faith in the face of new scientific discoveries,
and thus did not fully comprehend the revolution in the point
1
Ibid., p. 102.
2 Ibid., pp. 103-10lf.
3 When McCosh wrote these lines, Darwin's book, The
Descent of Man, published 1871, had been available for twenty
years•
k
H. W. Beecher, Evolution and Religion. 1885, pp. *+5-
*+6.
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of view forced by the doctrine of evolution.
This was not the case of John Bascom. He realized
that "evolution greatly alters" the widely accepted view "of
a physical world possessed of its own ultimate qualities, and
subject, like material in the hands of a builder, to construc¬
tive processes foreign to it."1 Fearlessly and in an impas¬
sioned manner he drew the consequences from this new under¬
standing. "The world," he said, "is not so much a construction
2
as a growth." The realization that this is so, he claims,
necessitates an adjustment in our thinking of such magnitude
as was never before compelled by a scientific discovery.
This adjustment^Bascom makes under the concept of
"spiritual" evolution. Unlike McCosh, however, he does not
merely attempt to show that the theory of evolution in the
biological sciences does not contradict the basic tenets of
the Christian faith, but goes on to make evolution the
"touchstone of religion itself and uses the idea of evolution
as the key to broad interpretations of the social and spiri¬
tual life of man.""^ In summary he says:
The world moves on; this is the very substance,
the underlying condition, of knowledge. But
1
Bascom, Evolution and Religion, or Faith as a Part of
a Complete System. 1897. pp. 1-2.
2 Ibid.. p. 2.
3 Werkmeister, op. cit.« p. 9^.
2k
whither does it so certainly and obviously move
as toward a spiritual life ever renewed by
invisible relations with God and with man? Here
is a creation that compacts the world into one
purpose and discloses the power of all that has
been done, and all that remains to be done—a
creation which is the embodied wisdom and love
of God. When we discover evolution as the
dynamic force of truth, the Spirit of Truth
begins to disclose all things to us. The
nidus of the world, physical and spiritual, lies
before us.1
F. THE COSMIC PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FISKE
Prior to the War of Secession, heated controversies
concerning the original unity or diversity of the human race
were disturbing the intellectual life of the new republic.
As previously mentioned, in the midst of these controversies
Darwin's theory of evolution became known among scientists
and theologians. The reaction among the latter was sharply
divided and violently partisan. In the beginning of the con¬
troversies the voices condemning the new theory as an atheistic
heresy predominated. But, as it became increasingly evident
that no amount of high-sounding condemnation could destroy
the empirical evidence which supports the scientific theory,
"more and more theologians accepted evolution and tried to
2
reconcile it with the tenets of traditional church doctrine."
1
Bascom, op. cit.. p. 205.
p
Werkmeister, op. cit.. p. 95
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The problem became especially urgent, however, when in 1871,
Darwin followed up his thesis On the Origin of Species by
drawing out its logical implications with respect to man and
by including The Descent of Man in the evolutionary scheme
of things.
We have seen that the "problem of man" led McCosh to
a cautiously restricted acceptance of evolution as God's
"means of creating" all that exists below the level of man,
but led Bascom to a radical and impassioned conception of a
cosmic development which engulfs man, the realm of the
spirit, and religion itself in its evolutionary sweep. We
shall now consider briefly how the same problem is dealt
with by John Fiske in his "Cosmic Philosophy." John Fiske,^
America's most outstanding disciple of Herbert Spencer, was
one of the most influential thinkers of the time.
Fiske's most influential work was his Outlines of
2
Cosmic Philosophy Based on the Doctrine of Evolution. It is
this work which characterizes John Fiske, and makes him known
3
to his contemporaries as the "cosmic" philosopher.
££• J* s* Clark, The Life and Letters of John Fiske.
2 vols., 1917; Ethel F. Fiske (editor), The Letters of
John Fiske, 19^0.
2 The first edition of this book appeared in 187^. The
influence it had will be shown that by 1890 it had gone into
its eleventh edition.
3 Fiske received Bowne's critical attention. In an
article, "The Cosmic Philosophy, by John Fiske, a Review,"
(Continued on the following page)
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Unlike Bowne, Fiske closely followed Herbert Spencer.
There is no doubt a great deal of truth in Schneider's con¬
tention that "Fiske was learned, but not inventive; he did
little more than expound Spencer's philosophy from the point
of view of enthusiasm for cosmic theism.""1" In the end,
however, Fiske was compelled to go beyond Spencer's ideas in
much the same way in which, earlier in his career, he had
gone beyond Compte. Fiske's "fundamentally religious inter¬
ests could not be satisfied within the framework of Spencer's
2
own ideas."
The outcome of Fiske's argument is that an investiga¬
tion of the theory of evolution leaves us "not Atheism or
Positivism, but a phase of Theism which is higher and purer,
because relatively purer, than the anthropomorphic phase
^ (Continued)
Methodist Review, 58 (1876), pp. 655-678, Bowne commended
Cosmic Philosophy for its freshness and vigor of style and
for originality of treatment. But in spite of Fiske's
excellencies as an expositor Bowne found his work vitiated by
the Spencerian fallacies. While Bowne rejoiced in Fiske's
theistic convictions he lamented that Fiske was illogically
wedded to Herbert Spencer. Asked for an opinion of Fiske's
Through Nature to God. Bowne replied that he had not read
the book and that it was not worth reading. Bowne regarded
Fiske's virtual abandonment of Philosophy for American History
as a confession of failure in the philosophic field.
"*•
Schneider, oja. cit•, p. 323.
2
Werkmeister, op. cit., p. 96.
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defended by theologians."1 "The Deity, in so far as absolute
and infinite, is inscrutable, and every hypothesis of ours
concerning nature and attributes can serve only to illustrate
2
our mental impotence." On the other hand, "the Universe in
itself is likewise inscrutable"; "the vast synthesis of
forces without us . . . can never be known by us as it exists
3
objectively." Since, says he, both Deith and Cosmos are
if
"alike inscrutable." Fiske reaches the conclusion that
... there exists a POWER, to which no limit in
time or space is conceivable, of which all
phenomena, as presented in consciousness, are
manifestations, but which can know only through
these manifestations.5
And this Absolute Power may well be called God. Moreover
... the God of the scientific philosopher is
still, and must ever be, the God of the Christian,
though freed from the illegitimate formulas by
the aid of which theology has sought to render
Deity comprehensible."
For Fiske in so far as it is a secret, it is God; but
in so far as it is open, it is the World. "In thus regarding
1
John Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy Based on




** Ibid., II, p. ^-13.
^ Ibid., II, p. lfl5.
6 Ibid.. II, pp. If21~tf23.
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the ever-changing universe of phenomena as the multiform
revelation of an Omnipresent Power, we can in nowise identify
the Power with its manifestations. • . . While the universe
is the manifestation of Deity, yet is Deity something more
1
than the universe."
In using the phrase "Cosmic Theism" to denote the
religious phase of a philosophy based upon the doctrine of
evolution, Fiske does not mean to use it as descriptive of a
new form of religion which is to supersede Christianity.
Rather he uses it "as descriptive of that less-anthropomorphic
phase of religious theory into which the present more-
2
anthropomorphic phase is likely to be slowly metamorphosed."
Fisk's "cosmic philosophy" was significant for his
contemporaries and valuable in making the theory of evolution
acceptable, but
... it has found no continuation in schools of
thought prevalent in America. When the foundations
of Spencer's comprehensive system were demolished
in the course of critical analysis, Fiske's own
system was deprived of its epistemological basis,
and having lost its support in the doctrine of





3 Werkmeister, op. cit.. p. 102.
G. HERBERT SPENCER
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But it is impossible to by-pass Herbert Spencer and
have any fair understanding of the intellectual atmosphere
in 1872. Men then sensed themselves as on the edge of momen¬
tous changes in thinking. Disturbing currents were running
the world over. In Europe the revolutions of IS1^ had left
their mark in the social consciousness; the wars connected
with Napoleon III had roused a vast questioning; the rise of
Germany was a portent hailed and execrated by adverse camps
alike astonished; and with the unsettling in national and
racial and social realms in America, men were ready for a new
philosophy. The steps toward the new statement were prepared
by the publication of Darwin*s work, but it is not too much to
say that there is very little in Darwin's publications to
warrant the agnostic and even atheistic doctrines which others
based upon them.
With all the world-currents making for questioning,
with the clue to an interpretation of an immense sum of physi¬
cal processes supplied by Charles Darwin, the conditions were
ripe for Herbert Spencer. Spencer is a veritable voice of
his time, of huge volume, all in one tone, without exactness
of articulation or delicacy of shading. He is the "outcome
of vast social forces which lumber along awkwardly without
any nice fitting of part to part, and often with one part
30
directly opposing another.""*" The "time" craved for relief
from everything suggestive of subtlety and Spencer could not
be called subtle. Downright common sense seemed to be in
order, with emphasis on what men could see and hear. Spencer
seemed to meet that demand. The philosophy of Kant and the
great German idealists, powerful as it no doubt was in Germany,
had not obtained wide acceptance in England, and the utter¬
ances of common-sense schools of the Sir William Hamilton
type had always seemed cramped and uninteresting. Spencer
would not allow himself to be tinctured with what he called
the "insanities of idealism," and he was neither cramped nor
uninteresting.
When the synthetic philosophy first began to make
headway the orthodox theologians and orthodox philosophers
met it with a "volley of shudders." They allowed themselves
to be browbeaten into silence before the swaggering confidence
of these first disciples of evolution. Of course they were
amused at the attacks of the church-men who had nothing but
impreciations in their arsenal.
The atmosphere of thought in that day was further dis¬
turbed by the penetrating eyes of historical criticism. Some¬
thing of the spirit of the age is caught in a paragraph by
Charles Bertram Pyle:
McConnell, op. cit., p. 53*
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Science advance with victorious feet in sweep¬
ing conquest of the world. It was discovered
that the universe is not ruled by caprice but
governed by law. Nature became a vast self-
running mechanism operated by force. The more
law the less of God was the cry! With the dawn
of law God began to fade from the memory of men.
New facts came asking for new interpretations.
Old notions were dissolved in the crucible of
swift and eager thought. Grass grew in the paths
of the ancients because these paths were no longer
traveled. New departures were made destined to
direct the oncoming thought of man. Evolution,
transformation of species, the reign of law, were
so interpreted as to threaten the higher faith of
men. Historical criticism adopting its method
from the spirit of evolution turned its penetrating
eyes upon the sacred literature of the world and
reduced them to purely human records of spiritual
aspirations and hopes. Beginnings were so dwelt
upon that ends were lost. Savagery cast discredit
upon civilization, and religion supposed to have
begun in dream and fancy, diminished respect for
its later and higher forms. An unsympathetic com¬
parative study of religion disparaged Christianity
while it failed to exalt other religions. Man was
not the offspring of God but of 'condensed matter
and evolving gas.'1
H. BOSTON ENVIRONMENT
Leaving the problem of evolution and higher criticism,
we proceed to discuss other factors in Bowne's environment.
Bowne spent most of his life in the intellectual atmosphere of
Boston. This atmosphere was characterized by two significant
phases which conditioned religious thought. In one phase it
Charles Bertram Pyle, The Philosophy of Borden Parker
Bowne. pp. 16-17. In this same connection Bowne said: "The
new wine of science and evolution went to the head and produced
many woes and more babblings." Personalism. p. 25.
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was a revolt from traditional Puritan theology with its highly
anthropomorphic and "angry God," like that of Jonathan .Edwards,
and in the other phase it was an effort to provide a more
liberal and tenable basis for Christian faith. The first
phase was evident in the rise of New England Unitarianism, the
second might be called "liberal Orthodox," or even Methodistic.
Both were opposed to a rigid Calvinism. The Unitarian phase,
theistic at first, tended more and more toward pantheism. It
was a revolt from an inhuman God whose attitudes would be con¬
demned in a human being. To save God, it was argued, he must
be impersonal. On the other hand, the liberally orthodox
could not brook the loss of the Fatherhood of God. Unitarian¬
ism was turned from the road of its founders by becoming the
opposition party to orthodoxy and so of denial and negation.
"In spite of Emerson and his transcendentalists there
was a strain of practicality in the New England character which
could not make general the transition from the realistic funda¬
mentalism of Calvin's definite pictures of Heaven, Hell, Judg¬
ment with its specific formulas of "escape," to a vague
depersonalized God and a worship of the All in which person¬
ality and immortality were dissolved.""*"
x
Ralph Tyler Flewelling, "Studies in American Personal-
ism," The Personalist, Vol. XXXI, No. *f, October, 1950, p. 3*fl.
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To practical Americans such a faith seemed little more
than a fad or a cult.
Whatever William T. Harris had to offer was thrown
into the New England scale. It was there that his heart was
set, partly from his New England origin and education, partly
from his admiration Alcott. Thus he was led to active par¬
ticipation in the Transcendental School at Concord.
As Alcott sought increasingly to emphasize the
personalist position as an offset to pantheism,
so also Harris attempted to solve the absolute
paradox by positing a personality which was abso¬
lute in the sense of being self-transcendent and
capable of infinite growth.1
Both Harris and Alcott opposed the pantheistic tenden¬
cies of the Transcendentals in favor of what later became
known as "personalism." Harris displayed his antipantheism
in the phrase: "All positive forms, all forms of immediate-
ness or being, all forms of identity are self-relations." In
addressing the Concord School on July 30, 1885, he laid down
the differences between transcendentalism, pantheism, and his
personal theism:
To him who sees the necessity of unity, but
finds it a mere essence or substance from which
things in their multiplicity arise, and into
which they return, there is pantheism. Finally




than this, sees too the necessity of the form
of personality as the form of any ultimate
unity or totality.!
To Harris the Supreme Absolute finds its absoluteness, not
in a limiting immanence, but rather in its capacity for
infinite progress, through a transcendent self-realization
2
by which through all change it preserves its self-identity.
"Self-modification is self-preservation."
Out of the earlier movements sprang the fuller recog¬
nition of personalism as a philosophy in New England. In
this Boston environment it became the distinguishing charac-
3
teristic of William James' psychology.
I. ULRICI AND LOTZE
This brief survey of the world in which Bowne lived
must suffice with the statement that his world included the
world of Ulrici and Lotze with whom he studied for two years.
Bowne's relation to these two men is treated in Chapter II.
1 T. H. Harris, "Is Pantheism the Legitimate Outcome
of Modern Science," Journal of Speculative Philosophy,
vol. xix, pp. kov-hoa.
2
Ibid.T p. 193.
3 William James's influence on Bowne will be treated
in the section: "Bownes1 Religious Pragmatism."
CHAPTER II
THE LIFE OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE
A. HIS ANCESTRY AND EARLY HOME LIFE
Borden Parker Bowne was born in Leonardville, Monmouth
County, New Jersey, January 1^, 18^-7, and died in Boston,
April 1, 1910. He was the son of Joseph Bowne and Margaret
Parker Bowne. ^
Bowne's immigrant ancestors on his father's side can
be traced back to William Bowne and wife Ann who came to
Salem, Massachusetts in 1631. They were English Puritans who
left England because of religious persecution. They were
granted forty acres of land at Jeffries Creek in 1636. After
living there for some years, William Bowne and his three sons
moved to Monmouth County, New Jersey. His three sons were
named John, James, and Andrew.
The three sons of William Bowne were prominent in the
settlement of Monmouth County. John was a patentee in the
famous Monmouth Patent issued by Governor Nichols, an agent
for the Duke of York who had received from Charles II a grant
of land comprising all New Jersey. John Bowne was also a
Kate Bowne, "An Intimate Portrait of Bowne," The
Personalist. Vol. II, No. 1, January 1921, pp. 5-15* The
ancestral background of Borden Parker Bowne is taken from
this article written by his wife.
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deputy to the first assembly in 1668; again a deputy in 1675;
•was in the first legislature, and in 1683 speaker of the
house. He was one of the founders of the Baptist Church of
Middletoun in 1668, This was the first church of that faith
in New Jersey, He gave the lot of land on which the church
was built and preached the first sermon when the church was
dedicated, John's brother Andrew was a member of Governor
Hamilton's Council in 1692, was appointed Deputy Governor of
New Jersey by Governor Bass in 1699; in 1701 was made Governor
of Eastern New Jersey, and in 1703 was commissioned by Queen
Anne a member of Cornbury's Council, James Bowne, the other
brother and direct ancestor of Borden Parker Bowne, was one
of the interpreters at the first purchase of lands from the
Indians,
He was later a Minister of Justice and held
various offices of honor and trust both by
appointment and election which he filled with
ability, integrity, and to the complete satisfac¬
tion of the people.1
In fact,
... he held some difficult positions from the
time of being an interpreter until his death
and was one of the most prominent men of Monmouth
County in his time.2






on inherited acres. He was not only a farmer but a local
preacher and Justice of the Peace, a man widely respected who
settled the disputes and made wills of the neighborhood. He
was a man of unusual common sense, fond of books, public
spirited, a strong abolitionist, and a devoted adherent to
the cause of temperance, "And this at a time when nearly
every home had a sideboard loaded with wines and spiritous
liquors, especially in anticipation of the minister."^ Bowne's
father was a man of deep piety, stolid with a deep moral sense,
and a man of few words. When he did speak he spoke forcefully
and to the point. This he did on the question of temperance
and slavery.
Borden Parker Bowne always spoke of his mother,
Margaret, with the deepest respect. This, of course, was also
true of his father Joseph Bowne, Nothing in the memory of his
early days seems to becloud his admiration for them. His
mother was no less solid in righteousness but seems to have
possessed a strong vein of mysticism as well. This strain of
2
mysticism was "probably due to her Quaker antecedents." She
reflected the stress on "entire sanetification" emphasized in
Methodism of one hundred years ago. The Guide to Holiness,
published monthly, was carefully read and cherished by Bowne's
•** Ibid., p. 7»
2 Ibid., p. 8.
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mother. In this publication the reader was introduced to the
1
writings of such mystics as Fenelon and Madam Guyon.
The home of Borden Parker Bowne was a Methodist home.
He became acquainted early with the traveling Methodist
preachers whose characters were far from ideal. The laziness,
coarseness, and "dram" handling of the tobacco chewing fron¬
tier preachers did not escape the attention of the sensitive
young Bowne. Bowne was reared in a home—
... where the solid virtues of the Methodist
itinerants were not by any means overlooked,
but there were some preachers whose virtues were
not solid. The roughness which had its place
on the frontier often degenerated into coarseness
in communities which had left the frontier condi¬
tions behind.2
Too many scenes not complimentary to the clergy were burned
into his memory for life. In his Methodist home Bowne felt
the peculiar views the laymen had in those days. Plainness
was a badge of Methodist loyalty. The people lived in sim¬
plicity as a protest against worldliness. All of this built
up an artificial standard of Christian living. From his boy¬
hood days Bowne revolted against this tendency to
Francis John McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne. p. 13-
Mrs. Bowne, holding exhalted views of her husband, success¬
fully forestalled the writing of Bowne's biography.
F. J. McConnell was finally allowed to write. His candid
admission of flaws in Bowne*s life and thought received
severe criticism from Mrs. Bowne.
2 Ibid., p. 15.
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artificiality in religious ethics.
Some of his later-day protests against
professedly Christian standards came out of
juvenile reaction against the exactness of
the mechanized ethics which he saw working
their customary moral havoc in the Jersey
community.1
In his youth, Borden Parker Bowne had a happy life
with ample exercise for both brain and body. He read widely
but no particular books stand out in the foreground as having
been more helpful than others in shaping and influencing his
life, except the Bible with which he was "saturated." He was
never a passive reader nor was he ever unduly impressed by
book authorities not supported by reason. He had all a healthy
boy's love of play, running with the swiftest and shouting with
the loudest 5 but in addition to this he was thoughtful beyond
2
his years and very fond of conversing with older people. He
was shy and sensitive.
As a very little boy the reading of death-bed
stories so keenly affected his imagination that
he often left his play and ran home from school
at recess time in order to make sure that his
blessed mother was alive.3
The first seventeen years of Bowne's life were spent




Kate Bowne, op. cit•, p. 12.
3 Loc. cit.
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close contact of the children with each other brought out into
expression the strong characteristics of each. This boyhood
home by the seaside was vividly engraved on Bowne's memory
and furnished a storehouse of apt illustrations which were
later drawn upon to clarify the profoundest teachings of
philosophy. In his later years Bowne used to say that having
passed his boyhood near the sea with his windows looking out
upon salt water, he did not believe he could ever live
happily far from the ocean; and if fate compelled him to
return to the homestead of his boyhood, after he had reached
the age of sixty, he could contentedly live out his remaining
1
days among the early memories. In one of the leading reli¬
gious publications of his day we are given an example of how
Bowne drew on boyhood memories to illustrate Philosophy:
The veriest crank has but to label himself a
scientist to gain prestige with the untrained.
This fact has made science, scientist, and scien¬
tific the great question-begging epithets of our
time. The logical state of the case is well
illustrated by the following legend out of the
region of my childhood: There was in that region
a family of wealth and social prestige by the name
of Hartshorne. On one occasion there had been a
drawing of the seine, resulting in an apostolic
draught of fishes. These were sent across the bay
to the New York market in charge of a hired man,
to whom, as often happens with the servants in
wealthy families, the name of his employer was
above every name. But the day was hot, and the
fish spoiled; and when the clerk of the market,
1
McConnell, op. cit., p. 10,
as the inspector was then called, came around,
he ordered the man in charge of the fish to
remove them. Now, to the hired man, this inter¬
ference was something incredible, and, thinking
to end the matter by a great stroke, he bawled
out, "My name's Hartshorne." But the inspector
was a person of much uncircumcision of heart
and speech, and there was no fear of Hartshorne
before his eyes. Accordingly, he made the
unfeeling reply: "Hartshorne or the devil's
horn, you can't sell that stuff here."
Which thing is an allegory. The man's name
was not Hartshorne, and if it had been, the fish
were spoiled nevertheless. In like manner we
have many persons of slender gifts who are fond
of giving themselves out as scientists and their
crude imaginings as science; and when the critic
complains of the product, their favorite device
is to arrogate to themselves the prestige of
science by assuming the name. But as in the case
of the hired man of the legend, they have no
right to the name; and in any case the stuff is
bad. We need, then, to be on our guard against
this undiscriminating faith, and try both the
sciences and the scientists as well as the
spirits.1
Bowne's sensitive conscience was undoubtedly influ¬
enced in no small way by the strict moral climate in which
he was reared as a boy. He persistently asked questions
regarding the Tightness and wrongness of certain things. At
a tender age he so seriously took the duty of telling the
truth that for a period he wondered if he could honestly
reply when people asked him the time of day. For the instant
the question is answered the hands of the clock have moved
and the answer is no longer true. The youthful Bowne got
^ The Christian Advocate. December 20, 189^.
[%0M
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past this overrefinement but interesting traces of his child¬
ish reasoning can be seen when he discusses Zeno's flying
1
arrow*
There is little doubt that Bowne's life on the farm
influenced his philosophical thinking* When he announced his
doctrine of what he called "objective idealism" many critics
said that such a doctrine could only be the fine-spun intellec¬
tual web of a mind that had never known close contact with
actual things. Kicking stones and pounding on the ground has
been the favorite answer of crude common sense to idealism
since the days of Doctor Johnson. Such common sense overlooks
the force of the word "objective" as describing idealism.
Bowne never tired of saying that in any sound idealism we must
recognize an order outside of ourselves which we do not make
but find. The actual working with plants and weeds, the close
observation of weathers and seasons, does not often make for
idealistic philosophy. It is here altogether too manifest
that we are dealing with a natural scheme of things which we
do not make but find. For that objectivity Bowne had most
thorough respect. Whatever the philosophy, he insisted, it
must start from the actual world and never lose sight of that
world.
1
Borden Parker Bowne, Metaphysics.
B. AMERICAN EDUCATION
**3
Bowne's education began in the simple elementary school
of his day. The school would not be judged as of a high order
compared with the schools of a later day but they did succeed
in introducing the students to solid books. Borden Parker
Bowne read so much in Don Quixote and Gil Bias that he almost
committed them to memory. Along with good books he was
taught lessons of order which were important. The iron
rigidity of law in the unnatural quiet of the schoolroom was
brought out by the stiffness of the regulations which made
whispering a deadly offence. This early classroom experience
evidently impressed Bowne for one of his own students remarks
that "there always was a trace of iron in the blood of Bowne
as a pedagogical disciplinarian."1
Bowne's determination to go to New York University
necessitated a year of hard study at Pennington Seminary. He
studied fourteen hours every day. In later years he said
that he would have killed himself if he had not been blessed
with immense vitality. But he was avidly interested in all
of the necessary subjects and passed the entrance tests with
distinction.
Bowne was matriculated at New York University as
^
McConnell, op. cit., p. 20.
Iflf
entering "privately tutored." The days were happy ones and
passed quickly. He was graduated, June, 1871. His scholastic
record is best told by a copy of his college transcript.
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Name: Bowne, Borden Parker
Date of Matriculation, September 17} 1867
Course, Arts
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^ Supplied by Registrar at New York University
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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (Continued)
Name; Bowne, Borden Parker
Junior Year. 1869-70 Senior Year. 1870-71
3rd Term 3rd Term
Greek 98 Inter. Law 93
Logic 100 Physics 99
Oratory 100 Chemistry 98
Astronomy.......... 100 Annual Grades 97*9%
Annual Grades...... 98.3$
General Average for Whole Course, 96.3$
Degree Conferred—Bachelor of Arts, 1871
By vote of the faculty at its meeting on May 19, 1871,
Mr. Bowne was assigned the Valedictory.
While a student at New York University, Bowne received
a number of honors for excellence in Latin, Greek, and Mathe¬
matics. He received a special prize for the greatest improve¬
ment in the first two years of his college course and a prize
for the greatest excellence in the entire period of study.
In fact, Bowne had the "highest record of any man that ever
1
graduated from New York University." In 1876 he received
2
the Master of Arts degree and in 1906 the honorary degree,
Doctor of Laws.
^ Kate Bowne, op. cit•, p. 11.
2
Ibid., p. 12. "During his college course his inter¬
est in philosophical subjects showed itself in such essays as:
Utility versus Intuition and The Reconeiliation of Science and
Religion in a Better Doctrine of Causality. These and others
of similar character foreshadowed the books that followed.
Professor Bowne had a deep understanding of physical science
having been instructed by the elder Draper, a man noted for
scientific research."
b6
The city life of New York greatly impressed the young
student from New Jersey. Especially was this true of the
orations he heard in the old Cooper Union. The influence of
these heated speeches on public issues left him very unfavor¬
able to oratory and very much alive to public questions. It
was Bowne's procedure to school himself against heated orators
and channel his interest in public matters through philosophi¬
cal writings. His Principles of Ethics"*" reveals the fruition
of much pondering on ethical questions. The basis of this
work on ethics was laid while he was a student at New York
University. Francis J. McConnell, a student and friend of
Bowne says:
He outlined the book which appeared in 1892 in
a sketch written in a student's blank-book in 1869
and 1870. He once read to me that outline. The
point of view was essentially that of the formal
treatment in I892.2
At the close of his New York University career Bowne
entered the New York Conference of the Methodist Episcopal
Church. He was made a local preacher in I867 and ordained a
local deacon by Bishop Simpson in 1872. His first charge was
Witestone, Long Island, a village of three thousand inhabi¬
tants. The church of eighty were of one accord in saying that
the young preacher's sermons were "over their heads." One of
1 Published in 1892.
2
Francis J. McConnell, op. cit., p. 30.
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Bowne's brothers who heard Bowne often, agreed with the con¬
gregation.
C. EUROPEAN EDUCATION
Borden Parker Bowne did not complete the first year of
his pastorate. Having received an opportunity to study
abroad he left his church and sailed for Europe. He did not
rejoin the New York East Conference until 1882.
A portion of a letter written to his mother from ship¬
board reveals something of the mind and spirit of the youthful
Bowne. This letter is written from the steamer Pembroke and
dated September 1873.
The captain took to me, and I to the captain.
We talked till midnight. We walked the deck by
the hour. We walked arm in arm and grew confiden¬
tial. He told me his history, and I told him my
plans. He voted me the queerest and most sensible
Methodist minister he ever saw, and I in turn put
him at the head of the captains. It grew to be a
joke with the passengers that we would suffer
greatly at parting.
On Sunday I talked in the cabin. I said that
religion does not aim to save us from the troubles
and reverses of life, that these come alike to all;
but that it aims to support us under them and to
teach us the divine purpose in them. I dwelt upon
the peace that flows like a river, and which passes
all understanding. I said that this, not outward
quiet, or prosperity, but this inward calm is the
great legacy of the Christian. "Peace I leave with
you, my peace I give unto you." Men wonder that
God's true child can keep his heart in such amid
the most distracting circumstances—the answer is—
"Peace I leave with thee."
Bowne studied chiefly In Paris, Halle, and Gttttingen,
1+8
but he was most reluctant to say anything about the incidental
side of his life abroad. His one interest was philosophy and
he assumed that that was all people would be interested in
hearing about.1 Occasionally, however, he shares experiences
of those exciting days in the seventies. Another letter
written to his mother, written from Halle, Prussia, reveals
that he had no easy time.
[i] live as the Dutch do. If you can't do that,
you will have to pay for all you get. But if one
has been used to restaurants, and has a cosmopolitan
stomach, he can come here and live cheaply. I came
here to [study] and put up with the inevitable. [I
buy] some rolls and put them in [my] coat-tail pocket,
and eat them without butter, as I go along the street.
Now, if one has not a stout heart, he will feel rather
home-sick when he tries such a meal, but if he is
crammed full of courage, he can enjoy it. A cold
room and a dry roll is not a feast, but one can make
it do. Still it requires some imagination to turn
it into a meal. . . . Don't, however, get the idea
that I live entirely on rolls. I have coffee in
the morning and dinner at noon. For the rest I use
the rolls. I am quite comfortable, and if my health
does not fail, shall need nothing more than I have.
While in France the young Bowne grew in thriftiness,
knowledge of French, and a complete disgust for the American
way of teaching foreign languages. In six months he learned
more about French than he had learned about Latin in six
years of study in America. This experience made him a harsh
critic of American language study methods.
The French habit of mind Bowne could never appreciate.
McConnell, ibid., p. 3*+
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He would say that the French systems of thought were like
well-sheared lawns. They were completely finished and beau¬
tifully kept, but were so planned and so cultivated as to
leave the onlooker without adequate discernment of what
nature really is, the artificiality hiding the truth. He did,
however, appreciate the logical thoroughness of the French
mind.
Bowne studied in Germany with Professor Ulrici and
Professor Lotze. In later years Bowne's indebtedness to
Ulrici did not reveal itself as clearly as his indebtedness
to Lotze. Ulrici, at one time desired to have Bowne translate
his works into English. In particular he wanted him to trans¬
late Gott und die Natur. The plan was not carried out.
Later, however, when Bowne published his Metaphysics. Ulrici
wrote to Bowne stating that Bowne's position was substantially
his. But Bowne never acknowledged any indebtedness to Ulrici
except for a line or two in the Introduction of his Studies
1
in Theism. Lotze's influence he readily acknowledged in the
Introduction of his volume, Metaphysics. Lotze himself
Borden Parker Bowne seldom quoted or gave documenta¬
tion in any of his writings. His failure to give sources has
raised suspicions on the part of able men. Professor Carroll
Dewitt Hildebrand of De Pauw University remarks that "Bowne's
debt to Ulrici in particular is much greater than his pub¬
lished works indicate. The reticence which characterizes his
acknowledgment of sources no doubt accounts in part for this."
The Personalist. Vol. XIII, No. 2 (April, 1932).
5o
always thought highly of Bowne and urged him to remain and
study for the Doctorate under him, but Bowne, never awed by
degrees, felt that he could spend neither the time nor the
money that it would involve.
Bishop F. J. McConnell relates an incident revealing
Lotze's admiration of Bowne:
One afternoon in student days Bowne called
on Lotze. As Bowne left, he called attention to
a heavy thunderstorm coming up the valley. "That
is nothing," said Lotze, "to the storm of question¬
ings you have raised in my mind concerning my own
philosophical system.1,1
The Germany of Bowne's University days he discussed
very little. Here as in France his major concern was
philosophy. This silence regarding social conditions is
remarkable considering Bowne's social consciousness and the
momentous days of Germany in 1873-1875* Germany was entering
on that career of material development made possible by the
victory over France. This prosperity and wealth coming from
the billion-dollar indemnity exacted from France was having
its effect in that momentous decade. All this Bowne must
have seen but of it he says nothing. It must be remembered,
however, that material prosperity had significance for him
only as an opportunity for the realization of the highest
human ideals. To him the important days of Germany were the
1
McConnell, ojd. cit., p. 37.
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days of the greater philosophies beginning with Kant, and of
the poets of whom Goethe was the leader. He delighted to
quote from memory the passages from Faust in which he found
perfect expression of some human moods. The lines having to
do with advice as to choice of one's profession, and especi¬
ally those voicing the gratification of the sense-bound
intellect at the positiveness of the physician's task, seemed
to him to set out with exquisite precision a recurring mood in
a well-marked human type.
In Germany he learned to assess educational values
apart from the "educational apparatus" with which the values
might or might not be set forth. "No great profusion of the
apparatus of Scholarship" was the phrase in which he once
described the circumstances in which a German Scholar worked.
The simplicity in which the German teachers worked made a
lasting impression on Bowne and marked all his subsequent
classroom work. He was accustomed to say that almost the
only significant question that could be asked about an
American University, which was making an effect on the public
mind by constant harping on material equipment, was; "Seest
thou what manner of stones and of buildings are here?"
Bowne brought back from Germany the authoritarian
method of teaching. He took an interest in his students but
he felt that the student should take the initial steps in
getting acquainted. It was his conviction that those "who
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had tendencies if not talents in the philosophical direction"
would seek him out on their own accord.
The period of study in Europe did not seem to weaken
the force of Bowne's inner convictions nor cool down his
religious intensity. His logical temper did bring him some
criticism. Many people thought him to be predominantly
rationalistic. Even William James referred three little
1 2
books which Bowne had published as "rationalistic," and
"*• The Atonement. The Christian Revelation. The Chris¬
tian Life.
2
William James, Varieties of Religious Experience.
p. 502, footnote 2. "Original men like Saint Francis, Luther,
Behraen, have usually been enemies of the intellects preten¬
sions to meddle with religious things. Yet the intellect,
everywhere invasive, shows everywhere its shallowing effect.
See how the ancient spirit of Methodism evaporates under
those wonderfully able rationalistic booklets (which everyone
should read) of a philosopher like Professor Bowne (The
Christian Revelation, The Christian Life, The Atonement).
Ralph Tyler Flewelling replies to the comment of
William James. He says: "James here assumes the common
fallacy that the highest type of mysticism comports with the
deepest ignorance and credulity. Thus he did an unintentional
injustice, both to Bowne and to Methodism. James's "ancient
Methodism" could not have been ancient enough to include that
of "the Holy Club" of Oxford and that of John Wesley, Fellow
in Philosophy, who managed, as did Bowne, to combine with
intelligence the highest type of religious fervor." The
Personalist.
To some extent, the words of William James were the
basis for Bowne being tried for heresy. Bowne wrote to James
in England expostulating him for his careless words. James
replied: "Your letter finds me in my nineteenth day of
immersement, with grippe, still weak as a 'cat,' both
cerebrally and muscularly, but a better Methodist than you,
I still believe, in spite of your efforts to persuade me to
the contrary. If the ass and the blatherskite succeed in
(Continued on the following page)
twitted Bowne that he, himself, was a better Methodist. Yet
inwardly Bowne was not rationalistic. This can be born out
by the endorsement of Bowne's "presiding elder." This par¬
ticular "presiding elder," Benjamin M. Adams, was a veritable
saint, after the soundest and noblest Methodist traditions.
"He had the temperament which lent itself to ecstatics, and
yet had also the good sense which judged such uplifts by what
happened after he returned to earth.Presiding Elder Adams
upon one occasion is said to have reported jubilantly that
Bowne, "the great metaphysician on my district enjoys reli-
2
gion." It would seem that the enjoyment had to be emphat¬
ically positive to win the praise of such a man as Adams.
There is no evidence to show that Bowne's religious "enjoy¬
ment" was dampened by his stay abroad. It is certainly true
that the European teachers opened up new fields of view, but
he was ready for those new fields and no teacher found it
necessary to request that he cast out prejudices or precon¬
ceptions. Yet no professor warped the mind of Bowne out of
2 (Continued)
their attempt to weed you out of the body, I hope that they
will have the wisdom to get me voted in to fill the vacuum.
Seriously speaking, I regret that my use of the word "ration¬
alistic" should in any way have added to your annoyance."
Perry, Thought and Character of William James, p. 331.




its own orbit. He received nothing passively. He did not
have that intellectual independence which fortifies itself
against new views, or holds them off for a season, but,
rather, of the type which seizes such views at once, to turn
them over repeatedly for critical scrutiny. If accepted
after scrutiny, they do not lose the marks of the handling
to which they have been subjected.
These years in Germany were years of notable philo¬
sophic writing by the young American student."** It was during
these years that he began a line of contributions to the
Methodist Review which continued until his death in 1910.
Almost every year he sent a carefully prepared philosophical
discussion running in length up to ten thousand words each.
All of these articles are worthy of permanent preservation
The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer was written during
his senior year at the university and afterward published in
the New Enelander. a magazine devoted to speculative subjects.
At the time its contributions were unsigned. President Noah
Porter of Yale University sought introduction to the youthful
author and from that hour became his admiring, devoted friend.
"In connection with this first published article there is
told a pleasing little story. As President Porter's guest
the young man was invited to a meeting of the New Haven clubs
composed mainly of college graduates. During the evening a
member who had read the article called out across the banquet
table: 'Which of you old graybeards has been demolishing
Herbert Spencer?' Great was the surprise and enthusiasm when
the young author was presented to them. It was an evening
devoted to the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Henry Ward
Beecher was present and took a lively part in the discussions
that followed." Kate Bowne, "An Intimate Portrait of Bowne,"
The Personalist. Vol. II, No. L (January, 1921), p. 13»
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both for matter and style. One of the articles which appeared
in the Review for 1871*- was a severe criticism of the views to
which David Frederick Strauss came at the closing years of
his life. The title of the article was "The Old Faith and
the New." After his book on Jesus, Strauss published a
philosophical formulation of which Bowne wrote a critical
review. When Strauss stepped out of his field of Biblical
research, he was an easy victim for the sharp philosophical
mind of young Bowne. Bowne had very little trouble proving
that the philosophy of Strauss was of the crudest sort. He
was resentful of the fine tributes that Strauss paid to the
older faith and quoted the dreadful sentence which describes
the crime of Jesus: "Hail, Master! and he kissed him."
This raises the question asked by many as to why Bowne was
so harsh and severe in his writings. According to Bishop
McConnell, Bowne's close friend and biographer, the answer
is that—
Bowne found it almost impossible to believe
that some of the arguments of the day were
advanced in good faith. They seemed so utterly
barren that he could not believe that the
reasoners were urging them seriously, except
with the seriousness of a desire to make a
plausible showing to deceive the intellectually
helpless. J-
Bowne could not understand how anyone could actually move
1
McConnell, ojd. cit., p. U-3.
into despair by such reasons assigned by Strauss. To him the
reasons advanced by Strauss were threadbare and insincere.
In judgements of this sort it is doubtful if Bowne
ever took account of anything except strictly philosophical
considerations. His method was to appraise systems by the
reasons assigned for them. No one could more clearly phrase
what he called "the natural history of atheism." By this he
meant the steps through which atheism ordinarily moves into
the human mind. He did not consider such atheistic utter¬
ances as anything more than a psychological effect of causes
working psychologically. Formal reasons assigned for atheism
to him seemed incredibly shallow and made him wonder if they
were sincerely given. This attitude made it difficult for
Bowne to see in an utterance an expression of a belief which
a person might be holding for quite other reasons than those
given, and yet doing so without thought of insincerity.
Actually Strauss' pessimism was so intense that anything
atheistic which sounded reasonable would appeal to his mind
as satisfactory. But Bowne was merciless in revealing the
futility of the attitudes and measures proposed by Strauss
for relief, or for peace of mind, in the face of oncoming
annihilation. He charges Strauss, in the phrase of Butler,
with maintaining that Christianity makes all the ills it
seeks to relieve. When the utterances of Strauss were put
forth in Bowne's condensation, their contradictions seemed
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incredible. For example, Strauss pictures the universe with¬
out heart or soul—a cruel machine which grinds and tears.
The wheels, and cogs, and stamps, and hammers, hiss and pound.
Yet in the face of this pessimism, Strauss claims that the
voicing of pessimism is impious and blasphemous. We must
have reverence for these wheels and hammers. Naturally the
description of the hammers does not come on the same page of
Strauss* book as the exhortation to reverence, but Bowne is
audacious enough in his review to place them side by side.
D. ASSOCIATE EDITOR OF THE INDEPENDENT
Before leaving Germany Bowne began to seek a teaching
position in the United States. His anxiety amazed his German
friends. Even Professor Ulrici expressed astonishment that
a man of Bowne's dimension should have the slightest concern
or uncertainty about being placed. But Bowne did not get a
satisfactory teaching post when he returned to America in
1875. He was compelled to do journalistic work with the
Independent in New York. At the same time he was afforded
the opportunity of teaching modern languages in New York
University.
While on the editorial staff of the Independent. it
was Bowne's responsibility to review books on philosophy and
religion. Some of the books he reviewed were: Draper's,
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Religion and Science,1 Martineau's, Religion as Affected by
2 3 ~
Modern Materialism. Ulrici's, Gott und Die Natur. and
if
Tyndall on Materialism. The excellence of these reviews
stand out in contrast to everything else appearing in the
same issue. Even one of the editorials is obviously from
Bowne8s pen. It contains in substance his whole argument
5
against materialism. At this time he also wrote an article
6
entitled: "The Religion of Childhood." This article is a
remarkable statement when it is remembered very little atten-
7
tion was given to the religion of childhood. The following
passage is a quotation:
Let the children come to Christ; but do not
perplex and confuse them by the demand for an
adult's experience, nor, indeed, by the demand
for any kind of experience. 'If ye love me, keep
my commandments' must be the supreme test of
affection. We have wrought mischief enough among
older people by substituting for this simple test
1 Independent. February *f, 1875.
2
Independent. February 11, 1875*
3 Independent. December 2, 1875.
** Independent. December 23, 1875* In dealing with
Tyndall, Bowne remarked: "until he gets sufficient control
of his moods to write a short article without changing his
opinion several times during the process" his work would not
have much philosophic value.
5 "Of Materialism," The Independent. May 6, 1875.
^ Independent« June 10, 1875.
7 Bowne does not mention any indebtedness to Bushnell.
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of Christ some peculiar psychological affections.
Owing to this demand, there are thousands and
thousands of our evangelical churches this day
whose religious life is a painful unreality, a
land of shadows, or a feast of wind. But let
not the children be thus perplexed. Let them
take their vows with glad hearts and teach them
that in this effort to love and obey they have
the Divine favor and help. And when the years
have come and the ideal of duty has gone up until
it seems to transcend all effort, they will learn
of themselves the blessedness of the fact that
we are God's children not of our own merit but of
his free grace. And if to the heart of childhood
the earth seems fair and fit for an eternal home,
let no attempt be made in the name of Deity to
disturb that beautiful dream. The sharp necessi¬
ties of life will do that soon enough. Let the
children learn of a Father's love, and when life's
trials come they will have whereon to lean. In
short, let the child be a child even in his reli¬
gion: and when he becomes a man, with the unfold¬
ing and opening of his experience, he will
necessarily put away childish things. To hasten
the work can only result in mischief. A too early
acquaintance with the confessional will make him
no better Christian; it will only make him false.
Strange as it may seem, Bowne also had charge of the
joke column in the Independent. The jokes are of high merit
and reveal Bo\me's addiction to punning.
E. PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY
In 1876 a door opened for Bowne to teach philosophy at
Boston University. At that time the University was only seven
years old but was making rapid educational strides under the
able leadership of Dr. William Warren. Dr. Warren aimed at
exacting scholarship and a distinctively Christian point of
view. In selecting Bowne he had a man who stood for these
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two ideals. As Bowne became known, Yale, Chicago, Northwest¬
ern, and other universities repeatedly attempted to acquire
his services, but Bowne remained at Boston University until
his death in 1910. When approached by these other educational
institutions he would facetiously remark: "Ephraim is wedded
to his idols. Let him alone." He taught at the University
from 1876 until 1910—never less than eight hours a week.
His regular courses were: Introduction to Psychological
Theory, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Metaphysics, Theism,
Ethics, and also seminars for advanced students in Kant and
Spencer.
Since it is as a teacher that Bowne is so influential
it is necessary to pause and observe him in the classroom.
For him teaching was not a task but a delight. President
Marsh of Boston University writes of his student days under
Bowne:
Any student with a swift sensitiveness to the
purpose of the teacher's spirit felt that he loved
to dissipate shadows of confused thinking. An
hour in Bowne's classroom had upon us—at least
some of us—an effect similar to that which a
traveler experiences when he reaches the top of
Jungfrau and, while standing there, sees the
clouds that obscure the far vision pass away,
enabling the traveler to get a marvelous view of
beautiful valleys, and of mountains that shoulder
up the sky. Bowne treated his students pretty
much as a guide treats mature and independent
travelers. His students were allowed to attend
class or not, as they pleased5 but they generally
pleased to attend.
Bowne lectured. Not much time was spent in
'reciting.' Sometimes he quizzed the class, and
6l
sometimes he invited the class to quiz him. No
class was ever kept more awake, more alive, than
his. No classroom was ever more a place of con¬
tagious intellectuality.
Often he talked with apparent extemporaneous-
ness. Sometimes he talked with a textbook
[written by himself] before him. Once in awhile
he read from a manuscript, or from the galley
proof of a new book he was writing. His manner
was alert. His voice was good, and his enuncia¬
tion always clear. He expected much of his stu¬
dents. He assumed that they were there for
business. He checked up., on their progress by
giving frequent quizzes.
Bowne refused to simplify his courses in Theism. At
one faculty meeting it was reported that some of the students
felt that Doctor Bowne's course in Theism was a little "high¬
brow," and suggested that a more simple and popular course
might enlist the interest of the students who were not so
well prepared as graduate theological students were for
philosophical thinking. Bowne sat silently attentive to the
discussion. Finally a faculty member asked why the students
could not be permitted to select a second and simpler course
in Theism, Bowne replied in a tone of authority emphasized
by a quiet finality of inflection: "Because the second course
2
will not be given."
Kindness and severity were wisely and warmly blended
1 President Daniel
Bostonia. April, 1937 > p.
address given at Boston.
2
Ibid., p. 8.
Marsh, "Borden Parker Bowne,"
3. This was a Founders' Day
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in Bowne's relation to his students. He recognized that
"philosophy is not everybody's business."1 But he also
recognized mental laziness. He was kind to the honest and
confused seeker after truth but merciless in his treatment
of a bumptious ignoramus. He remarked that a certain orator
2
"should be arrested for intellectual indecent exposure."
To a certain critic who had made uncomplimentary remarks
about one of Bowne's books without reading it, Bowne replied:
3
"He's bald on the inside of his head."
Bowne was a master of sarcasm. With him "sarcasm was
a rapier with which he punctured inflated egos and pierced
swollen sophistries. He did it all with a gentle voice and
with his ever-present inscrutible smile." In his discussion
of the metaphysical attributes of the "World Ground" Bowne
told a story of how some atheist, with Byronic bravado,
scrawled on the face of a rock: "There is no God," and then,
stepping back, the atheist said, "If God is omnipotent, let








J. T. Carlyon, "Bowne in the Classroom," The Per-
sonalist, Summer, 19*+7> p. 271. This volume of The Personal-
ist is the "Bowne Centenary Number" and has several chapters
referring to Bowne: F. J. McConnell, "Bowne in Ethical
Progress," A. C. Knudson, "Bowne in Theological Education,"
E. S. Brightman, "Bowne, Eternalist or Temporalist."
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ended the story was that "God is capable of omnipotent con¬
tempt." The sting of his words burned his teaching into the
the minds of his students in an unforgettable way. For
thirty-five years Bowne leveled his sarcasm at Herbert Spencer.
J. T. Carlyon, another student of Bowne's, shares some of the
experiences of his student days under Bowne.
The unclearness of Spencer was dismissed with
such devastating remarks as one I find in quota¬
tion marks at the foot of a page in my notebook:
•Spencer made a desert and called it peace.' When
Spencer defined both •absolute' and 'infinite' in
such a way as to make both terms unacceptable,
Dr. Bowne made the comment that it is 'etymologiz¬
ing rather than philosophizing.' When Spencer had
reached the conclusion that consciousness cannot
be a definite thing at all, Bowne replied, 'Of
course I cannot be unconsciously conscious or con¬
sciously unconscious; I cannot conceive of being
both dead and alive at the same time.' For
Spencer's mixture of Physics and Metaphysics,
Bowne had a fitting description in the phrase of
Mrs. Carlyle; it was 'the great Bad.' In discus¬
sing the notion of world progress from 'indefinite,
incoherent homogeneity to definite coherent hetero¬
geneity' the critic resorted to a quotation from
Goldwin Smith: 'The Universe might well have given
a sigh of relief at this eminent description of
itself.' Patiently and one by one Bowne examined
and refuted the basic concepts of the man who
thought he had given the death-blow to the Christian
faith in God. He concluded by saying, 'Spencer had
the pathetic experience of finding his system of
philosophy obsolete before he passed away.'1
From the very first session the students of Bowne's
classes knew they were intent on important business, rather
than taking a course at the university. There was never any
1
Carlyon, op. cit., p. 272
6*+
suggestion that the teacher was entertaining a large class
of college and seminary students; when humor appeared, it
was part of the technique to bring home the lesson of the
hour. When Dr. Bowne described "an imaginary person tumbling
down an imaginary steep place and breaking his imaginary
neck," it was delicious irony that would forever help the
students to discriminate between two very different kinds of
Idealism in philosophy. The students were given to believe
that the future of the Church and of Christianity waited
upon what they were thinking.
Bowne not only submitted his students to devastating
criticism of Spencer, but he also gave them a careful and dis¬
criminating evaluation of Immanuel Kant. Here the student
learned to think with precision and with judgement as he
sought to understand the Master of Konigsberg by the aid of
Boston's premier thinker. To those who were disposed to pick
flaws in the teaching of Kant and thus fail to see the great
contribution he had made to modern thinking, Bowne sagely
remarked: "The quibbling intellect ever knows much.""*"
While pointing out the weakness of the Kantian system, Bowne
went on to say that it was the "greatest work since Plato and
2






and Ethical Idealism and for both he was grateful. Bowne
summarizes his own species of Pragmatism by saying, "Where
argument has no place, life can assume what it needs." His
students were frequently reminded of Jesus' words, with
Bowne's parenthetical interpretation, "By their fruits (and
not their roots) shall ye know them." Bowne offered his
students his own Personal Idealism over against Kant's stress
on the laws of thought, insisting that objects themselves
must be case in the moulds of thought. Carlyon quotes him as
saying: "I hold that mind makes nature, in the same way that
our mind makes another's thought understandable."**"
Carlyon gives us a picture of Professor Bowne as he
saw him at Boston University:
I shall ever have in my memory the dignified
and serious man who sat behind the teachers table,
hair graying and closely cropped, a beard always
well trimmed, eyes that looked into the depths of
one's soul, without seeming to be prying but within
and back of appearances a mind that was racing
swiftly in pursuit of errors to be overthrown and
of high truth to be caught and made plain to inquir¬
ing youth, whose powers of discernment and of under¬
standing had been all too little developed. He
moved with quietness even as he moved swiftly, and
one could scarcely believe that a full hour had
passed when the bell rang for the closing session.
It was well that we had the long walk back to
Number 72 Mount Vernon Street, for we needed to
argue and to debate as we made the high thoughts
our own.2
Carlyon, loc. cit.
^ Ibid., p. 267.
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The opening years at Boston were given largely to
studies in Theism. Being of a profoundly religious nature,
Bowne approached philosophy from the religious point of view."'"
It was during these early years that Bowne wrote Studies in
2
Theism. This volume is an extraordinary piece of philo¬
sophical writing. The germs of all his later conceptions are
there with an abundance of exposition and illustrative mate¬
rial. Some of the critics, in those more ponderous days,
thought Bowne's style too vivacious, but it would not be con¬
sidered so today.
Bowne had close friends of great influence in those
beginning days at Boston University. Bishop Randolph S. Foster
3
of the Methodist Episcopal Church was one of these friends.
He was a man of imposing physical stature and a commanding
power of mind. Throughout his life he was interested in the
profounder phases of theology. Without much formal education
he was, nevertheless, a man of deep insight and a master of
discussion. His lofty pulpit oratory would have failed to
George A. Coe, a student of Bowne's, says that Bowne's
metaphysics was a sort of police force to defend his religious
experience. Studies in Philosophy and Theology, p. 19.
2 Published by the Methodist Book Concern, 1879. Bowne
considered this work his best literary volume.
3 Bowne lived in Foster's home his first seven years
at Boston University.
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impress Bowne if it had been anyone else but Bishop Foster.
Bowne admired Foster, oratory and all. He admired his power
of sustained reflection, his genuine piety, and his personal
courage. Bishop Foster was a determinative influence on the
young philosophy professor. Many a long philosophical dis¬
cussion was had by Bowne and Foster into the early hours of
the morning. Foster's metaphysics never did satisfy Bowne
since Foster remained in bondage to common-sense realism
till his death. But Foster could intelligently discuss
philosophy and was an excellent stimulus and foil to Bowne.
There was much of the philosophical explorer in him and he
lent encouragement to the young Bowne in his attempt to break
new paths of thought. Under all there was in the Bishop a
passion for the welfare of mankind, and this passion left its
mark on Bowne.
The Boston University circle provided other influen¬
tial friends. Along with Dr. Warren, president of the Univer¬
sity, there was Dr. Henry C. Sheldon, Methodism's outstanding
systematic theologian, Dr. Heinckley G. Mitchell and
Dr. Huntington, who later became president of the University.
Here in this stimulating fellowship, and in love with
his work, Bowne carried on a busy program of teaching, preach¬
ing, and writing until he left for his sabbatic year in 1882-
I883. There is little known of this trip except for
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several letters1 written to Dr. Huntington, who was at that
time a dean of the University. A glance at two of these





Just running down toward Queenstown I
find this old blank and a worse pen and the
result is being evolved. Nasty weather all
the way—cold almost as winter. Several days
very rough. • . . Sankey is on board, but he
has been moody most of the time. Numerous
libations poured out to Nep—•; meat and drink
offerings both freely made. Old Nep— not
pacified yet; but we hope soon to be out of his
power. Have experienced sundry temptations to
profanity on account of weather, etc., but have
resisted.
Having my Lares and Penates with me, I
am not half so anxious about letters from U.S.A.
as on former occasion, but would be glad to
hear 'allee samee' from you and yours. ...
Yours Ever
(Signed) Bowne
"Recovered Echoes from a Wanderjahr of Bowne," The
Personalist. Vol. XXII, No. *f, October, 19^1. Ralph T.
Flewelling, Editor of the Personalist in a footnote to these
published letters says; Francis J. McConnell, Life of Bowne.
indicates at the time of writing that biography, only one
letter was known to have survived from the sabbatic year
spent in Europe in 1882-1883. The importance of the accom¬
panying five letters from that period written to the late
President Huntington of Boston University is therefore con¬
siderable. They indicate social and humorous interests in
Bowne that will delight his admirers." The letters are given






... I was down to Halle a couple of
weeks ago, and had a very pleasant visit with
friends there. Ulrici is very feeble and since
the death of his wife very lonely. His children
are all married and live at a distance. He is
also a little querulous and very forgetful.
Erdmann too has grown old, but remains much
fresher in spirit, Hym and Jacobi are active
and optimistic. Both of the latter are opti¬
mistic and hope for better things; both of the
former take a rather sombre view of the future.
Yours very cordially
(Signed) B. P. Bowne
In the year 1883, Bowne finished his sabbatic year
abroad and returned to his responsibilities in Boston. His
responsibilities were largely speculative, spending what he
1
called "long brooding in silence." It was during these
years that Bowne developed his theism, realism, idealism,
2
transcendental empiricism, ethics, and personalism. From
the year 1900 to 1910, the year of his death, Bowne devoted
much more time to practical activity. The first thirty years
he was so absorbed in speculation that he had little oppor¬
tunity to indulge in many tasks that interested him. For
^
McConnell, op. cit., p. 179.
0
Bowne's thinking on these themes is fully discussed
in chapters that follow.
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example, he was profoundly interested in the popular presenta¬
tion of the essential Christian principles from the pulpit,
but during his studious life, although living in the same
city, he had almost no chance to watch the famous Trinity
Church under the ministry of Phillips Brooks. By the time
Bowne had finished with Spencer, Tyndall, and "all that ilk,
Brooks had passed away." As Bowne read, with thorough satis¬
faction, Allen's biography of Brooks,
... he expressed regret that his time had been
so taken up with the battles on the frontiers
of religion that he had not had opportunity to
enjoy work of those who, like Brooks, were nobly
expounding the truth to believers.1
F. BOWNE' S HERESY TRIAL
About 1895, a very heated controversy over the so-
called higher criticism of the Old Testament broke on the
Methodist Episcopal Church through attacks on Professor
Hinckley G. Mitchell, of the department of Old Testament in
Boston University School of Theology. This controversy
simmered until 1900 when the attacks against Mitchel became
hot. Bowne went to Mitchel's defense and as a result involved
himself. In 190*+, in spite of his attempts to make himself
understood, he was charged with heresy and brought to trial.
Following the counsel of Dr. Charles S. Wing, Bowne consented
MeConnell, loc. cit.
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to the trial and was completely vindicated. It is the feel¬
ing of Bishop McConnell that
. . • under the circumstances the trial was an
indignity, in the opinion of hosts of Bowne's
friends. Indignity is not too strong a word
even though Bowne consented to all that was
done. The charges were so absurd on their face
that-they should have been summarily thrown
out.
But Bowne thought differently about the matter and at the
end of the trial he said, "The decisive and unanimous declara-
2
tion of my doctrinal soundness is a great gain."
A few paragraphs from the record of the trial gives a
picture of Bowne's trying experience:
In the spring of 190^ at the session of the
New York East Conference of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, of which Doctor Bowne was a
member, charges of heretical teachings were
brought against him by a member of another
Annual Conference. These charges were wholly
based on passages taken from several of his
published works. He was charged with teaching:
1. Doctrines which are contrary to the
articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal
Church.
2. Doctrines which are contrary to the
established standards of doctrine of the Metho¬
dist Episcopal Church.
First Specification. He denies the Trinitarian
conception of the Deity and also the moral attri¬




Borden Parker Bowne, in a letter to Dr. F. M. Larkin,
April 23, 190*+.
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fourth Articles of Religion of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, (followed by extended quota¬
tions from Bowne's Metaphysics. and Philosophy
of Theism).
Second Specification. His teaching on mira¬
cles is such as to weaken if not destroy faith in
large portions of the Old and New Testaments. His
views on the inspiration of the Scripture are con¬
trary to the teaching of the Scriptures themselves,
contrary to article five of the Articles of Reli¬
gion of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and tend
to destroy faith in the authority of the Bible in
matters of faith and practice. (Quotations from
Bowne's booklet, The Christian Revelation).
Third Specification. He denies the Doctrine of
the Atonement as set forth in the second and
twentieth Articles of Religion of the Methodist
Episcopal Church and as taught by our established
standards of doctrine. (Quotations from The
Atonement and Metaphysics).
Fourth Specification. He teaches such views
of the divine government and of the future of
souls as to destroy the force of Christ's teaching
about future punishment of the wicked and the
future reward of the righteous. (Quotations from
The Atonement and Metaphysics).
Fifth Specification. He teaches views on the
subject of Sin and Salvation, on Repentance, Jus¬
tification, Regeneration, and Assurance of Salva¬
tion through witness of the Spirit that do not
represent the views of the Methodist Episcopal
Church as expressed in our standard works of
Theology. (Quotations from The Christian Life
and the Philosophy of Theism)
The rest of the account of the trial goes on to deal
with each of these forementioned specifications and the
answers of Bowne to them. Then comes the verdict.
George Elliot, Methodist Review, May-June, 1922
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After two hours of argument by the persecution
and the defense, the full Select Number of Fifteen
being present, votes by ballot were taken on each
of the Five Specifications. The result in each
case was the same: Sustained, none; not sustained,
fifteen.
The verdict of the Committee was expressed as
follows: . . .
That all the evidence and testimony offered by
the complainant and defendant in this case have
been received and carefully considered, and that
counsel for each has had ample opportunity for the
presentation of arguments.
That the Select Number, by unanimous vote taken
by ballot, find and decide that of the five speci¬
fications none are sustained, and that the charges
are not sustained.
(Signed) FRANK MASON NORTH, Chairman
WM. H. BURGWIN, Asst. Sec.
There were some good results from the trial. It gave
Bowne an opportunity to say in fresh form many worth-while
things. It also gave opportunity for closer fellowship with
one who had been at odds with him, Dr. James M. Buckley of
The Christian Advocate. The estrangement between Bowne and
Buckley began in 1895 when Bowne read a paper on ethical legis¬
lation to a young men's congress in Pittsburgh. This paper
irritated Buckley and he continually advanced reasons against
Bowne's advocacy of the repeal of Methodism's famous amusement
clause. It was with Buckley in mind that Bowne wrote:
A plausible argument may be made for anything.
The argument for religious persecution is perfect.
The argument for a state church is irrefragable;
that is, in both cases, from an abstract stand¬
point. Descending from these high themes, a very
7b
good argument might be made for adding to the
form for the admission of members to our church
the following:
Question. 'Will you be a diligent reader of
at least one of our official church papers?'
Answer. 'I will, the Lord being my helper.'
When one considers the necessity of supplying
the people with sound, wholesome and edifying
religious literature, the needs of the worn-out
preachers, and the demands of denominational
loyalty withal, the argument is seen to be very
strong. Excellent reasons can be given for each
detail of both question and answer.1
The contact of Buckley and Bowne was mutually helpful
in other ways. Buckley was much enlightened on the newer
approach to the Bible and Bowne was much enlightened on the
restrictions under which an ecclesiastical leader is forced
to work. Furthermore, Bowne had a new appreciation of
Buckley as a steadying power for keeping Bishops in their
place. Bowne, however, never had much use for bishops and
the heresy trial did not in any way encourage a change of
attitude.
For the most part, the verdict of the trial brought a
favorable response throughout the country and Bowne returned
2
to his work. Once started on the definitely practical
1 Borden Parker Bowne, Methodist Review. May 1898,
P. 379.
2
Dr. John Godfrey Hill, a student of Bowne's, gives
an account of Bowne's return to the classroom after the
heresy trial. ,,We> the sixty-odd students clamored for an
(Continued on the following page)
75
aspects of Christian leadership Bowne was more and more asked
about spiritual questions. He began to be asked about inti¬
mate phases of Christian experience. His answers to these
questions began to come out in personal interviews, articles
in the religious press, and finally, in a book entitled
1
Studies in Christianity. From the turn of the century until
his death Bowne gave himself to this practical task as reli¬
gious guide.
As previously mentioned, Bowne had no use for bishops.
He was an outspoken foe of officialism in the Methodist
Church. He strongly resented the ecclesiastical pressure
brought to bear on those who dared to think for themselves.
The bishop's refusal to confirm Professor Mitchell cost this
unfortunate man his chair in Boston University. This particu¬
lar case as well as his own trial set the pattern of Bowne's
antagonism to centralized authority for the rest of his life.
Believing in freedom as he did it is easy to see how he would
(Continued)
explanation. He only shook his head and beckoned with his
hand for silence and started to lecture where he had left off
a week before. The clamor increased so that he was compelled
to give heed. With that characteristic flash of eye which no
words can convey to those who have not seen it, he playfully
and laconically remarked, 'Well, there isn't much to be said;
I came, I saw, and the rest concurred.' The Personalist,
Vol. Ill, No. 3, pp. 192-19^-
1 Published in 1919. It included Bowne's three book¬
lets, The Christian Revelation. The Atonement. and The
Christian Life.
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resent authoritarian ecclesiasticism of any kind.
He was for the elimination of the episcopacy
root and branch, until the action of the
General Conference of 1908 in taking doctrinal
decisions out of the hands of the bishops some¬
what mollified him.1
Yet for all his criticism Bowne was a staunch Methodist.
Excerpts from two letters to an eminent Methodist minister
will reveal his attitude toward Methodism and Methodist
authorities.
With regard to your ecclesiastical relations,
I hope you will not be hasty in reaching a
decision. I gather from your letter that finan¬
cially you are fairly well treated, as such
matters go in our church, and I infer that your
difficulty is rather one of lack of sympathy
with some of the authorities and some of the men
and methods in the church. I have no doubt that
your feeling in this matter is quite correct, but
this thing seems to be a part of the present situa¬
tion and has to be endured as one of the things
that go to make up the life of today. I feel the
same myself, and on a great many accounts would
find it more congenial in other communions, but I
do not feel free to go on my own accord without
some better reason than I have. Our Church has
in it a large body of ignorant people, and there
is somewhat of ignorance in high places, but,
after all, it is a great body of much real effi¬
ciency and more potential efficiency, and I have
never felt justified in leaving it to flounder in
ignorance in order to be more comfortably or con¬
genially located myself. The leaven that is to
leaven the lump must be in the lump. If it be
removed from contact with the lump, it will have
no leavening power, and it seems to me that the
lump is big enough and important enough to give
every bit of leaven a worthy task in the way of
leavening; and I have no doubt that when you come
1 McConnell, op. cit., p. 231
to be mustered out you will be better satisfied
if you can look back upon such leavening work,
even in uncongenial circumstances, than to look
back upon a life of more peace and quiet under
pleasanter conditions but with less real effec¬
tiveness. Not to go through life quietly and
comfortably, but to execute a high commission is
our real task.
With respect to the General Conference, I am
not discouraged. I hardly think the ultracon-
servative elements will accomplish much in their
own line. It appears to me that the light is
breaking in.
One good sign is that they [the bishops] put
the better sort of bishops on the Committee to
revise the Conference Course of Study, and I
think many of them are really anxious to please
and even to propitiate the more progressive
element. In any case we are much better off
than we were not many years ago. Then most of
our leaders 'had not so much heard' of many of
the newer views, whereas now all of them have
heard of them and some of them are in main well
meaning, but weak and timid. Had they been men
who commanded respect by their scholarship and
character, they could have guided the church by
simply saying that these questions are subordi¬
nate in any case and do not concern the standing
or falling of the faith, and by inciting the
church to greater activity along the fundamental
lines of faith in God the Father Almighty and in
his Son and in the Holy Spirit and the forgive¬
ness of sins and building up the kingdom of God.
These things constitute the real faith of the
church and work for these things is a great
source of faith. No church working on these
lines will ever go far into unfaith, and a church
that does not work on these lines is of little
value anyhow, but the good men did not know the
day of their visitation, and they had not the
authority that comes from scholarship and charac¬
ter. They could not read the signs of the times
[in the Mitchell case], and by consequence they
became blind leaders of the blind with the usual
result of that condition of things.
Hughes has the real stuff in him. To look
at him one would not take him for anything like
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his real worth. ... I heard recently a little
story about him which is at once to his credit
and to another's discredit. It was at the time
of one of the bishop's meetings when one of the
bishops proceeded to denounce Professor Sheldon's
Systematic Theology and declared that it was a
crying shame that such a heretical book should be
published by a Methodist House. Here Hughes
interrupted to ask if he had ever read the book,
and the poor creature said, 'Not all of it.'
Hughes continued, 'Have you read any of it?' and
he had to admit that he had not. Then the other
said 'Have you read the book?' 'Yes,' Hughes
replied, 'I have read it all three times and I
accept every word of it.' And there was a great
calm.1
To some it seemed that Bowne's attacks on officialism
came of an excessively critical spirit and of a natural liking
for criticism itself. Bishop McConnell does not agree. In
reply to this criticism he says:
I do not think this is just. It is quite
possible that Bowne, with his interests in the
intellectual, was not qualified to take due
account of the difficulties of officialism; but,
even so, the soundness of his essential conten¬
tions must not be forgotten.2
Bowne had very little interest in General Conference
elections. In his volume, the Immanence of God, he refers to
General Assemblies and Church Conventions along with others as
"all such unprofitable works of darkness." Furthermore, he
says, "facts will have way; regardless of Popes, Bishops,
Quoted by McConnell, ibid. T pp. 231-232.
2 Ibid.. p. 235.
3 Borden Parker Bowne, The Immanence of God, p. 102.
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Councils, General Assemblies, and General Conferences to the
1
contrary notwithstanding." In another place he remarks:
A person of devout habit of thought and speech
might convince himself that ministerial appoint¬
ments are made by the Lord, or the General Confer¬
ence elections are divinely guided; but if he
should be present at the Conference sessions, he
would find that this divine causality is for faith
rather than sight, and that in the phenomenal mani¬
festation the continuity and uniformity of experi¬
ence are abundantly illustrated and verified.
In 1902, when the presidency of Boston University
became open, many of Bowne's students thought that their
philosophic leader should fill the post. This move, however,
was blocked by just as many of Bowne's friends who success¬
fully argued that it was necessary for Bowne to remain at his
teaching post.
Bowne was always interested in preaching. When the
chair of Homilectics became open in 189^, to the astonishment
of all, he recommended E. H. Hughes, a twenty-seven year old
minister from Newton Center. The committee had the names of
some men who were regarded as the best masters of preaching




Ibid.. p. 78. In 1895, Bowne went with Bishop
John H. Vincent to a series of Ohio Annual Conferences—A
General Conference election year—and found delegates so
taken up with lobbying that they could not find time to listen
to addresses on the essentials of Christian thought and experi¬
ence. This opened his criticism to more than just the bishops
alone.
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way of doing things. In another instance, when an important
educational position opened, a good man of financial impor¬
tance urged upon Bowne the desirability of supporting a
certain candidate. In supporting his candidate, this particu¬
lar layman argued: "I favor this man because he is an
excellent judge of men. He has moved around the world a good
deal, and is socially-attractive—especially a wonderful
story-teller." To this Bowne instantly replied:
All these recommendations could be put forth
in favor of the devil. He is a good judge of
men. He could not do what he does if he were not.
We have it on high authority that he has moved
around in the world a great deal; and, no doubt,
if he were put to it, he could tell a number of
capital stories.1
The records do not tell whether Bowne's candidate for the
preaching professorship succeeded or not, but they do make it
clear that his interest in preaching was not dimmed. In 1905,
he wrote a letter revealing his interest in the presentation
2
of Christian truth.
It appears to me there should be a way of study¬
ing sermonic literature and the sources of sermon
material which should be fruitful beyond anything
yet attempted. Comparative studies of preachers,
studies of biography, studies of living men at
work. All these might be used so as to make the
dry bones of homiletics live and move and have
their effective being. I sometimes wish I had a
McConnell, op. cit., p. 237.
p
Letter to Francis J. McConnell, January 28, 1905*
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relay of heads, a set of about four, so that I
could work continually by screwing on a fresh
one at will. In that case I would like to try
the chair of practical theology to see if
something could not be made of it.
Bowne never became President of Boston University, but
he still held definite convictions on the educational policy.
Although a foe of officialism, he seldom tried to press his
educational philosophy on the trustees of the University.
Some of his convictions on educational policy are revealed in
an extract from his address entitled: "The Passing of Educa¬
tional Fiatism."
Questions of educational policy are not to be
settled by popular clamor nor by the wishes of the
students themselves. Scholars must decide them in
the light of social needs and obligations, and
they as little need to concern themselves respect¬
ing the opinions of the ignorant as physicians and
legislators need concern themselves respecting the
vote of dwellers of the slums against sanitary laws.
It is the duty of the university to counteract popu¬
lar errors and to set up a standard against them and
not to yield to them. It is the duty of the college
to lead, not to follow. It should express the
opinions of the educated world as to what constitutes
a liberal education, and for the sake of guidance it
is desirable that there should be some standard
degree which should have a fairly definite meaning
other than a quantitative one. Let the persons who
do the work leading to this degree receive and let
others be free to do what they please, on condition
that they shall show proper industry in the work
they choose. Such a rule would tend to clearness
and would do no one any injustice. If this be
thought a counsel of perfection, then another course
is possible. Let every diploma state the work for
which the degree is given. If it were given chiefly
for a course in Italian novels or something else of
the same sort let it appear in the diploma. There
certainly would be no hardship in having the diploma
state precisely what the student has done. In this
way we might unite the extremest freedom of choice
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and get all the benefit of the youthful student's
self-knowledge together with the little wisdom
which might be added by the wise counsel of
friends, and we should also not be doing business
under false pretenses.1
Bowne was a guiding force in the Methodist Episcopal
Church. While a philosopher in his own right, he was in
reality a religious guide for many years. There were many
in his day who refused to accept his guidance, but there were
a great many more who received it gladly. As a leader in the
Methodist Church he was criticized for his supposed lack of
interest in evangelism. His critics claimed that Bowne's
attitude had a chilling influence on the evangelical temper
of Methodism. He claimed that the "faithful editorial watch¬
dogs of Methodism would bark through column after column" at
him. It must be admitted that for the evangelistic methods
ordinarily practiced in his day he had very little sympathy.
On the other hand, it also must be admitted that for the
bringing in the Kingdom by persuading men to yield their wills
to the divine will he had every regard. For the professional
evangelist he had nothing but criticism. To him they had a
The Personalist. Vol. IV, No. 2, January 28, 1905.
In publishing the address, R. T. Flewelling, the editor says:
"When a great soul speaks profoundly and simply he speaks for
many years. Our readers will, we think, realize this truth
as they apply the words of Bowne written more than a decade
ago to the problems of present-day education. The words were
scarcely more needed when they were first written than they
are now. As the years pass these unpublished literary remains
of Bowne gain a new importance to the minds of his former stu¬
dents."
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shoddy claptrap theology, artificial tests, overworked emo¬
tionalism, and many other things that were an abomination.
For winning persons outside the church he held that reliance
should be placed on personal work. It was his opinion that
no better means of spiritual guidance had been contrived
than the class meeting as conceived by John Wesley and that
it still had possibilities regardless of the changes since
Wesley's day.
Bowne put his main stress on religious education. He
insisted that religious education was the only way, provided
the nature of the child's mind be kept continually in view.
Bowne had quite an exalted idea of the ordinary child mind as
we find it, and protested against its being abused. In moral
equipment and capacity for insight he thought the child
"further along" than is ordinarily understood.
Borden Parker Bowne was a man of intense religious
feelings and convictions. This is best revealed in the prayer
that he uttered at the funeral of his long-time friend and
counselor, Bishop Randolph S. Foster.^"
0 God, thou art the Lord of life and death!
Life and death are alike thy ministers, and in
both life and death thy children are safe and
secure in the Everlasting Arms.
Our Father, we gather here in the sorrow of
^ The prayer is quoted at length because it gives an
insight into Bowne's religious beliefs.
Qb
our human bereavement. Our hearts ache and the
tears start before the awful void and silence
left by this vanished life.
But we gather, also, in the solemn joy and
triumph of our Christian faith. For thou hast
brought life and immortality to light, and we
sorrow not as those who have no hope. We are
not left to the sad and sinister suggestions of
the visible senses. We are not left to stand by
these precious relics, soon to be hidden forever
from our sight, and think that this is all and
this the end. To sense, indeed, this is the end,
but to faith it is the beginning. The mortal
life has ended, and the life immortal begun. By
faith we see our father, our brother, our friend,
freed from the weakness and frailty of the
earthly life and putting on the strength of the
eternal years. We follow him into the glad
reunions and divine revealings of the better
land. We see him join 'the great intelligences
fair, who range above our mortal state,' to whom
he always belonged in aim and sympathy, and to
whom he was bound by every spiritual affinity.
We see him 'where loyal hearts and true stand
ever in the light, all rapture through and through
in God's most holy light.' But, above all, we see
him face to face with his Lord, whose he was and
whom he served, and whose love was his supreme
delight. He knows no longer in part, but knows
even as he is known. Earth's sorrows have
vanished, the mysteries are made clear, and now
the eternal living, and the eternal loving, and
the tireless activities, and the divine fellow¬
ships of the skies, are his. We bless thee, our
Father, for the exceeding grace and wonder and
comfort of the hope of the gospel. By a light
above the brightness of the sun, shining from
the upper sky, thou dost transform the gates of
death and darkness into the gates of life and
light. Glory be to the Father, and to the Son,
and to the Holy Ghosti
We thank thee, our Father, for the holy dead,
for the great multitude which no man can number
who have been gathering home out of every age
and kindred and tongue and clime. They served
thee in their day and generation, and passed into
the heavens, where they are forever with thee,
faithful over a few things and now made rulers
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over many. For all these holy souls we give thee
thanks, and especially we thank thee for those
that we have known who have faithfully lived and
peacefully and bravely died. They vanished from
our side and from our arms, but they are ours
forevermore. Death has separated but for a little
while, and we are one family still. In Christ we
and the holy dead are united. They belong to us
and we to them, one in the service of our common
Lord, and one in his eternal plan. . . .
And now we pray that thou wilt bless to all of
us this solemn scene and hour. Bring home to
every heart the sense of our mortality. Help us
to realize the things that are seen are temporal,
and that only the things unseen are eternal. Free
us from undue bondage to temporal things. Make
us mindful of the end, and help us to estimate
life's values aright. And seeing that the night
cometh and life hastens so swiftly to be done,
whatsoever our hands findeth to do may we do it
with our might. May we pattern after thy servant,
and in our place and measure imitate him in the
unselfishness of his life and the greatness of his
devotion, so that his life, which was the life of
Christ may reappear in us.
And now, our Father, we especially pray for the
hearts that are especially sore and smitten. Thou
only canst help. Thou only canst bind up the
broken heart. 0 God, who knowest our frame, who
rememberest that we are dust, have mercy upon us!
0 Christ,.who hast borne our griefs and carried
our sorrows, have mercy upon us! 0 Holy Spirit,
who art the Comforter, have mercy upon us! Help
us to see that thou wast never nearer, Help us
to cast ourselves upon thy love, and wait for thy
peace and thy salvation.
And in thy mercy grant us thy grace for the life
that now is, and bring us all to the inheritance of
the saints in light; there to take up again the
interrupted friendship, and go on forevermore in
unbroken communion in thy presence! Amen, and
Amen!
Borden Parker Bowne was faithful in attending church.
Dr. Jucius H. Bugbee, Bowne's pastor two years prior to
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Bowne's death, writes of Bowne's church relationship.
He was always at prayer-meeting, and seldom
failed to express some very pertinent and helpful
thought. A favorite quotation of his, given with
the utmost sympathy and understanding, was two
or three stanzas from Richard Baxter's hymn. . . .
'Lord, it belongs not to my care
Whether I die or live;
To love and serve thee is my share,
And this thy grace must give,'
Christ leads me through no darker rooms
Than he went through before;
He that into God's kingdom comes
Must enter by this door.
My attention had never been called before to
that hymn, and his use of it made a deep impres¬
sion on my mind. It stands out in my memory as
a most striking expression of his own religious
experience.1
G. WORLD TOUR AND ITS INFLUENCE
About the year 1900 Bowne expressed a desire to go
"around the world." The plans were worked out and in the year
1905 he began on a tour that included Japan, China, India,
and Europe.
This trip around the world was among the important
experiences of Bowne's life. Out of it grew a spiritual pil¬
grimage of profound significance. It widened his view and
deepened his appreciation of those human values which always
stood at the heart of his philosophy. It gave a final touch
1
A letter to Francis J. McConnell, June 20, 1927
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to all he had been thinking.
This trip changed his attitude toward non-Christian
systems. Prior to the trip Bowne was rather severe toward
the non-Christian systems. He had very little patience toward
the "heathen" peoples. While being genuinely interested in
the missionary cause, he was not oversympathetic toward non-
Christian peoples. In his work on ethics he wrote that the
1
non-Christian heathen must either be transformed or perish.
When the United States conquered the Philippines in 1899,
Bowne wrote an article saying that it was necessary for people
2
to be ruled if they were unable to rule themselves. And this
he claimed was necessary in the name of humanity's own best
good. Bowne justified himself by saying that to take away a
people's sovereignty does not necessarily mean that you are
reducing them to slavery. Men are deprived of freedom in some
directions, only to be given a chance to realize more freedom
in others. He contended that life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness would be worth more if people were relieved of
tasks for which they had shown themselves incapable. The trip
around the world, however, brought Bowne in close contact with
the people of the Orient and he returned home with a much more
considerate spirit towards non-Christian groups.
1
"Humanity's Eminent Domain," The Independent.
New York, 1899•
^ Borden Parker Bowne, Ethics, p. 87.
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Bowne was enthusiastically received in Japan. His
book Personalism. had already been translated into Japanese
and had been widely read. Bowne was a little suspicious of
the Japanese politeness because he continually remembered
the experience of another American lecturing in Japan. This
particular lecturer noticed that the interpreter took much
less time with the interpretation than the original delivery
required, and that the interpretation always ended in the same
phrase. A Japanese, pushed for an explanation, reluctantly
revealed that the constantly recurring formula was: "I have
given you the substance of what this man is saying. The rest
1
of it is nothing but words," This was not Bowne's experience.
He was well received. The Japanese appreciated his metaphys¬
ics, but they could not quite understand his wit.
Bowne was impressed by the Japanese. This was not
because of the public welcome nor because of the private hos¬
pitality, but the result of seeing the vast possibilities of
the masses. A friend in whose home he stopped in Japan found
him sitting one morning with bowed head lost in meditation
from which he slowly roused himself. His host said to him,
"What vision?" Bowne replied, "Just the vision of these
masses of mankind, their possibilities in themselves and in
2
their possible relation to the welfare of the whole world."
■*"
McConnell, op. cit., p. 256.
2 Loc. cit.
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He had a similar experience in China when he saw the
evident genuineness of religious devotion in those under
stress. He was especially touched when he saw a poor Chinese
mother come to a shrine with a sick baby and make an offering
there in hope of the child's recovery. This incident he
afterward used before a group of Christians in China as indi¬
cating the spontaneous turning of souls in trouble to religion
1
the world over.
Actual contact with China, with the worthiness of the
people, and with their resentment at the grievances they had
suffered at the hands of other nations, seemed to modify the
tone with which he declared himself in his work Ethics. He
wrote home saying that the recollection that the Englishman
who negotiated the treaty which fastened opium on China was
the author of "In the Cross of Christ I Glory" actually caused
2
him to shiver. In the same correspondence he wrote:
The dealing of foreign nations with China has
been one sad, dreadful, atrocious, abominable
history. The things the Chinese have done will
not compare in inhumanity and diabolism with the ^
things that the Western nations have done to them.-15
When the address was afterward published, without
Bowne's knowledge, a reference to the Christian God as One who
could not fail to note the human appeal even in the heathen
rites, was cut out.
2




When he returned home he did not boast of Anglo-Saxonism and
startled his friends with the remark that if he were beginning
his professional career in 1906, he felt confident he could
accomplish most by teaching in China.
One of the cherished memories which Bowne carried with
him from China was the memory of a visit with Bishop Samuel
I. J. Schereschewsky of the Protestant Episcopal Church.
Bowne penned an article about this man's heroic life. In
writing the touching account of the Bishop's life Bowne told
of the eight years which the saintly missionary gave to trans¬
lating the Scriptures into the Mandarin dialect. A large part
of the translation was done after Bishop Schereschewsky had
something resembling paralysis following sunstroke. The
translator used the Roman alphabet to spell out Chinese
sounds. Because of his physical infirmity, he was compelled
to tie a stick to his middle finger, and with his finger thus
stiffened, "poked out" twenty-five thousand pages of manu¬
script. One can agree with Bowne in his article when he says
that the bishop "by his courage and energy did humanity
imperishable honor. "**"
Bowne was not so favorably impressed with India. He
felt that the Indian audiences did not possess much power of
^ "One of the World's Heroes," Youth's Companion.
January 3, 1907. Bowne did not sign his name to the article.
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sustained attention. While he was speaking one after another
the Bengalese would get up and leave. Furthermore, the
connection between a thoroughly heathen belief and a wretched
social condition became more evident to him in India than any¬
where else. Attending a religious festival at Kaligat he was
literally made ill by the reek of goat *s blood and the stench
of sweating crowds. After the experience he remarked that he
could well understand the mood of the Old Testament writer
who spoke as if it had repented God that he had made man,
and that God had felt an impulse to wipe the race off the
earth.**" The mood passed and he began to preach that
Christianity rightly presented was the only avenue through
which the vast possibilities of India could be realized.
When Bowne's reasoned discourses were not well
received, he expressed his dissappointment to Doctor MacKichan,
Chancellor of Bombay University. He was surprised to hear
Doctor MacKichan reply,
I don't wonder that you were disappointed in
dealing with these subjects in a learned, philo¬
sophical way with the students of Calcutta. Of
course, some may have followed you, but I am not
surprised that many did not. I would not want you
to come and deliver a learned, philosophical lec¬
ture on one of those subjects, but come and give us
an address on religion in simple discourse.2
1 McConnell, op. cit., p. 258.
2
Written in a letter from Rev. Mell of San Francisco.
Rev. Mell introduced Bowne to MacKichan in Bombay and heard
Bowne's address.
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This Bowne consented to do.
Elaborate arrangements were made for Bowne to speak
at Bombay University. Classes were dismissed and a great
company of Parsees, Mohammedans, Christians, Anglo-Indians,
Eurasians and Hindus of all castes, gathered to hear the
message. Bowne followed the suggestion of Dr. MacKichan and
was amazed at the result.
The students cheered heartily its main points,
and at the close the cheering developed into a
great ovation. For five minutes Doctor Bowne had
to stand and receive the applause of the great
crowd. Students and professors thronged to the
front to greet this prophet of the future.1
Bowne called his message "The Religion of the Future."
Rev. A. W. Mell, gives a condensation of the address.
The religion of the future will have:
1. ONE GOD—Modern thought in all science and
in all philosophy is recognizing the unity of all
force; physical, mental and moral. 'In him we
live, move and have our being.' The many gods
must go.
2. AN INTELLIGENT GOD—The illiterate, dumb
and unintelligent gods must go. The modern mind
can worship only a God that can be worshipped with
all the mind.
3. A HOLY GOD—The immoral, thieving, lying and
licentious gods must go. Only a moral God—a holy
God—can appeal to the soul of modern man.
!f. A BENEFICENT GOD—The cruel, jealous, revenge¬
ful gods must go. The God for the modern mind must




give for the good of all.
5. A GOD OF LOVE—The gods of hate are doomed.
Love is the end—the goal—of man's aspirations
and worship.
6. A UNIVERSAL GOD—The gods of classes, races,
and nations must go. As there can be but one God,
the modern mind must think of him as the God of all
nations and peoples—the God of the universe.
7. A GOD OF BROTHERHOOD—One who will seek the
unity and the peace of all men.
CONCLUSION—For me, gentlemen, the God that I
have described to you as the God of the religion of
the future—though I do not ask you to accept my
judgement, for it is only a statement of my belief—
I repeat again, as for me, I find such a God revealed
in the face of Jesus Christ, in his character, his
life of good deeds, and in his teachings. It satis¬
fies my mind and heart, and I believe that this God
as revealed in Jesus Christ will ultimately receive
the homage of all nations. In his life the nations
will find their life, and life more abundant.
Bowne was fairly overwhelmed by the reception of his
message and thanked Doctor MacKichan for his suggestion that he
deal with the subject of religion rather than the subject of
philosophy. When he returned to America he wrote back to
A. W. Mell indicating how this Bombay experience changed his
whole approach to India. From that time on Bowne was convinced
that India could never be reached by the way of philosophy. In
substance he declared, "India will not be saved by the mere
intellectual approach to Christ, but by faith in Christ and in
2





In the late summer of 1906, Bowne returned from his
world tour and resumed his work at Boston University.
H. LAST DAYS
The closing years of Bowne's life were happy. He
looked forward to the day when he could retire and be able
to take a long look at nature. When asked what he wanted
most to see in these desired hours of leisure he replied:
"Oh, just the coming and going of the seasons, dawn and the
sunset, night and the stars. I shall be disappointed if I
have to leave this world without a chance for a good long
look at all these."1 He also desired a wider recognition of
his philosophic achievements. But he did feel that the main
principles for which he had fought were accepted even by
those who had approached philosophy along other paths. He
was optimistic enough to believe that the general theistic
position was finally established, and that the task of the
future would be merely to carry theism out in its implica-
2
tions. He loved gardening and in a letter to Albert Coe he
wrote: "Of all the odors, according to my nose, there is none
other so gracious and refined as the violet. What manner of
man ought I to be with 20 x 20 violets in the house."
^cConnell, op. cit., p. 26*f.
2Ibid.. p. 265.
3a personal letter to Albert Coe.
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The early days of 1910 slipped by, no one suspecting
that the last summons was at hand. Bowne was full of labors,
contemplating a sketch of the history of philosophy to show
the trend toward personalism, preparing to discuss Berkeley
in an important English lectureship, getting ready for a
visit to Constantinople to inspect the American School for
Girls of which he was a trustee. He was not a man of great
muscular strength, never weighing more than one hundred and
sixty pounds. All his life he ruled his body like a Spartan
until it was completely flexible to his will; never ill, never
unresponsive to the exacting demands for endurance that he
laid upon it. The end came suddenly on Friday, April 1, 1910.
He was seized with a heart attack as he met his
class, was able to reach home, but passed away in
the afternoon of the same day. Except that the
end had come prematurely, he could have desired no
better lot than to fall thus at his post in the
midest of the daily task.1
That task for thirty-four years had been to be a
teacher of men. Of the teachers' task, Bowne had a high esti¬
mate. In a letter he wrote:
The teacher's life is rarely a show one, and
to many it is a root out of dry ground, but for
real permanent influence no one has more of it
than the effective teacher. 'Our echoes roll
from soul to soul and grow forever and ever.
McConnell, op. cit.. p. 268.
^ From a letter to Dr. William S. Bovard, October l*f,
1909.
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President Daniel L. Marsh of Boston University in his
founders' day address summarizes Bowne's work as a teacher."*"
For thirty-four years (1876-1910) as Professor
of Philosophy and Dean of the Graduate School of
Boston University, Bowne devoted himself to the
intellectual propagation of what he well termed a
life philosophy, a philosophy of life and for life.
He believed that philosophy had a mission for
everyday living. Rigorous logician though he was,
yet he made 'the field of life and action' his
supreme court of appeal as against the 'arid
wastes of formal logic.' He turned the minds of
his followers away from religious, theological
and metaphysical conventionalities toward certain
of the living, dynamic realities of experience,
and then insisted upon the ethical evaluation of
all experience.
Dr. Albert Cornelious Knudson, one of Bowne's most
brilliant students, was in Europe when the sad news of Bowne's
death reached him. It filled him with a sense of irrevocable
loss. At once he sent to Zions Herald his brief tribute:
Professor Bowne is gone! Not until April l^f
did this sad news reach us. We were then in
Paris. It was a dark and dreary day. And since
then the clouds for us have not lifted. Boston
will not be the same place without him, and
Boston University—how she is bereft! Her chief
light is gone out. ... I cannot adequately
express my sense of personal loss. While a stu¬
dent in college twenty years ago, his books fas¬
cinated me, and called forth an admiration which
the years has deepened into a love and reverence
such as one seldom comes to feel towards another
of one's kind. ... No teacher of philosophy,
so far as I know, so completely met the deepest
needs of his time as Professor Bowne. And
"Borden Parker Bowne," Bostonia. April 1937? p. 3.
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because those needs in their essential nature
are not ephemeral, but permanent and to some
degree universal, his light is, to my mind,
destined to be as that which shineth more and
more.l
Quoted by Elmer A. Leslie in Personalism in Theology.
A Symposium in honor of Albert Cornelius Knudson, by associ¬
ates and former students, edited by, Edgar Sheffield Brightman,
p. 11»
CHAPTER III
BOWNE'S PHILOSOPHY OF PERSONALISM
A
Bowne is a man with a warm Methodist religious experi¬
ence. His philosophy of personalism is an attempt to preserve
that experience from the distructive and disturbing factors
1
of his day. Bowne, like Fiske, wrote at a time when the
impact of science and higher criticism upon the religious
thought was keenly felt. Again, like Fiske, he tried to
"mediate" between science and religion by incorporating both
Borden Parker Bowne, Personalism. p. 8. "We need a
sound philosophy at least as a kind of intellectual health
officer whose business it is to keep down disease-breading
miasms and pestiferous growths, or as a moral police whose
duty it is to arrest those dangerous and disturbing intellec¬
tual vagrants which have no visible means of support, and
which corrupt the people." Frank Wilbur Collier points out
that the distinguished and generally accurate scholar, James
Hastings was mistaken when he said: "Bowne came by way of
philosophy to believe in the God of the Bible." Collier
replies to this statement saying that "those who know the
personal history of Bo\me know it is not true." In the same
article he quotes Charles Parkhurst, Editor of Zions Herald,
as saying "Doctor Bowne's interest in religion is even deeper
than his interest in philosophy." The Personalist. Vol. I,
No. 1, April, 1920, p. 2>b, George A. Coe, a former student
of Bowne's remarks that "The part of Bowne's thinking that
seems to live on in the greatest vigor in our minds today is
the empirical rather than the dialectic or speculative factor.
Ana the particular empirical content that looms most sig¬
nificantly in the retrospect is the observable facts of reli¬
gious and moral life to which he insistently called attention.
. . . This may not be evident to one who approaches Bowne's
mind through his metaphysics, but then metaphysics was to him
not the main thing, but, rather, a sort of police force with
which to defend the life and liberties which he prized. "The
Empirical Factor in Bowne," Studies in Philosophy, edited by
E. C. Wilm.
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in an all-comprehensive metaphysical system. But unlike
Fiske, Bowne was saturated with the philosophical views
abroad and these views gave new directions to cosmic philos¬
ophy. Bowne knew of the work of W, T. Harris and he was
acquainted with Hegel, but as mentioned previously, his
inspiration did not come from these two men. Speaking of
the origin and nature of his philosophy, Bowne tells us that
"Leibnitz furnishes the starting point,"'Herbart supplies
the method," and "the conclusions reached are essentially
those of Lotze," but he adds, "the conclusions have been
reached by strictly independent reflections.""*" From his
German teachers Bowne obtained a perspective in philosophy
that was new in America and was of special importance because
of its fundamental affinity with religious speculation in the
New World. Before giving an exposition of his philosophy
of personalism let us glance at the history of the word
"personalism."
A. HISTORY OF THE WORD "PERSONALISM"
Personalism, like pragmatism, is a new name for some
old ways of thinking. "But it is not merely a new name. The
new name, as in the case of pragmatism, represents a new
emphasis and a new approach to some of the oldest problems of
1
Bowne, Metaphysics. p. 3
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philosophy and theology."1
S. S. Brightman, representing personalisin before the
Sixth International Congress of Philosophy says that
Personalism is a recent name for what, in
various forms, has in the past been called
monadology, spiritualism, neo-criticism, and
personal or teleological idealism. It is the
theory that to be is to be a self or a member
of a self.2
The origin of the word "personalism" as a philosophi-
3
cal term takes us back into history over one hundred years.
Schleiermacher used the word in his famous Discourses pub-
k
lished in 1799 as a general term distinguishing theism from
pantheism. The English translator, John Oman, did not trans¬
late the German word "Personalismus" by its English equiva¬
lent, personalism, apparently not regarding the word warranted
by English usage. Even as late as 1922, the word "personalism"
did not appear in any of the standard English Dictionaries
1
Albert C. Knudson, Philosophy of Personalism. p. 17.
2
E. 8. Brightman, "Personalism and The Influence of
Bowne," Proceedings Sixth Intemational Congress of Philos¬
ophy. 1926, p. 161.
^ Loc. cit. "But the word personalism is recent. Its
earliest use as a terminus technicus appears to have been by
Schleiermacher while John Grote introduced the word in
English, in his Exporatio Philosophica. It is found in many
recent writers, such as Caldecott (1908), William James (1902),
C. Renouvier (1903), Hans Dreyer (1905), L. William Stern
(1906), M. W. Calkins (1907), Bowne (1908), and many others.
The term is not incorporated into general philosophical usage."
^
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Discourses. pp. 256-257*
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except the Oxford English Dictionary.
The word "personalism," used not as a general philo¬
sophical term, but as designating a definite system of
philosophy is not used until we reach the beginning of the
twentieth century. In 1902, the French philosopher, Charles
Renouvier, wrote a book entitled Le Peronnalisme. Although
his philosophy had been previously known as "Neo-Criticism,"
he came to the conclusion that the word "personalism" more
fitly represented his system. To use his own words, "Le
Personnalisme est le vrai nom qui convient a la doctrine
designee jus qu ici sans le titre de neocriticisme.1,1
Four years later in Germany, a young philosopher,
William Stern, published the first volume of Person und Sache.
In the sub-title he describes his system as "Critical Person¬
alism." After thirty years of expounding his philosophic
system, Borden Parker Bowne, in 1908, gave it a fresh and
compact form in his volume, Personalism. This is probably
the first time the name "personalism" had ever appeared on
2
the title page of an English volume.
Two years prior to the publication of Renouvier's book?
Le Personnalisme. G. H. Howison of the University of
California, published a book entitled The Limits of Evolution.
Charles Renouvier, Le Personnalisme. p. iv.
2 Albert C. Knudson, Philosophy of Personalism. p. 18.
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In this volume Howison uses the term "personal idealism" to
designate the metaphysical system he expounds. This term,
"personal idealism" in the following year became the title
of a collection of essays published by eight members of
Oxford University. From a philosophical standpoint, the most
important of these essays was Personality. Human and Divine
by H. Rashdall.
The term 'personal idealism,' as used by
Howison and Rashdall, is synonymous with 'per-
sonalism,' but the latter is the shorter and
more distinctive term, and hence has in.recent
years been coming into more common use.
It cannot, however, be said to be a popular term. Many
thinkers who might certainly be classed as personalistic still
2
shun the term as far as they themselves are concerned. But
let us now attempt a definition of Bowne's personalism.
B. BOWNE'S PERSONALISM DEFINED
If one were to ask Bowne to classify himself he would
probably receive something like the following as an answer:
It is hard to classify me with accuracy. I am
a theistic idealist, a personalist, a transcendental
empiricist, and idealistic realist, and a realistic
Ibid., p. 20.
2
Professor Brightman discusses the unpopularity of the
term in two articles, "The Unpopularity of Personalism," and
"Why Is Personalism Unpopular?" Methodist Review, pp. 9-28.
F. J. McConnell, also discusses the unpopularity of personal¬
ism in his book on Borden Parker Bowne.
103
idealist; but all of these phrases need to be
interpreted. They cannot well be made out of
the dictionary. Neither can I well be called
a disciple of anyone. I largely agree with
Lotze, but I transcend him. I hold half of
Kant's system, but sharply dissent from the
rest. There is a strong smack of Berkeley's
philosophy, with a complete rejection of his
theory of knowledge. I am a Personalist, the^
first of the clan in any thoroughgoing sense.
While we may derive considerable insight into Bowne's
vital personality from this passage, we are hard put to dis¬
cover any definition of his system. Furthermore, we do not
find any clear cut definition of "personalism" in his books.
Thus we must turn to those who sat at his feet.
Albert C. Knudson, professor of Theology at Boston
University, after spending eighty-six preliminary pages gives
the following summary and definition:
As we now look back over this chapter we see
that our study has given us a general survey of the
different types of personalism. The less distinc¬
tive is the pantheistic personalism of William Stern,
which makes personalism equivalent to a universal
teleology. Another type is pluralistic or finitis-
tic. It is represented in different ways by the
atheistic personalism of McTaggart, the relativistic
personalism of Renouvier, and the purely finalistic
personalism of Howison. Opposed to this type of
personalism is absolutistic personalism, or personal¬
ism in the form of absolute idealism. This is repre¬
sented by a number of distinguished thinkers of the
neo-Hegelian school. What I have called typical per¬
sonalism is neither pluralistic nor absolutistic, or
rather, it is both. It recognizes a permanent truth
in both pluralism and absolutism, and so seeks to
keep the scales evenly balanced between them. But
B. P. Bowne, The Personalist T 1921, p. 10.
lO^f
the most distinctive form of personalism is not
reached until personalism becomes a philosophical
method as well as a body of conclusions. It is
this that Bowne has given us, systematic philo¬
sophical methodological personalism, in which the
whole metaphysics is organized around one central
and all-illuminating principle—that of self-
sufficiency of personality.
In the light of these facts we may define per¬
sonalism as that form of idealism which gives
equal recognition to both the pluralistic and
monistic aspects of experience and which finds
in the conscious unity, identity, and free
activity of personality the key to the nature of
reality and the solution of the ultimate problems
of philosophy.!
2
Ralph Tyler Flewelling, a former student of Bowne's
and Director of the School of Philosophy, The University of
Southern California, gives the following definition of per¬
sonalism.
Personalism, in the proper sense of the term,
asserts a system of selves related through a supreme
personality. It conceives of the supreme as exist¬
ing in and through the concrete continuous exercise
of his personality, thinking, willing, and sustain¬
ing all things. This personality, far from being
subject to analysis, is the ultimate fact which
alone makes the world as a whole intelligible. Lotze
affirmed personality of the divine being, but neg¬
lected to carry out the implications to its deeper
theistic conclusions. Renouvier, who first employed
the term 'personalism,' thought it necessary to
escape pantheism by assigning the world of things
to a single primary creative act. Bowne, however,
insisted upon a supreme personality creatively
present in the on-going of the world.
^
Knudson, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
o
R. T. Flewelling is also editor of the Personalist
magazine which carries on the Bowne tradition.
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Personalism in this stricter sense is closely
allied with the thought of Augustine, and accords
with the Christian demand for a personal rela¬
tionship of man to the infinite world-ground
which is a person.
Personalism may then be defined as that system
of philosophy which views personality as the
active ground of the world, and as containing in
the mystery of its own unique being the key to
all the antinomies of metaphysics. It is the
latest form of theism and has been most com¬
pletely worked out in the writings of the American
philosopher, Borden Parker Bowne. It occupies a
mediating position between pure empiricism and
pure idealism, and is to be judged by its defini¬
tion of reality, its doctrine of knowledge, and
its conception of space and time.3-
Allowing these two definitions of personalism to stand
as valid representations of Bowne's thought, we proceed to
give a brief exposition emphasizing his epistemology and
metaphysics.
Such a procedure is very much in line with the mind
of Bowne. In the preface to his work on Personalism. he
claims that it is our Epistemology and Metaphysics that
decide the day in intellectual campaigns. These subjects
which seem to have little or no practical bearing, are the
subjects out of which come the issues of intellectual life
or death. Our conceptions of reality and causality, our
thoughts regarding time and space, "these are the things that
decide our general way of thinking and give direction to our
Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
Vol. IX, pp. 771-772.
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1
thought even in morals and religion." A harmless looking
doctrine is set forth in epistemology and before long there
is "agnostic chill in the air that is fatal to the highest
faiths of the soul, or some sensual blight and mildew spread
2
over the fairer growths of our nature." If space and time
are made supreme laws of existence "determinism and material-
3
ism and atheism are at the door."
C. SELF, THE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE
For Bowne, Philosophy is an attempt to answer two main
questions: (1) How is knowledge possible? and (2) What is
the true nature of reality? To Bowne, these two questions
are interrelated and an answer to one of them has an unmistak-
b
able bearing upon the answer to the other.
Bowne maintains that knowing consists in forming con¬
cepts of things known and knowledge consists of the concep¬
tions thus formed. But, he says, the mind cannot transcend
its conceptions, and for this reason the object exists for
the mind only as it is conceived, not as it is in itself. In
other words, a thing can never be more for the mind than a
Borden Parker Bowne, Personalism. p. viii.
2 Ibid.. pp. viii-ix.
3 Ibid., p. ix.
K
Borden Parker Bowne, Metaphysics. p. 1.
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realized conception, and the mind can grasp the world only
through the conception it forms of it. Thus it follows, that
the demand to know "things in themselves" is absurd, if by
"things in themselves" be meant things out of all relation to
thought.Knowledge of things in themselves, if this term be
used, can mean only a knowledge which shall be universally
valid; and the question, What is reality? reduces therefore to
this other pertinent question: How must we think about
2
reality? The answer to this question, says Bowne, presup¬
poses an understanding of the nature of thought and of how
thought functions in the knowledge relation.
Thought is mental life, considered as apprehending
truths. "Thought, then, is that form of mental activity whose
aim is truth or knowledge."^ As psychological fact, thought
is special to me; but it affirms and apprehends something
valid for all. Bowne does not doubt that this is a great
mystery, "but," he says, "the fact is so involved in the
nature of thought that thought vanishes altogether with its
denial." Furthermore he says:
It is this fact which constitutes the univer¬
sality and objectivity of thought, and distin¬
guishes the judgement—at least, in its intention—-
1 Ibid., p. 5.
2
Ibid., p. 6.
^ B. P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. p. 9.
^ B. P. Bowne, ibid.. p. 1**.
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from a subjective union of ideas.
Of course, this does not hinder that thought
may often be mistaken. Chance conjunctions are
put forward as fixed connections. Accidents of
the individual are assumed to have universal
validity. The special to me is mistaken for the
common to all. But this very fact only illus¬
trates once more that universality, or objective
validity, is the essential of thought.^
Werkmeister, commenting on this point of Bowne's
thought says:
... how the purely subjective can comprehend
something valid for all—is, for Bowne, a great
mystery. But he is sure that thought and all
possibilities of knowledge vanish if this trans¬
cending nature of thought is denied; for it is
this fact of transcendence which constitutes the
universality and objectivity of thought, and
which distinguishes the judgement—at least in
its intention—from a subjective union or associa¬
tion of ideas. Only by virtue of this transcend¬
ence can the apprehending thought reproduce an 2
order which is independent of that thought itself.
For Bowne, the mere presence of ideas in consciousness,
or their passage through it, is but a mental event and has no
truth significance. Truth or error emerges only at the level
of judgment. "The fundamental conditions of the judgment,
3
therefore, must be fundamental conditions of thought itself."
These are three: "the unity and identity of the thinking self,
1
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. loc. cit.
2
W. H. Werkmeister, A History of Philosophical Ideas
in America, p. 10^.
3J Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. p. 20.
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the law of identity and contradiction, and the fact of connec-
1
tion among the objects of thought." The first, he explains
more fully, is the condition of any rational consciousness
whatever. The second is the condition of our thought having
any constant and consistent meaning. And the third refers to
that objective connection without which thought loses all
2
reference to truth.
Logically, a judgment involves the distinction between
subject term and predicate term no less than the union of
these terms. And for this logical distinction and union alike,
says Bowne, we need something which is neither (a) nor (b), but
which comprehends and acts upon both. This something Borne
3
calls the self. And by this, he means not anything sensu¬
ously or imaginatively presentable, but only that abiding prin¬
ciple revealed in thought, and without which thought is
impossible. The self, therefore, is the real basis and pre¬
supposition of all judgments.
If we ask Bowne: "What is the self?", he replies,
"Over against the plurality of successive particular states
5
the self must be both one and abiding." Because says he,
^
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. p. 20.
Loc. cit.




... the latter necessity Is as manifest as
the former. For if we suppose the particular
states to be in time, they vanish as fast as
they are born; and if there be nothing which
abides across this flow and unites the past and
the present in the unity of its continuous and
identical existence, once more the judgment
becomes impossible.!
Such an answer may not satisfy the metaphysician;
indeed it may raise still further questions concerning the
nature of self-permanence. But Bowne is convinced that all
these questions do not touch or alter the fact of permanence
itself. "The fact is revealed in thought itself; and no one
has ever succeeded in more than a verbal denial of it."
Moreover, he says:
The metaphysical questions apply equally to
all reality, and are no special difficulties of
psychology. On the plane of ordinary thinking,
where for action we demand an agent, and for
changing states an abiding subject, there is
nothing which can show a better title to be
called real and abiding than the thinking self.
And if we raise the deeper metaphysical questions
we find the apparent realities of sense perception
vanishing into phenomena, while selfhood seems to
be the only thing that can show any claim to abid¬
ing existence. ... Whatever mystery the reality
and permanence of self may involve, they cannot be
denied without wrecking thought altogether. . . •
The claim is simply that I am not thoughts, but I
think, and that I who now think am the same who
thought yesterday.
1





Thus, Bowne maintains that the reality and permanence
of the self cannot be denied without wrecking thought alto¬
gether .
D. HOW THE SELF ATTAINS KNOWLEDGE
If we admit that the existence of a self is an indis¬
pensable presupposition of knowledge, then the question
arises, How does the self come to know objects or things?
Naive realism maintains that the mind receives the imprints
of objects through the senses, and that it thus passively
obtains at least the elements of knowledge. Bowne, on the
other hand, argues that if there are states of "passive sensi¬
bility," they "become something for thought only through the
constitutive activity of intelligence." For those who think
otherwise, Bowne proposes the problem:
Given a flow of states, each of which perishes
as fast as it is born, to deduce, or in any way
reach, any articulate conception whatever. It is
respectfully suggested that all who undertake the
problem should carefully refrain from falsifying
the question by importing their own knowledge of
what is to be deduced into the data of the problem.
If this care be exercised it will appear that the
temporal, as such eludes all knowledge until it is
brought under the control of a timeless idea.1
Hence, he continues, by the time sense data are "any¬




activity even in the simplest sensation.1 This activity of
thought is certainly involved in the fact of "recurrent
experience"; for regardless of what the association in
psychology say about it, such recurrence—or rather the experi¬
ence of recurrence—"is possible only for an intelligence
which has transformed its particular experiences into general
2
concepts of abiding significance."
The immanent activity of thought in sense experience
is further illustrated in the interpretation of the impres¬
sions .
For thought does not rest in the apprehension
of sensations as having simple and identical
qualitative contents; it proceeds to relate them
variously and interpret them. Only thus does
thought reach a world of reality and of rational
system.3
The activity of mind, then, is basic to all knowledge,
and
. . . worthless are the theories which describe
the object as impressing, or stamping, or
photographing itself upon the mind.4"
Such theories of passive receptivity of the part of the mind
are at best but figurative descriptions and
. . . lose all credit, except as rhetorical




3 Ibid., p. b6.
Ibid., p. 51*
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conditions of perception and upon the fact that
knowledge can never be passed along ready-made
but arises and exists only in and through the
cognitive act.
Furthermore, he says:
As the spoken word or the printed page con¬
tains no thought, but is on the occasion upon
which a living mind thinks out of itself, so
the nervous changes contain no thought, but
are on the occasion upon which a living mind
thinks out of itself.2
Bowne remarks that one who does not know how to read would
look in vain for meaning in a printed page. Nor would his
failure be helped by using strong spectacles.
Language, [he says], has no meaning except
for one who furnishes the meaning out of him¬
self. Where the mental insight is lacking,
eye-glasses and ear trumpets are of no avail.-5
On the basis of these considerations Bowne argues that
neither the realists nor the Berkeleyan idealists can over¬
come the dualism of subject and object which their respective
systems suppose or imply and which is inherent in human
knowledge. According to the realistic view, a "world of
things" stands over against our thought in supreme indifference
and independence, while according to the idealistic view "we
have an objective divine thought over against our thought,"
^
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. loc. cit.
2 Ibid., p. 52.
^ Loc. cit.
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which so far transcends our power of comprehension that the
gap between them cannot be bridged.1 This raises the question,
how is it possible for the human mind to know anything.
To this question Bowne replies that the world of things
can exist for us "only as the mind reconstructs it as a world
2
of thought." If we prefer to say that the real world is
already a world of thought, then the conclusion is that the
world of objective thought becomes anything for us "only as
3
we rethink it and thus constitute it our object." However
real or ideal the world may be, "it becomes an object for us
only as the mind builds up in consciousness a system of con¬
ceptions, and relates their contents under the various forms
if
of intelligence." That is to say, the world becomes an
object only as the mind proceeds to interpret systematically
and under the guidance of basic categories whatever contents
of experience are disclosed in the consciousness of existing
selves.
The guidance of the basic categories is an important
factor in Bowne's system. It is impossible to fully under¬
stand his thought without an understanding of his interpreta¬










heavily from Kant but that he has also made some unique con¬
tributions of his own. The following is a distilled exposi¬
tion of his views on the categories of Knowledge.
E. CATEGORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
The categories are for Bowne what they were for Kant:
"immanent mental principles which underlie articulate experi¬
ence and make it possible."1 They are the norms by which the
mind proceeds, implicitly or explicitly, in fixing, defining,
and relating its objects. "They constitute the framework of
2
thought, and form the contents of the pure reason." The
most fundamental of these categories is time or the "form
under which we relate events."-^
1. Time. Discussing the nature of time, Bowne argues,
if
in Kantian fashion, that whatever time may be, it is no inde-
5





3 Ibid., p. 66.
k
B. P. Bowne, Metaphysics. p. 16m-. Bowne says that
"Kant made the same argument do for both but there are many
difficulties in the case of time which do not exist in that
of space, and which compel a separate discussion. The sub¬
jectivity of time is by no means involved in that of space."
5 Ibid., p. 219.
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itself. If time is assumed to be "real," ambiguities and
contradictions are unavoidable; for if time were "real,"
then it must comprehend in its unity past, present, and
future alike and must yet be identical in its totality with
eternity or timelessness; or it must "flow on" and yet be
1
also the "standing condition of all flow." In view of this
"congery of contradictions" in the notion, time as an entity
or "container" cannot exist, and "reality is not in time any
2
more than it is in space."
What is essential in time is the relation of anteced¬
ence and sequence, and this relation, according to Bowne, is
established by the mind. "The necessity of the relation does
not lie primarily in the events, but in the mind; and the
properties of time are to be understood from the side of the
3
relating act." Time, in other words, is but a form which
mind imposes upon experience, a law of relating events. In
so far as all events are related by the same law in a common
scheme, time is said to be one; and "the unity and infinity of
time are only consequences of the fact that the law of synthe-
sis is one and extends to all events."
1
Bowne, Metaphysics« loc. cit.
2
Ibid., p. 22k.




Again in Kantian fashion Bowne maintains that "the
succession of moments and events gives us the basis of
1
number." Supposing units established, they do not count
themselves. Eyes cannot see number. To simply stare at a
group of objects will never report their number. "Number is
grasped only through a process of counting, and number exists
2
only as things are united by the mind of numerical relations."
Bowne gives a summary of his views of time:
1. Time is primarily an order of relations in
our experience. This order admits of no question
or denial.
2. There is no ontological time separate from
things and events, in which they exist or occur.
3. There is no order of ontological change of
which time is the form and to which time may be
referred, without reference to intelligence.
if. Both time and change must be referred to
intelligence as their source.
5. Neither time nor change can be carried into
intelligence as such without making thought
impossible.
6. Neither time nor change can be construed
with reference to any extra-mental fact, but only
from the standpoint of self-conscious intelligence.
7. Hence the temporal judgment becomes relative
to the range and contents of self-consciousness.






temporal coexistence, as if one should say that
the earth is on all sides of the sun at the same
time, but rather as the immediate possession of
the objects by the conscious mind. This relation
cannot be construed in temporal terms, but must
be experienced.
9. What this may mean may be gathered from
reflection on what we call present experience.
This is not temporal in the sense of having a
real before and after in it. It is temporal in
the sense of having the temporal form. It is
non-temporal in the sense that the conscious
self grasps all its elements in an indivisible
act, and thus makes consciousness possible.
10. But still experience has the temporal
form; and we may resume our temporal language
with all confidence, only guarding ourselves
against mistaking this form for an ontological
fact, and also against overlooking the rela¬
tivity in the temporal Judgment due to our
limitation.1
2. Space. The next category in order of importance
is space. On the negative side Bowne argues that any attempt
to make space real and yet distinct both from things and from
nothing must fail; for "either we must make [space] a pure
nothing in reality, or we must make it a thing in interaction
2
with itself and with other things." "Both of these views,"
says Bowne, "are untenable, and the former is absurd."-'
1 B. P. Bowne, Metaphysics, pp. 193-191+. Bowne's con¬
ception of time has been criticized by some of his former stu¬
dents as being inconsistent with his Christian philosophy.
Bowne Brightman, "Temporalist or Eternalist," Personalist.





The situation is not improved even when we assume—
with Leibnitz—that "space is a certain order of relations
among realities." According to this view, Bowne claims, "if
things were away there would be strictly nothing remaining.
But things, when they exist, exist in certain relations, and
the sum, or system, of these relations constitutes space.
Bowne's criticism of this view is twofold. He points out
(1) that when space is defined as the mutual externality of
things, we have to call up the general form of space to under-
2
stand what is meant. He says that this position rests upon
a logical circle. He shows (2) that relations as such are
incapable of objective existence. Hence if space be only a
3
system of relations, it is necessarily subjective.
The positive solution of the problem of space Bowne
finds once more in the position of Kant, according to which
space, like time, is primarily a law of mental synthesis
whereby the mind relates its coexistent objects under the
b
form of mutual externality. The unity of space is simply
the unity of the law of mutual exclusion. The all-embracing





3 Ibid., p. 191.
** B. P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 7b.
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mutually external objects, while the infinity of space is
"the inexhaustibility of the spatial synthesis".1 The phrases
"in space" and "in space relation," mean essentially the same
thing.2
3. Motion, quality, and quantity. Bowne next dis¬
cusses motion, quality, and quantity as additional categories,
and points out that—
. . . space, time, motion, and quantity, with number
for their measure, are the great elementary cate¬
gories of mechanical science. They contain the basis
of pure mathematics and kinematics, and thus furnish
the groundwork of physical science.3
if





3 Ibid.. p. 80.
if
Bowne discusses this point at length under the head¬
ing of "The Phenomenality of The Physical World," in Personal-
ism. pp. 110-158.
Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics. Vol. IX, pp. 771-773, says: "Personalism agrees with
Kant in his view of the subjective nature of space and time,
but goes on to assert an objective validity as well. I may
say that time and space are only the forms under which I
think, but are they peculiar to me. If purely subjective, as
Kant taught, there is no way of granting them general validity
and no assurance that our calendars or geographies will agree.
Both time and space must be given objective validity to free
from the disjunctive caprice of the individual and make possi¬
ble a world united in space and time relations. The forms of
time and space gain validity universal for intelligent beings
through a supreme personal intelligence who creates and
upholds all."
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"phenomenality of Motion,"1 Therefore, says Bowne, it follows
from this that the mechanical sciences can never give us a
2
true picture of the essence of things or of reality as such.
Being. This brings Bowne to his discussion of
being. Science, he says, is to be supplemented by metaphysics.
Bowne regards being as the first metaphysical category. "In
the broadest sense, then, being includes everything, thought
and its objects alike; for all of these do in some fashion
3
exist." But in this broad sense, being does not necessarily
imply substantiality. We must therefore demand
... another and more metaphysical use of the
term in which the mind distinguishes between
being as substantive existence and being as
applied to events, between being as the abiding
reality and being as objective, appearance which
exists only in its perception.4"
This metaphysical and "substantial" conception of being "is
5
the fundamental category with spontaneous thought" i,.,e., with
uncritical minds. Even causation is secondary to this category
of being; for our experience is absolutely inarticulate and
nothing for intelligence until it is fixed and defined with
1 Bowne, Metaphysics. p. 2^2.
2
Loc♦ ci^#





reference to an abiding and independent meaning. Qualities
are qualities of something, and this "something" must have
"substantial" existence or it is nothing. For if we deny the
category of "substantial being" outright, then not even solip¬
sism is left as a possible view of reality."*" Furthermore, he
says,
... if we should allow the solipsistic subject
and his phenomena, those phenomena would reveal
nothing, would have no ground or bond or inner
connection whatever, and would thus elude all
rational apprehension.2
3
Bowne's category of being requires special interpreta¬
tion. As Bowne views it, the category of being appears in
three leading forms—thing, soul, and God$ but in all three
it stands for "the real ground and principle of unity in the
manifestations of the respective realms." Pure being, of
course, or being without attributes, is objectively nothing.
"Subjectively," says Bowne, "it is bare category of objective
position." Its significance lies in the fact that it pro¬
vides us with the means in and through which we transform the
chaotic manifoldness of sense perceptions into the relative
1 Ibid., p. 81!-.
2
Loc. cit.
~ R. T. Flewelling, Hasting's Encyclopedia of Religion
and Ethics T Vol. IV, pp. 721-723-
Ll
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, loc. cit.
^ Ibid., p. 85*
orderliness of a world of "things."
The senses can give us "only qualities" which are in
themselves unrelated so that "there is nothing in any one
that implies an other.Nevertheless these qualities "form
groups by association and all that we mean by a thing is
2
simply such a group" viewed under the category of being.
The "notion of being" adds nothing to the "sense contents"
that can be sensuously presented, but it contributes "inde¬
pendent objectivity"; i.e., it provides the "objective prin-
3
ciple of ground and unity" which transforms the sense content
into an abiding object of experience.
5. Identity. The category of identity Bowne admits
in two forms: first, in the logical realm, as "sameness of
meaning"; and second, in the field of metaphysics, as "con¬
tinuity of existence"; and he contends that without this
category in the metaphysical sense, "experience would vanish
into a groundless flux of perishing events. There would be no
1 Ibid., p. 86.
2
Loc. cit.
3 Ibid.. p. 87.
k
Perhaps the most thorough discussion of Bowne's
treatment of change and identity is J. A. F. Ventura's work;
Borden Parker Bowne's Treatment of the Problem of Change and
Identity. 19*f2.
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connection between the past and future of a thing.""*" In fact,
he says, "there would be no thing. Thus the thought of being
2
itself would vanish."
6. Causality. Supplementary to being and identity is
the category of causality. Without it
... events would be groundless and experience
would fall asunder into chaos. Perception, if
it were otherwise possible, would become solipsism;
for our perceptions, having no cause, could never
be related to a real world. Indeed, even the idea
of being itself, as anything beyond the individual
and momentary presentation, would vanish, and thus
nihilism would be the outcome.3
For Bowne the essential meaning of causation is
if
"dynamic determination." He finds it necessary to distin¬
guish three forms of it: (1) the self-determination of a
free agent; (2) the determination of the consequent by ante¬
cedent; and (3) the mutual determination of different things,
or interaction. He says: "in the first form we have freedom;
in the second we have the causal connection of sequences; and
in the third we have the causal connection of coexistences,
5
or the interaction of things."
1
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. p. 88.
^ Hoc, cit*





But this is not the complete story of the categories.
There is another and much more important category—the cate¬
gory of the self-acting person. In this category we find the
central thesis of Bowne's "personalism."
F. SELF-ACTIVE PERSON AS CATEGORY
The categories of being, space, time, and causation,
Bowne maintains, are necessary in order to have any articulate
experience whatever. For it is through them that we reach
intelligible objects. But, says he, these categories alone
1
would "keep us among isolated things and events." Further¬
more, "space and time separate rather than unite; and causal-
2
ity, at least in its mechanical form, provides no system."
For the further systematization and unification of our objects
a higher category is needed; and this Bowne finds in purpose,
or, rather in the elevation of causality to intelligent and
volitional causality, with its implication of plan and purpose.
We can understand experience completely only when it is inte¬
grated into one all-inclusive system of meaning. But the
unity and system demanded must be internal to experience







"internality" the category of mechanical causation does not
give to us.
Therefore, argues Bowne, the
. . • true inwardness can be found only in
self-determining, self-conscious causality,
guiding itself according to plan and purpose.
Thus only do the unity and totality of the
system become possible. Until we advance to
this conception we either contradict ourselves
or wander among verbal solutions.1
The recourse to such a category is therefore the ultimate
2
basis of all understanding and of all explanation. Thus we
have found the central thesis of Bowne's "Personalism."
There is still one more problem that arises, however,
because from the human standpoint "there is an ineradicable
dualism of thought and thing"and yet, "without assuming,
1 Ibid., p. 105.
2
"The real meaning of the categories is to be found
not in their conceptual or formal role, as modes of connection
among phenomenal, but 'through our living experience of
intelligence itself.' In this 'active self-experience' is to
be found a revelation of causality, of substance, of unity-in
manyness, and of identity in change. The categories so con¬
strued in terms of the real mind which creates phenomena, may
then be assigned to the reality beyond phenomena,—a step which
all philosophers have virtually taken in the acknowledging the
reality of other selves. This doctrine Bowne called his
'transcendental empiricism.' It leads to a spiritualistic
metaphysics, which defines 'a world of persons with a Supreme
Person at the head,' of which nature is the expression and
means of communication, and which, despite their ultimate
substantial and causal unity, nevertheless as persons preserve
a 'mutual otherness' and 'relative independence.'" Alfred Weber
and Ralph Barton Perry, History of Philosophy. 1925, p. 552.
3 Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 296.
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at least implicitly, that the laws of thought are valid for
reality, knowledge is impossible."'1" This problem of the
validity of thought and of its meaningfulness in the face of
reality, Bowne claims, can be solved neither by a mechanistic
materialism nor by absolute idealism. The mechanist and
materialist who explain everything in terms of "natural causa¬
tion," even the ideal distinctions of truth and error, of
rationality and irrationality, are meaningless. Thus, in a
purely mechanical system, says Bowne, "one notion is as
necessary as any other and as good as any other while it
2
lasts." On the other hand, "the metaphysical monism of
thought and being for the absolute leaves the epistemological
dualism of human thought and cosmic being as undeniable as
ever.""^
Leibnitz asserted a general parallelism of the laws of
thought with those of things. But this is far from being a
solution to the epistemological problem; for "the conception
of two entities mutually independent yet groundlessly parallel,
if
is impossible." Therefore, metaphysical considerations com¬





^ Ibid.. pp. 306, 309.
^ Ibid., p. 310.
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depends. What is this basic reality? Bowne answers,
... if we assume that the world expresses
thought and that our thought has something
universal in it, the ground of the parallelism
between our thought and the system becomes
apparent, and there is no longer any specula¬
tive reason why finite minds should not grasp
the cosmic fact.l
Further he says,
Things, as products of the creative thought,
are commensurable with our intelligence and are
essentially knowable. Both human minds and
cosmic things must be traced to a common source
in the creative thought and will. Only thus can
the antithesis of thought and thing be trans¬
cended and mediated. The universe, though not
founded in our thought, is yet founded in
thought; though independent of our will it is
still dependent on will.2
Bowne further contends that both traditional realism
3
and traditional idealism have been hasty and superficial,
and that "no tenable idealism can be founded on a theory of
b





^ R. T. Flewelling shows the mediating position of per-
sonalism between realism and idealism. Hasting's Encyclopedia
of Religion and Ethics. Vol. IX, pp. 771-773.
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 326.
It was these epistemological considerations which led
Bowne directly into the problems of metaphysics and "it is as
a metaphysician that Bowne dealt most directly with the prob¬
lems of his time and that he exerted his greatest influence
upon American thinking." Werkmeister, Philosophical Ideas in
America, p. 111.
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"must either lapse into solipsism, or it must be arbitrary
and inconsistent.""1" Thus if any idealism is to be held, it
must be based upon an analysis of the object known rather
than of the knowing process.
It is clear that Bowne wishes to distinguish his posi¬
tion from that of Hegel as well as from that of Berkeley.
His own view he regards as realistic "in affirming an objec-
2
tive cosmic system independent of finite thinking." But it
is idealistic "in maintaining that this system is essentially
phenomenal, and exists only in and for, as well as through,
intelligence."^
G. BOWNE'S METAPHYSICS—PERSONALISM
Bowne defines metaphysics as an "interpretation of
if
being." Being, "in its widest sense," may, of course, be
affirmed of every object of thought; but in its metaphysical
sense, Bowne says, the term "applies only to substantive
5
things." Laws, relations, and events are also real, but not
in the same sense as things.
■**




^ Bowne, Metaphysics. p. 27.
y Loc. cit.
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He says further: "The reality of a feeling is in
being felt; that of a thought is in being thought; that of a
law is in its ruling; that of a truth is in its validity.""*"
The question is, "in what does the reality or being of things
consist?" It is the task of metaphysics, claims Bowne, to
find an answer to this question and to discover "what condi¬
tions a thing must satisfy in order to fill out our notion of
2
being."
In the metaphysical sense of Bowne's doctrine, Being,
cannot be a matter of logical concepts; for such concepts are
contradictory when viewed as real existences. The universal
man, who is neither white nor black, neither tall nor short,
neither young nor old, does not, and cannot exist; and "motion
in general," to use another example, is impossible. There¬
fore, it follows that "whatever exists in reality must always
if
be something specific, and not logically universal." But
if that be the case, then, says Bowne, the notion of "pure
being" must also be rejected as incapable of real existence.
Furthermore, if it could exist, it must be rejected as useless.
5





3 Ibid., p. 29.
^
Ibid., p. 30.
^ Ibid.. pp. 32-33-
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To Bowne, the distinctive mark of being consists in
some power of action. "Things are distinguished from non-
1
existence by this power of action and mutual determination."
Causality is therefore essential to the nature of being; in
2
fact, "being" actually means being a "cause." He says fur¬
ther: "Whatever is to be considered as existing must be
3
capable of action in some form." "Being and action are
inseparable. To be is to act; the inactive is the non-
*f
existent." Again, "Being is only a class-notion, under
which things fall, not because of a piece of existence in
5
themselves, but by virtue of their activity."
When we see the emphasis that Bowne places on activity,
it is not at all surprising to note that he also insists that
. . . the rule of law, which determines the form
and sequences of a thing's activities, represents
to our thought the nature of the thing, or
expresses its true essence. It is in this law £
that the definiteness of a thing is to be found.
Therefore we must abandon as impossible of accomplishment all
attempts "to grasp the nature of reality by asking how it
1 Ibid. P. bO.
2
Ibid. P. bl.
3 Ibid. P. b5.
if Ibid. PP . 55-56
5 Ibid. P. 59.
6 Ibid. P. 60.
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looks,1,1 The nature of reality, being action, "can never be
expressed by a quality, but only by a rule or law according
2
to which the thing acts and changes." Any theory which
finds the essence of a thing in some simple quality is thus
utterly inadequate. It makes no provision for activity and
change; or, if it provides for change, it makes no provision
for identity. Thus such a theory is unacceptable as a meta¬
physical doctrine.^
Bowne as we have seen, thinks of a thing as active;
but he also insists that the thing be and remain "identical
with itself" in the midst of all changes. Now change is
5
neither a lawless nor a groundless sequence. There exists
a causal continuity between the successive states of reality
whereby each is founded in its predecessor, and, in turn,
founds its successor. "It is not a change of anything into
everything, but the direction of a change for everything is
6












continuity of being, and is identical with becoming."*"
2
"Everywhere there are ground and law."
Now if this be granted, the question arises, where do
we find an adequate conception of a reality which so obviously
involves both identity and diversity, permanence and change?
Bowne replies that we find it only in the conception of per¬
sonality, in "self-conscious spirit."
Only personality is able to give concrete mean¬
ing to those ontological categories by which we
seek to interpret being. Only personality is able
to reconcile the Eleatic and Heraclitic philosophies
for only the personality can combine change and
identity, or flow and permanence.3
For, says Bowne, as a person, each "one of us knows himself
as one and as enduring," and he distinguishes himself from
his changing states and experiences as their permanent subject.
This permanence, however, does not consist in any rigid same¬
ness of being, but in memory and self-consciousness, whereby
alone we constitute ourselves abiding persons. As persons
we are "one in many," "abiding in the midst of change," and
we are pre-eminently active. The idea of person or person¬
ality, therefore, provides us with the only adequate








H. ARGUMENTS FOR BOWNE'S POSITION
Bowne supports and defends this general thesis with a
number of specific arguments. In the first place, he points
out that things cannot be "individual and independent," for
1
"such things cannot form a universe." If each thing were
one and independent, it would necessarily be indifferent to
all the rest. Many such things put together would result in
a sum, not a system; an aggregate, not a whole; and even the
sum or aggregate would not really be inherent in the things
2
but would exist only for observing minds. A system or whole
presupposes at least an interaction of its constituent parts,
and such interaction supersedes the mutual indifference of
the things. For in a system of interacting things, where
every thing determines every other thing and is determined by
every other thing, every thing is what it is, and does what
3
it does, only as a member of the system. And that it does,
k-
only in relation to others.









so only because of "a co-ordinating one." The interactions
of the universe are possible only through the unity of a
basal reality which brings them together in its one immanent
omnipresence. "The ultimate pluralism of spontaneous
thought," that is, the pluralism implied in a superficial
and nonreflective view of the things about us, must therefore
be exchanged for a "basal monism." The unity thus reached
is not the unity of a logical universal, nor of a class-
concept, but the "essential substantial unity of being which
alone is self-existent, and in which all things have their
2
being."
This ultimate One, which Bowne regards as fundamental
to all existing things, he calls "the infinite, the absolute,
and the independent." It is the "self-sufficient source" of
the finite. Everything else has its cause and reason in this
being. The infinite must be viewed, says Bowne, as the sole
and determining ground of the system of all things. "It is
the source of all law, of all manifestations, and of all move-
ment in the system."





^ Ibid., p. 131.
** Ibid., pp. 131; 132-133.
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is grave danger that it completely absorbs all finite things
and that the latter lose all individuality and all signifi¬
cance. This danger is not unseen to Bowne. He admits that
inanimate nature, and to a lesser degree animate nature also,
fail to achieve independent existence. He asserts that only
selfhood suffices to mark off the finite from the infinite,
and "only the finite spirit attains to substantial otherness
to the infinite.""1" Apart from finite spirits there is
nothing but the infinite and its manifold activities. "The
impersonal finite attains only to such otherness as an act
2
or thought has to its subject."
Bowne conceives the infinite as an agent rather than
a substance. The infinite is "causality" rather than "sub¬
stantiality"; it is the "one basal being in action," the
source of the system and of all its laws, principles, and
3
realities. It is "personality," for, Bowne claims, "no
If
other conception is consistent with thought itself."
Before substantiating further this basic assertion,
Bowne states a rule of procedure which is indispensable to





3 Ibid.. p. ikb.
^ Ibid., p. 16!+.
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we must continually keep before us as we study his arguments.
The rule is this: "Whatever the mind demands for the satis¬
faction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be
1
assumed as real in default of positive disproof." That is
to say, unless there be positive proof to the contrary, we
may assume the universe to be such that mind, as we know it
in ourselves, is perfectly at home in the universe and,
indeed, finds its complete satisfaction therein.
Bowne claims that the mind is not a disinterested logic
machine, but is a living organism with manifold interests and
tendencies. He says that philosophy must recognize all these
2
interests and must "make room for them." In other words,
our moral interests must be recognized, and "the universe
must be not only rational, but righteous at its roots.
Furthermore, we are also religious. In fact, says Bowne,
"our entire nature works together to construct the religious
if
ideal." This ideal, must therefore, be grounded in ultimate
reality. The "one Perfect Being" "to whom heart, will, con¬
science, and intellect alike may come and say, 'Thy kingdom
5
come; thy will be done'" must exist; for only thus will the
^ Borden Parker Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. I1*.
2
Ibid., p. 19.
3 Ibid., p. 20.
^
Loc. cit.
5 Ibid., pp. 21-25.
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whole of our nature be satisfied.
Thus we have seen that to B. P. Bowne, the "world-
ground," the source of the finite and of all its determina¬
tions, is an "agent" and not "stuff or raw material," causal¬
ity and not substantiality. If we concede this, Bowne
argues, then we shall find that we have at our disposal only
two principles of causal explanation: "(1) necessary or
mechanical agency, which is driven from behind, and (2) self-
directing intelligent agency, which is led from before."1 Of
these two principles, Bowne finds the former to be inadequate
and self-defeating. Only the latter principle is to be
accepted as an ultimate explanation of reality.
The mechanistic explanation is inadequate because, for
one thing, mechanism can never explain itself. It must assume
2
the interconnection of phenomena within the system without
being able to show how such interconnection could ever get
established or how the system could come into existence.
Furthermore, mechanism and systems of necessity in general,
can never explain teleological problems. Such problems "can
find a final explanation only in a self-directing intelli-
3
gence." And all other explanations, says Bowne, "are either
1 Ibid., p. 63.
2 B. P. Bowne, Metaphysics. p. 31*+.
^ Ibid., p. 91•
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tautologies, or they implicitly abandon the problem."1 In
the world in which we live, however, teleological problems
2
abound; for we do find "design" in nature. Mechanism must
therefore be abandoned as a metaphysical doctrine.
Against the mechanistic view, Bowne further argues
that "no system of necessity has any standard of distinction
between truth and error.For, says he, if truth and error
b
be alike necessary, there is no standard of truth left.
Therefore, it follows that there can be no rationality, and
hence no knowledge, upon any system of necessity, and
mechanism as a doctrine which claims to be true thus cuts the
ground from under itself.
If, on the other hand, says Bowne, we assume that the
universe is "founded in intelligence," then the facts will
confirm our assumption. Although our knowledge is fragmen-
5
tary, we shall now encounter no contradictions. We find
that everything fall into place naturally and reveals a per¬
fect pattern. But, if we deny that the world-ground is
intelligence and affirm that the universe is "founded in
1 Bowne, Metaphysics. loc. cit.
2
Ibid., p. 109.
^ Ibid., p. ll^-.
**
Ibid., p. 115.
? Ibid., p. 119.
I*f0
non-Intelligencethen we find an irrational power doing
rational work, an unconscious power producing consciousness,
nonintelligence producing intelligence, necessity producing
freedom, and the nonpurposive working apparently for purpose.1
"The facts appear in irreconcilable and growing hostility to
2
the hypothesis." They reduce that hypothesis to an absurdity.
It is only the assumption that self-active intelligence
is the ultimate nature of reality that will, according to
Bowne, "save the phenomena" and provide an adequate explana¬
tion of all the facts of experience. This "self-active
Intelligence" says Bowne, is to be conceived as a person, a
self; for "the free and conscious self is the only real unity
of which we have any knowledge, and reflection shows that it
is the only thing which can be a true unity. All other unities
3
are formal, and have only mental existence." It is only free
intelligence, by its originating activity, that can posit
plurality distinct from its own unity, and by its self-
consciousness maintain its unity and identity over against
the changing plurality. The "abiding and identical principle
superior to change and constant in change" can be found only
if











I. SUMMARY OF BOWNE'S PERSONALISM
In sketching Bowne's personalism we have traveled a
long distance and have considered many arguments. These
arguments have been based exclusively upon Bowne's earlier
writings. In order to round out our discussion we present a
summary statement of Bowne's thinking as reflected in his last
2
great systematic work.
Common sense, Bowne tells us, has always claimed that
we are not living in a world of illusions, but in a real
3
world, and "this we not only admit but affirm." It is "with
this living, aspiring, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, human
world, with its life and history and hopes and fears and
1+
struggles and aspirations, philosophy must begin." This
world of experience, he says, is real in the sense of "being
trustworthy, or something which can be practically depended
5 6
upon." It is not modified by what we call it. It is what
1 Ibid., p. 1^3.
2
Borden Parker Bowne, Personalism; Common Sense and
Philosophy. 1908.
3 Ibid., pp. 2k-2$,
L.
Ibid., p. 25.




it is."*" Experience, however, is such that when we reflect
upon it we find ourselves unable to rest in it, not for its
reality or trustworthiness, nor for its truth, but for its
2
explanation and understanding. Only a system of thought
which transcends experience can give an adequate account of
experience and can integrate it in one comprehensive whole.
When we examine our experience, we find that "things
hang together in certain ways," and that "events come along
together according to certain rules." These uniformities
may be studied by observation and experiment, and knowledge
of them is "of the utmost practical value for the guidance of
3
our lives." Bowne claims that it is the task of science
and the "inalienable right" of science to make the necessary
observations and to plan and execute the required experiments.
No philosopher or theologian, says Bowne, "may molest" science
or "make it afraid." Furthermore, Bowne tells us, "it is in
this work, too, that science does invaluable service, for it
is just this knowledge of the way things hang together in an
order of law that gives us our control of nature and makes
civilization possible. We cannot overestimate the importance
1
Ibid., p. 25.
2 Ibid., p. 32.




of science in its own field.
Yet, our author tells us, the field of science is
strictly limited. "After we have found that things exist and
hang together in certain ways in space and time, we next need
to know what they mean; and what the cause is that underlies
2
the cosmic process." Philosophy, therefore, as "the higher
interpretation" of experience, is indispensable to a complete
3
understanding of the meaning and significance of experience.
When we reflect philosophically upon experience, we
discover that the "flitting and discontinuous impression" of
immediate experience is "interpreted into a continuous and
abiding world only by a permanent self with its outfit of
rational principles" or categories; and we discover also that
if the self were taken away there would be only "an inarticu-
k
late flux of impressions without rational contents." The
self, insists Bowne, is a necessary presupposition of all
knowledge and all interpretation.
The categories which the self employs in its task of
interpreting experience are, "in themselves, simply forms of
mental arrangement and merely prescribe the form in which







experience is to be ordered when it is given.""'" The cate¬
gories do not create the content of experience, but "are like
rules of grammar, which prescribe how we shall speak if we
speak at all, but which in themselves have no concrete con-
2
tents." Therefore, continues Bowne,
... it is only as we find these categories
realized in living self-experience that they
acquire other than a formal meaning, or pass
for anything more than purely verbal counters.
They are like grammar when there is no speech,
or rules for saying something when there is
nothing to be said.3
It is upon such an epistemology that Bowne builds his
metaphysics, and from such a point of view with respect to
the nature and possibility of knowledge, that he approaches
the facts of experience which supports his personalistic
thesis.
In the first place, he finds that the world we live in
is a "personal and social world." "We and the neighbors are
if
facts which cannot be questioned." Here, in the world which
is our "common experience," we meet in mutual understanding;
5
here "the great business of life goes on." It is a world
1 Ibid., p. 100
2
Loc. cit.
3 Ibid.. p. 102
b Ibid., p. •oCM
5 Ibid.T p. 21.
which has brought forth human beings, persons.
In the second place, Bowne finds that the world of
experience exists for us only through a rational spiritual
principle by which we reproduce it for our thought, and that
it has its existence apart from us only through a rational
spiritual principle on which it depends, and the rational
1
nature of which it expresses.
This second point in the exposition of Bowne's meta¬
physics is especially important because it constitutes the
very essence of his personalism. To establish this point,
our author maintains, first, that for an understanding of
reality only two basic ideas are at our disposal. Reality is
either a "space and time existence" or it is "self-conscious
existence." He claims that "any other conception is purely
2
verbal and without any corresponding thought." Following
Kant, Bowne then argues that space and time in themselves are
not real and that therefore a "space and time existence is
3
phenomenal only, existing only for and through intelligence."







3 Ibid.. p. 158.
^ Loc. cit.
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Bowne follows another line of argument which proceeds
from the contention that the universe is one and self-
identical. The "identities" we find in the "thing world"
our author shows to be nothing but "formal identities of
logical meaning." When we attempt to find anything more in
the way of concrete identity in the thing world we look for
it in vain."'1' They possess no existential reality. The only
concrete identity we can find anywhere turns out to be the
unity of the conscious subject. But this identity, says
Bowne, is not to be viewed as any rigid core of being, but
rather as "the self-equality of intelligence through experi-
2
ence." This conception of identity alone fulfills all the
requirements of an ultimate category of being. On the imper¬
sonal plane the problem of change and identity, according to
3
Bowne, admits of no solution. But if ultimate reality is
interpreted in terms of selfhood and personality, the diffi¬
culties vanish.
Even though the problem of causality have proven




"On the impersonal plane this problem of change and
identity admits of no solution. We cannot find the abstract
changes when we look for them. We have simply a world of
experience in which the same ideas and forms remain valid,
and through which the conscious subject remains as the only
fixed point to which everything, both permanence and change,
has to be referred." B. P. Bowne, oj). cit., pp. 123-12^.
1h7
difficult in the history of reflection, Bowne tells us that
we must face the problems nevertheless. Thus we note the
particular part which causality plays in his philosophy.
Causality, Bowne says, is "the ground of cosmic changes""*"
but, he adds, we must distinguish between "causality in the
inductive (or scientific) sense," which is concerned only
with the interdependence of phenomena, and "causality as
2
dynamic or productive efficiency," which is the source and
origin of all phenomena. In scientific or mechanical causal¬
ity, "what was" determines "what is"; in volitional causality
"free intelligence chooses things which are to be and works
for their realization.""^ It is between these conceptions,
Bowne tells us, that we have to decide.
Bowne does not believe that the decision between these
two conceptions is difficult. He claims that the causal idea,
if it is to be of ultimate significance, demands completeness
in the series of conditions, and it never can be completed on
k
the mechanical plane. There is never a true first in
mechanical causation; the sequence of cause and effect is









causality, however, we trace the act to the personal purpose
1
and volitions, and "there the regress ceases." Volitional
causality is therefore the only causality that provides a true
beginning for any sequence of events.
Bowne says that volitional causality is the only
causality of which we have experience and of which we can
2
therefore form a concrete and intelligible idea.
Here is a unity which in the oneness of conscious¬
ness can posit plurality and remain unity still.
Here is an abiding power which can form plans, fore¬
see ends, and direct itself for their realization.
Here is a cause which in the self-equality of
intelligence remains identical across the changes
which it originates and directs. And this is the
only conception that meets the demands of the
causal idea.3
Furthermore, this is the only conception that provides
an adequate explanation of the whole universe, the only con¬
ception that allows freedom and self-determination; and
"freedom is the only solution which does not wreck reason
itself." Even error is possible only on the basis of free¬
dom, and without the possibility of error, truth itself loses
its meaning.
1 Ibid., p. 191.
^
Ibid., p. 196.




The self, which for Bowne, gives to us the key to our
understanding of the universe is "not to be abstractly taken."
It is the living self in the midst of its
experiences, possessing, directing, controlling
both itself and them; and this self is not open
to the objection of barrenness and worthlessness,
being simply what we all experience when we say
me or mine. This self can never be more than
verbally denied, and even its verbal deniers have
always retained the fact. The language of the
personal life would be impossible otherwise.1
It implies "selfhood, self-consciousness, self-control, and
2
the power to know." In brief, it is "personality."
Man, however, cannot regard himself as self-sufficient
3
and independent in any absolute sense. For "complete and
perfect personality can be found only in the Infinite and
Absolute Being" which is God. And this God, says Bowne, is
the creator and sustainer of the Universe, the ultimate explan-
ation of all that is.
J. THE GOD OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE
For the universe as a whole the principle of self-active
5





3 Ibid., p. 281.
**
Ibid., p. 267.
^ B. P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, pp. 152-153*
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But to Bowne, God is not merely the absolute person without
a past or a future; he is also
... the founder and conductor of the world
process. This fact brings God into a new rela¬
tion to time. This process is a developing,
changing one, and hence is essentially in time.
Hence the divine activity therein is essentially
temporal.1
"Unchangeability and non-temporality apply to God only in his
2
relation to himself." Or we might say that they apply only
to God's inherent nature, not to His manifest activity. As
active, He is in the world; but His essence transcends every
particular stage in the world-process and also the process as
a whole. He is never less than the world.
We come now to the "world-ground" as ethical. In the
world in which we live we find truth, beauty, goodness, love,
righteousness, and other values.
The thought, therefore, of a perfect being in
whom these qualities should be lacking, or
should be present in only an imperfect degree,
would be an intellectual, aesthetic, and moral
absurdity of the first magnitude.3
Conversely, if the "world-ground" is to provide an adequate
explanation of our experience, it must be essentially moral








The "empirical argument" for the moral character of
the world-ground Bowne finds in "our moral nature," in "the
structure of society," and in "the course of history." The
first two are held to point to a moral author, and the last
reveals a power not ourselves, making for eighteousness, and
hence moral.^ Bowne argues that even
• . • life itself is so constructed as to furnish
a constant stimulus in moral direction. Nature
itself inculcates with the utmost strenuousness
the virtues of industry, prudence, foresight, 2
self-control, honesty, truth, and helpfulness.
Such is Bowne1s interpretation of evolution.
Bowne believes that history is an unfolding and reali-
zation of the divine purpose. He says:
The slow moralization of life and society,
the enlightenment of conscience and its growing
empire, the deepening sense of responsibility
for the good order of the world and the well-
being of men, the gradual putting away of old
wrongs and foul disease and blinding supersti¬




3 Ibid., p. 52.
Ll \ r-»
Borden Parker Bowne, The Immanence of God, p. ^5*
One wonders if Bowne's optimism might not have been
somewhat mitigated by the realism of two world wars and the
current omnipresent shadow of atomic destruction.
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Theistic faith accepts them as such. But at the same time,
warns Bowne, we must be on our guard against dogmatic and
1
confident interpretations of purpose in events. He feels
that we must not judge individual events too hastily; for
2
God's plan, "needs eternity for its full vindication." Nor
does Bowne admit that, since history is the gradual manifes¬
tation of God's plan, we human beings may relax in our striv¬
ing after perfection. For, says he, "It is indeed God who
worketh in us, but he works according to law, and in such a
3
way as to call for all our effort." Therefore, Bowne
admonishes us to, "work out your own salvation with fear and
trembling; for it is God who worketh in you, both to will and
to work for his good pleasure."
God, then, is the omnipresent ground of all finite
existence and activity, and the world is ever upheld by the
5
ever-lasting, ever-present, ever-working God. Nature, in
the sense of an ontological reality, is, for Bowne, "only an









5 Ibid., p. 3.
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ontological nature, but only natural events."1 Even the
commonest event like the falling of a leaf, is as super¬
natural in its causation as any miracles would be; for in
2
both alike God would be equally implicated. Furthermore he
says;
The presence of God in nature does not mean
that God is here and there in the world perform¬
ing miracles, but that the whole cosmic movement
depends constantly upon the divine will and is
an expression of the divine purpose. In like
manner the presence of God in history does not
mean exclusively, or mainly, that God is working
signs and wonders upon occasion, but rather that
God is carrying on the great historical movement
and working his will therein.3
God is omnipresent and all-pervasive. "In him we live
if
and move and have our being."
We give the closing paragraphs of Bowne's work,
Personal!smT Common Sense and Philosophy to catch the flavor
of his confident summation.
Laying aside, then, all thought of corporeal
form, and limitations as being no factor of per¬
sonality, we must really say that complete and
perfect personality can be found only in the
Infinite and Absolute Being, as only in Him can
we find that complete and perfect selfhood and
self-possession which are necessary to the
1 Ibid.. p. 16.
2
Ibid.. p. 18.




fullness of personality. In thinking, then of
the Supreme Person we must beware of trans¬
ferring to him the limitations and accidents
of our human personality, which are no neces¬
sary part of the notion of personality, and
think only of the fullness of power, knowledge,
and selfhood which alone are the essential
factors of the conception.!
If we are in a personal world, the final
cause of nature must be sought in the personal
and moral realm. Criticism frees us from all
the naturalistic nightmares of necessity and a
self-running material world, and allows us to
trust our higher human instincts once more.
Philosophy replaces the infinitely far God by
the God who is infinitely near, and in whom
we live and move and have our being. But for
the practical realization of this divine pres¬
ence, logic and speculation can do little for
us. This belief must be lived to acquire any
real substance or controlling character. This
is the case with all practical and concrete
beliefs. If we ignore them practically we soon
accost them skeptically5 and they vanish like
a fading gleam. Or we may build them into life
and organize our lives around them, and they
become 'truths that wake to perish never.' 'To
as many as receive him, tOpthem gives he power
to become the sons of Godi
Borden Parker Bowne, Personalism: Common Sense and
Philosophy, pp. 266-267.
Bowne, Personalism. pp. 325-326.
CHAPTER IV
BOWNE'S RELIGIOUS PRAGMATISM
This chapter attempts to deal with Bowne's Religious
Pragmatism. A problem is presented by the parallel occurrence
in his work of both rationalistic and pragmatic types of
method. This has resulted in Bowne being variously claimed
as both rationalist and pragmatist. Research has made it
quite clear, however, that conservative students of his
philosophy have, in general, underestimated the importance of
the pragmatic elements by subsuming them under his rational¬
ism, and that more radical students, though recognizing the
importance of the pragmatism, have failed to show its rela¬
tion to his rationalism.
By rationalism we shall here understand any method or
methods that make reason, as the logical understanding, the
final standard and arbiter of all philosophical questions.
Rationalism may proceed deductively, after the manner of
Descartes and Herbart, or it may proceed empirically, gather¬
ing the facts of experience and attempting their ultimate
theoretical explanation under the standards of consistency
and coherence. The distinguishing mark of rationalism is its
ultimate appeal to reason for its criteria of truth. By
pragmatism, on the other hand, we mean those methods which
make various extra-rational factors the final standards of
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philosophy, such as fruitfulness or favorable results, or the
satisfaction of our human interests and feelings. This type
of pragmatism is of the humanistic type rather than the
scientific, but it is the pragmatism with which we are con¬
cerned in Bowne's works.
A. THE FACT OF BOWNE'S PRAGMATISM
The pragmatism of Bowne sprang almost exclusively from
his interest in religion. The metaphysical groundwork of
religion could indeed be established by rationalistic method,
but the distinctively religious concepts, on his view, could
not be thus established. Rationalism provides a sufficient
basis, therefore, for the unity, intelligence and free causal¬
ity of the world ground. But the concepts of the love and
goodness of God, prayer and immortality require some other
ground for their affirmation. Only because of our faith in
the ideal can we hold to them. Our faith in the reality of
the ideal is established alone by practical considerations,
by the energy of life itself. In his book Theism. Bowne
explains.
God is seen to be that without which our ideals
collapse or are made unattainable, and the springs
of action are broken. Hence the existence of God is
affirmed not on speculative or theoretical grounds,
but because of the needs of the practical life.
This has often been called the moral argument for
157
the divine existence5 a better name would be the
practical argument.1
Religious belief, therefore, is to be justified primarily on
pragmatic grounds. We have here, then, the line of division
through the system of Bowne's thought. Edward T. Ramsdell is
correct in saying that Bowne's viewpoint "combines at once
that of the metaphysical rationalist and that of the religious
2
pragmatist."
To dis tinguish the pragmatic elements in Bovme's
epistemological theory and method, we begin with his view of
the nature of the mind. From the publication of the Studies
in Theism in 1879 to the end of his life work, he described
the mind as an organic whole of vital interests and feelings
which outline and control our mental development and determine
our fundamental beliefs. Under the compulsion of his own
religious interests, Bowne joined in the revolt against an
over-intellectualism. The mind is not only to be thought of
as primarily intellect, but the logical intellect is not even
to be credited with a controlling place in the mind. It is
not logic, but our interests and feelings that determine our
fundamental beliefs. Note his pragmatic, anti-intellectualist
descriptions of the mind:
^
Borden Parker Bowne, Theism, p. 291.
2 Edward T. Ramsdell, "The Religious Pragmatism of
Borden Parker Bowne," The Personalist. Vol. XV, No.
(October 193*0 •
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"Mental activity runs in lines determined by our funda
mental interests, and all our theories are adjusted to them."
The mind is not a disinterested logic-machine,
but a living organism, with manifold interests and
tendencies. These outline its development, and
furnish the driving power.2
The driving and directing force of the mind lies
in its living interests, and not in the discursive
faculty. The principles of mental movement are to
be sought, not in logic, but in life. . . . There
is no department of belief into which subjective
interests do not enter as controlling.3
Such descriptions as these are not casual or incidental in /■
Bowne, but occur throughout the course of his religious
writings.
A second pragmatic element is found in Bowne's use of
the criterion of interest-satisfaction. Anything which satis
fies the fundamental interests or subjective needs of the
mind may be regarded as true. As we have now seen, Bowne
thought of the mind as an organic whole of manifold interests
and tendencies. These interests and tendencies include the
intellectual, the moral, the aesthetic, and the religious.
Each represents a basic "subjective" need of the mind. These
1 Borden Parker Bowne, "Concerning the Christian Con¬
sciousness," The Independent. 37, January 8, 1885.
2
Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 19.
^ Bowne. "The Logic of Religious Belief," Methodist
Review. 66, l8w, p. 660.
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needs are satisfied through certain postulates which rise out
of them. The intellectual need requires our belief in the
intelligibility and rationality of the universe; the aesthetic
need requires our belief in the moral government of the world;
and the religious need requires our belief in the reality of
God as the inclusive ideal. It is impossible to prove these
beliefs or postulates and Bowne saw no adequate rationalistic
justification for them. We can accept them as valid, there¬
fore, only on the pragmatic grounds that they satisfy the fun¬
damental needs of the mind out of which they grow.
In its practical unfolding the mind makes a
great variety of practical postulates and assump¬
tions which are not logical deductions or specula¬
tive necessities, but a kind of modus vivendi with
the universe. They represent the conditions of
our fullest life; and are at bottom expressions of
our practical and ideal interests or necessities.1
Primarily, all of these assumptions are but the
projection upon the universe of the demands and
interests of our total nature.2
Bowne reaches beyond a strictly religious pragmatism
in his defense of the religious postulate. If the postulates
of morality and religion are subjective, he argues, at least
they are not more subjective than the postulates of science.
All fundamental postulates rest, in the final analysis, simply
upon their satisfaction of human interest. The scientist
Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, pp. 13-11*.
p
Bowne, The Independent. 37 (January 8, 1885), p. 35*
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assumes the intelligibility and uniformity of the natural
world, but "this is a tremendous assumption, based only on
1
his subjective needs."
If the instinctive affirmations of the mind
are accepted in default of proof in the field
of sense-perception, there seems to be no good
reason why similar affirmations should be 2
rejected in the field of morals and religion.
While not attempting a critique of Bowne's religious pragma¬
tism, it may be pointed out that Bowne, in his treatment of
the scientific postulates, he is invading the field which,
according to his own definition, should be left to rationalis¬
tic method. The rationalist contends that the cognitive need
of the mind may indeed account for the origin of the postulate
that the world is intelligible, but only reason can establish
the rational justification of the assumption on the ground
that it yields the most reasonable, that is, the most con¬
sistent and coherent, view of experience. To the thorough¬
going rationalist, of course, "the moral and religious postu¬
lates find their warrant in the same way and not in any fact
of basic interest-satisfactions."^
From the criterion of interest-satisfaction Bowne
formulated the fundamental method of his religious writings.
Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 70.
2
Bowne, Methodist Quarterly Review, 66 (1881*), pp. 665-
666.
3 Ramsdell, o£. cit.. p. 309.
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This method is essentially the method which James later
called that of the "will to believe." As early as 1887
Bowne wrote:
There is an element of faith and volition
latent in all our theorizing. Where we cannot
prove, we believe. Where we cannot demonstrate,
we choose sides.
It was Bowne's belief that he found authority for this method
in Kant. He says that Kant
. . • claimed to have shown that, by way of
speculation, neither proof nor disproof is
possible; and in this balance of speculative
reason practical interests may be allowed to
turn the scale.2
Bowne's formal statement of the method appeared for
the first time in 188^. He states it as follows: "Whatever
the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective
interests and tendencies may be assumed as real, in default
of positive disproof."^ Since Bowne held that rational proof
or disproof of ultimate religious beliefs is impossible, this
statement of method remains entirely pragmatic.
A third pragmatic element in Bowne's thought is his
use of the criterion of workability or results. This criterion
Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. iii.
2
Ibid., p. 2*f2.
3 Methodist Quarterly Review, op. clt., 66, (l88>+),
p. 652.
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used as early as 1879 in his Studies in Theism. For example,
"We conclude • . . that it is no objection to a belief that
its grounds do not admit of satisfactory formal statement,
provided always that it works well."^" And again in the same
work he says: "In addition, then, to beliefs deduced from
formal data, there are other beliefs which are based on
2
results." Shortly before his death in 1910, in one of his
last published articles, he speaks of what he calls the
"essential beliefs" of the mind:
They are the principles by which men live, and
without which they cannot live their best life.
And the proof of such beliefs rests entirely on
the energy of the life they express, and on their
power to further that life in practice. They meet
our mental needs and they work well in life* This
is the pragmatic test of truth, and for concrete ^
truth there is no deeper or surer test than this.-3
There are other indications that Bowne employed the
results-criterion in full consciousness of it as a pragmatic
instrument. In his volume, Kant and Spencer, published post¬
humously, he writes:
Thought has become pragmatic, especially in
ethical and religious fields, and we are very
little concerned at speculative inadequacy, pro¬
vided a doctrine works well, in practice and
enriches and furthers life.4"
Bowne, Studies in Theism, pp. 6*+-65.
2
Ibid., p. 75.
3 Bowne, "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last
Generation," Hibbert Journal. 8 (1909-10), p. 892.
^ Bowne, Kant and Spencer, p. 209*
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Another form in which the results-criterion appears is found
in the phrase "practical absurdity," as, for example: "The
1
test of concrete truth and error is practical absurdity,"
In this particular instance the criterion is given in negative
form.
A fourth pragmatic element in Bowne's thought is the
criterion of survival. He uses this criterion a number of
times but in a more incidental way than the other elements
previously mentioned. Characteristic of this use is the
statement, referring to conflict-beliefs: "More and more
history itself becomes the argument, and the survival of the
2
fittest judge." And in another article, "If there be others
with a different set of fundamental sympathies and interests,
and no mediation is possible, history and the survival of
3
the fittest must decide between them." Furthermore, speaking
of the anti-religious views of the world, Bowne affirms:
These views have not been great enough to
command the faith or stir the hearts of men. In
this fact the survival of the fittest, as the
supreme court for considering the matter, hands
down a final decision.^"
1 Bowne, Theism, p. 2?.
2 Methodist Quarterly Review, op. cit., 66 (1881*),
p. 665.
^
Bowne, "Cardinal Newman and Science," The Independent.
h2 (1890), p. HfOl.
** Bowne, The Essence of Religion, p. 298.
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Bowne's view of reason as instrumental with respect to
the fundamental interests of the mind constitutes a fifth
pragmatic element in his thought. The following is a charac¬
teristic statement of the view:
Our feelings and interests are the deepest
thing in us. They furnish the great impulses
to action, and they also outline its direction.
... Man can interest himself in truth, in
righteousness, in beauty, in a great variety of
ideal aims, which thus become the norms and
guides of his action. For these basal interests,
the intellect is simply instrumental.1
Speaking of the postulates or assumptions which grow
out of the basic interests of the mind, Bowne writes:
What, now, is the function of logic with
regard to these postulates? Plainly not to
prove them, but to bring them and their impli¬
cations out into clear consciousness, and to
keep them from losing their way.
It is obvious that in Bowne's mind these fundamental interests
of the mind stand in their own right, independent of any possi¬
ble justification by reason. In point of fact, reason is to be
regarded as instrumental to these interests, helping to artic¬
ulate and clarify them and to bring them into harmony with one
another. By this Bowne does not intend to say that the
intellect has not "full rights" of its own, but rather to
■*"
Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 217-
218.
2 Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, pp. 25-26.
3 See Hibbert Journal. 8 (1909-1910), p. 892.
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affirm that these rights are restricted to the fields of
logic and metaphysics.
There is one further pragmatic element in Bowne's
thought that is to be distinguished—his view of truth.
Bowne sometimes uses the term truth in the restricted sense
of meaning simply the a priori principles of reason. So
defined, truth is, on his view, absolute.1 Concrete truth,
or truth regarding the external world, on the other hand,
2
means the validity of our thought for the external thing.
At this point the conception has a strong pragmatic tone. In
other words, the truth of any theory may be rationally pre¬
sumed if its results are favorable to human life. Referring
to the criterion of results as used by certain "materialists,"
Bowne says:
This standard is simply results. Those thoughts
and views are true which work well; and those are
false which work ill. In a rational systeuP such a
test would be valid; but the materialist has no
such system.4"
Bowne's conception of truth was thoroughly teleological.





Bowne, of course, thought of his own philosophy as a
"rational system."
Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 115.
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All truth is in some measure purposive. There is no truth
that is not in some measure purposive. With this view it was
natural to assume that truth will show itself in fruitful
results. In an article written in l88*f, after affirming the
pernicious influence of atheistic beliefs and the beneficial
influence of theistic beliefs, he wrote:
If. now, this is no ground for believing
them (i.e., the theistic beliefs), we are under
the disagreeable necessity of admitting that a
true belief may be paralyzing and pernicious,
while a false belief may be necessary to our
best development.^
Perhaps the clearest statement of this conception of truth is
to be found in one of Bowne's last articles. Referring to
the basic beliefs of life, he explains:
They meet our mental needs and they work well
in life. This is the pragmatic test of truth,
and for concrete truth there is no deeper or
surer test than this. Indeed theory of knowledge
implicitly assumes this test. If we are theists,
we can hardly believe that the truth will work
mischief. If we are evolutionists and believers
in natural selection, we must equally believe
that these evolved beliefs are the best adjusted
to reality, as being the outcome of that evolving
and selecting process whose function it is to
eliminate the false and preserve the true.
This view of truth certainly gives evidence for those
who would have William James and Bowne stride together. In
^
Methodist Quarterly Review, op. cit., 66 (188^-),
p. 65*f. * ~ "" '
2
Hibbert Journal, op. cit., 8 (1909-1910), pp. 892-
893.
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his work The Meaning of Truth he says: "All that the prag¬
matic method implies, then, is that truths should have prac¬
tical consequences."*
The pragmatic elements in Bowne's thought are confined
largely to his writings on religion. Within that field,
however, they are widely used. They are not causal or
incidental. They appear first in the Studies in Theism,
published in 1877, and in the article "The Logic of Religious
Belief," published in the Methodist Quarterly Review in 1881}-,
and thereafter are consistently employed to the close of
Bowne's work.
B. THE RELATIONSHIP OF BOWNE'S PRAGMATISM
TO HIS RATIONALISM
Having presented the evidence for Bowne's religious
pragmatism, we now proceed to discuss this religious pragma¬
tism in relation to his rationalism. As a systematic meta¬
physician Borden Parker Bowne was a rationalist. His method,
he admits, was that of Herbart, "who defined it as 'the work-
2
ing-over of the notions."' This critical re-working and
harmonizing of basic concepts was not a passing method with
Bowne. He uses it without change in the two editions of the
1 William James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 52.
2
Bowne, Metaphysics—A Study in First Principles.
P. 23. """"
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Metaphysics. published in 1882 and 1898 respectively. Charac¬
teristic of this rationalism is his own statement of principle:
"that a contradiction in a notion proves its untenability.""*"
And a fuller expression of this view in the following:
Our interpreting activity presupposes the
intelligibility and hence the rationality of
all existence. It presupposes that the objec¬
tive reality is cast in the molds of thought, so
that the irrational is the impossible.2
As a philosopher of religion Bowne early developed and
regularly employed a pragmatic methodology. This we have dis¬
cussed in the first section of this chapter. The question we
now ask is how did Bowne relate his religious pragmatism to
his metaphysical rationalism. How are consistency and
"adequacy to the facts" to be equated or harmonized with
results, interest-satisfactions and survival as criteria of
truth? Will an idea tested by one set of criteria meet the
truth-requirements of the other set? If they will, the use
of the two sets is superfluous; if they will not, we are con¬
fronted with an inescapable contradiction. Or as Ramsdell
puts the question to Bowne, "When the pragmatic and the




"What Is Rationalism?". The Independent. bO (January
26, 1888), p. 99.
*3
Ramsdell, op. cit., p. 2*f.
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Let us first look at Bowne's own attitude toward this
parallel use of method. From that point we shall consider
whether Bowne actually achieved unity and harmony in the two¬
fold approach.
At the outset we may say that Bowne probably had no
thought of a fundamental contradiction in his use of the two
types of method. Indeed he regarded the exclusive use of any
particular method of truth as impossible in actual experience.
"The test of fundamental beliefs can never be any simple rule,
but will rather be as complex as our nature itself."^" Further¬
more, writes Bowne:
Academic discussion of the standard of certainty
or of the criterion of truth are barren of any
valuable result. There is no general standard which
the mind can mechanically apply. The standard is the
mind itself, dealing with particular and concrete
cases; and any given item of knowledge must stand
or fall, not because it agrees or disagrees with
some assumed standard, but because of the evidence
with which it presents itself to the living mind in
contact with the facts.2
This notion of the superiority of the mind to any
"simple and compendious" standard of truth only reflects
Bowne's belief that the method of the theoretical reason must
differ from that of the practical reason. We have previously
considered Bowne's description of the mind as an organic
^ Bowne, "The Logic of Beligious Belief," Methodist
Quarterly Review. 66 (1881*), p. 665.
p
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. p. 293*
170
whole of vital interests and tendencies. On his view the
intellectual interest was to be identified with the Kantian
practical reason, and the practical, aesthetic, moral and
religious interests were to be identified with the Kantian
1
practical reason. Each function of reason has its own
method, and no standard of truth is sufficient for both func¬
tions. For the most part the two methods are harmonized even
as are the two functions of reason to which they are peculiar.
This distinction between the theoretical and the prac¬
tical reason corresponds to Bowne's classification of knowledge
and belief. It is only the immediate data of experience and
the rational truths of logic and mathematics which are knowl¬
edge in the strict sense. The remainder, and the largest por¬
tion, of the cognitive field is comprised of rational belief
or probable knowledge, that is, knowledge characterized by
probability under the evidence rather than by absolute cer¬
tainty. Bowne contends that there are two types of belief:
those beliefs which rest upon "objective facts" that is, per¬
ceptual experience, and those beliefs which are grounded in
what he calls "subjective tendencies," that is, the vital
2
feelings and interests of the mind. The first mentioned
Cf. "Present Status of the Conflict of Faith,"
Methodist Quarterly Review. 105 (1922), pp. 363-36^-.
^ Cf. Studies in Theism, pp. 62-63.
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beliefs constitute the fields of science and metaphysics,
which, together with logic and mathematics, are rationalistic
in method. The second mentioned beliefs belong to morals and
religion and depend upon the pragmatic method.
There is a reason why Bowne distinguished so diarply
between the two types of belief and between the two functions
of reason and the methods peculiar to them. This reason is
to be found in his understanding of the nature of religious
belief. Bowne was greatly impressed with the psychology of
religious belief. This particular field of investigation was
beginning to come into prominence during the early period of
Bowne's work. He increasingly came to feel that our personal
beliefs spring out of and are determined by the particular
feelings and interests of the mind. Bowne felt that such
beliefs, because of their "subjective" origin, could not be
treated objectively. In other words, he "failed in practice
to distinguish the question of origin from the question of
validity, although in theory he protested against such con¬
fusion. "**"
Bowne's failure to treat the validity of moral and
religious beliefs objectively, whatever their origin, and the
consequent assignment of rationalistic method to the field of
the theoretical reason and of pragmatic method to the field
Ramsdell, op. cit.. p. 26.
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of practical reason, was due in no small measure to this
influence of the psychology of religious belief* That is to
say, religious belief must be treated differently from other
rational belief because it has its "ground" in "subjective"
feelings and interests. Undoubtedly it was this influence,
more than anything else, that kept Bowne from treating moral
and religious beliefs axiologically, although at several
points he anticipated such objective treatment of the facts
of value-experience. These anticipations are sufficiently
striking to deserve attention.
It is often objected that feeling cannot be a
basis for ethics, because feeling is particular
while ethical law must be universal, and hence
must be founded in reason. This is merely a war
of words. . • . The fact is not made universal
by calling it an utterance of the reason; nor is
it made less than universal by calling it feeling.
Its universality depends upon its content, and
not upon its psychological classification.1
It is in this sense of having many implications
which can be unfolded in systematic statement that
the ethical and religious consciousness may be
spoken of as independent source of truth.2
And in the same article, in referring to basic beliefs, Bowne
suggests: "In the last analysis these axiomata have an ethical
root. They rest upon the idea, not of what must be, but of
3
what ought to be."
1
Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 206-
207.
^
Bowne, Methodist Quarterly Review, op. cit.. 66 (188^),
p. 662.
3 ibid., p. 66l«
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In these three quotations the ground-work for a
thoroughly objective and rationalistic treatment of religious
belief is clearly present. But these anticipations remained
as casual and unexplored suggestions in Bowne's writings.
They are never systematically developed. He continued to
defend moral and religious beliefs pragmatically to the end
of his work while remaining rationalistic in his metaphysics.
This would indicate that he never quite threw aside the notion
that such beliefs have their "ground" in "subjective" tenden¬
cies.
The acceptance of subjective grounds of belief as
valid seemed, to Bowne, to fit into his teleological concep¬
tion of truth, and knowledge without contradiction. Truth is
in nature rational, yet it must also be considered as purposive
and fruitful. It would be inconceivable to believe that meta¬
physical truth could have results that would be harmful to
human life. Ultimate truth must be conceived teleologically.
"The mind demands the thought of a goal, an end toward which
things are working. When this thought is given, our explana-
1
tion is formally complete." Or, as he puts it in another
place, in answer to the question, "What is rational?"
First, that is rational which accords with
the fundamental laws of thought. Second, that
Bowne, "Explanation—A Logical Study," Methodist
Review, 70 (1888), p. 662.
17^
is rational which is viewed as fitting into an
intelligible system. Third, that is rational
which has in^it evidence of purpose, outcome,
final cause.
In other words, knowledge in any ultimate sense is possible,
for Bowne, only within the framework of purpose. "Thought
2
must become teleological before it can complete itself."
Purpose is a category of reflective thought.
In accepting subjective grounds of belief and in
attempting to justify pragmatic method under the category
of purpose Bowne was only revealing the strength of his per-
sonalistic premise. Personality is the first value and the
first reality of our experience. It is impossible to get
beyond it. Its integrity is a presupposition of truth itself.
It is inconceivable that anything harmful to personality can
be ultimately true. It is now clear that personalism is not
the outcome of Bowne's philosophical activity; it was the
starting point. Frank Wilbur Collier, a student of Bowne's,
comes to the same conclusion. He says:
It is now evident that Bowne was a personalist
from the beginning. By Personalism he meant that
the Ultimate Reality, and indeed all reality, as
distinguished from appearance, is Personal Intelli¬
gence. Having been born and brought up in a
Christian home and a Christian community he
Bowne, "Theology and Reason," Zion*s Herald, 66
(1888), p. 1*01.
2
Bowne, "Spencer's Nescience^ The Independent. 56
(190*+), p. 67.
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inherited the belief in a personal God, which is
not only the God of the Bible, but which has
always been the God of religion. This great
catholic belief is what he began with, and as
he progressed in his philosophical study, he not
only never found any reason that suggested posi¬
tive disproof, but on the contrary everything led
back to personal intelligence as the source of all
things. The irapressiveness of this grew until he
reached a point where he was not satisfied with
any one of a number of terms which he suggested
• . . and finally adopted the term Personalism
which he gave his last philosophical work.l
Bowne allowed personalism to determine the method. It
is clearly this fact that lifts his pragmatism to a dominant
position in his religious thought. Morals and religion are
indispensable to personality. Where rationalistic method
fails to establish morals and religion upon a sound philo¬
sophical basis, there we must resort to pragmatism. If con¬
sistency and "adequacy to the facts" are not sufficient, then
results, interest-satisfaction and survival must be appealed
to. In the sphere of moral and religious thought, therefore,
any conflict between rationalistic and pragmatic method must
be resolved by giving the pragmatic the position of control.
To Bowne, this meant only the primacy of the practical reason.
2
It meant "the primacy of life over speculation," as Kant, it
seemed to him, had permanently established it.
To Bowne there appeared to be no fundamental contradic¬
tion in the parallel use of the two types of method. Whenever,
1 The Personallst. Vol. I, No. 1 (April, 1920), pp. 38-39.
^ "Spencer's Nescience," Independent. 56 (190^), p. 67.
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in the field of moral and religious belief (and this was the
only point of danger), a conflict threatened, the primacy of
the practical reason was invoked. And to this extent this
meant for Bowne the dominance of the pragmatic method.
This brings up other questions that demand an answer.
Was Bowne correct in identifying the vital interests of the
mind, as he described them, with the practical reason of Kant?
Did the primacy of the practical reason mean for him what it
meant for Kant?
It would seem that the evidence demands a negative
answer to the first of these questions. Bowne was not correct
in identifying the interests of the mind, as he described them,
with the practical reason. For Kant the practical reason was
strictly autonomous. It Is true that it has its interests,
but its judgements are made in the light of a priori princi¬
ples, and not because of any interests or feelings. Kant
specified of the moral law:
... that its validity for us does not lie in
the fact that it is, interesting—for that is
heteronomy and the dependence of practical
reason upon sensibility (Sinnlicheit), namely,
a basic feeling whereby it could never be
ethically law-giving-but, on the contrary, it
is interesting because it is valid for us as
men, since it has sprung from our will as
intelligence, that is^from our real self
(eigentlichen Selbst).
Immanuel Kant, Saemtliche Werke, ed., by Karl
Vorlaender (Leipzig: Meiner, 1920-1922), Vol. Ill Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 91.
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On the other hand, Bowne's doctrine makes moral and religious
beliefs, in so far as they are determined by the interests
and feelings of the mind, heteronomous expressions of reason,
rather than autonomous. For Bowne moral and religious beliefs
were products, not conclusions:
The fundamental outlines of human belief are
determined by various circumstances, chief of
which are the essential interests of the mind.
Mental activity runs in lines determined by our
fundamental interests, and all our theories are
adjusted to them. Accordingly, we find a variety
of postulates underlying our mental procedure,
which are at bottom only expressions of those
interests; and we also find that any theory
which cannot be adjusted to them is sure, sooner
or later, to be set aside.1
According to Kant, the validity of the principles of
the practical reason rests in their a priori nature; they are
seen by reason to be a priori universal and necessary without
respect to experience. As Ramsdell says,
The primacy of the practical reason meant
the validity of the a priori principles of the
practical reason, independent of the possibility
of their being established by the speculative
reason, so long as they do not contradict the
speculative reason.2
But Bowne makes no use whatever of the a priori argument for
the universality of the principles of the practical reason.
1
Bowne, "Concerning the 'Christian Consciousness,'"
Independent, 37 (January 8, 1885), p. 35»
o
Ramsdell, op. cit., p. 30.
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Instead, he concludes that the moral and religious belief
must be assumed to be valid because feelings and interests
which determine them occur universally in human experience.
Their universality, therefore, is not affirmed as a priori
but as inductive. Bowne writes:
Historically, there has been a good deal to
justify suspicion of and impatience with appeals
to feeling in any form as reasons for belief.
. . . But this impatience is itself short-sighted.
First, it overlooks the fact that there are feel¬
ings and feelings. There are particular fancies,
and there are the great catholic sentiments of the
race. There are individual desires, and there are
the great fundamental human interests in which life
itself roots.1
Without doubting the validity of this argument, we may still
see that Bowne's doctrine and method have been separated from
those of Kant. For Kant the primacy of the practical reason
meant the rational universality and necessity of the moral
law, but for Borden Parker Bowne, it meant the setting of
the vital over against the intellectual. "Life is richer
2
and deeper than speculation." In an article published a
short time before his death he said: "We have come to a point
at last where we are trusting our instincts again, our higher
instincts as well as the lower ones."^
1
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 370.
2
Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. I1*.
^ Bowne, "Present Status of the Argument for Life after
Death," North American Review. 191 (1910), p. 103.
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Not only did Bowne depart from the Kantian doctrine,
but he also failed to achieve real unity and harmony in his
twofold use of method. He did not establish the rational
character of the interests and feelings of the mind as he
described them. While he called them the practical reason,
he did not justify that identification. There are places
where he did approach and anticipate in terms of values and
content, but these anticipations did not constitute his
systematic treatment. To the end of his life he defended
the "subjective grounds" of moral and religious belief prag¬
matically.
Bowne's identification, however, will bear a closer
study. If the interests and feelings of life are to be sub¬
sumed under the concept of the practical reason, then either
all of them must be so subsumed or only a part of them. If
we say that all of them must be so subsumed, then there is no
distinction left between the rational and irrational life.
It is interesting to note in Bowne's writings that he specifi¬
cally recognizes that some of our interests and feelings are
"individual" and "particular," and therefore not rational
grounds for belief. This would lead us to say that if only
a part of the interests and feelings of life are to be iden¬
tified with the practical reason, how may we know which ones
are to be identified? How are those which are designated
rational to be distinguished from those which are not?
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Bowne's reply to this question is that those interests are
rational which are essential to the mind. He says:
We cannot intend to base any conclusion on
individual and non-essential feelings and
interests, but on the essential needs of the
mind; and these, we hold, render an objective
correspondence highly probable.1
And these essential needs of the mind are revealed by "the
2
great catholic sentiments of the race." But it is obvious
that the truth of a belief is not to be established by its
generality, and furthermore, the religious beliefs which
Bowne speaks of as general are not general. Bowne himself
recognized this fact in providing the criterion of "survival
of the fittest" as between theistic and atheistic beliefs.^
Then again, as Ramsdell points out,
... even if religious belief were general in
its distribution, no point of truth would be
established thereby, for clearly the most erro¬
neous beliefs may be the most widespread. This
is nothing but the consensus gentium argument.
Bowne uses another argument for the trustworthiness of
"the great catholic beliefs" of mankind and of the "essential
needs" from which they spring. They are products of the
"*■
Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 76.
2
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. p. 370.
3 Methodist Quarterly Review, op. cit., 66 (1881*),
p. 665.
Ramsdell, "Pragmatism and Rationalism in Bowne,"
Personalist. Vol. XVI, No. 1 (January, 1935)*
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universe of mind:
When it is seen that belief is made for us
rather than by us, that the great outlines of
belief are drawn in life and by life, then the
great catholic beliefs of humanity begin to
acquire the significance of any other great
natural product. They show the direction of the
evolving moment, the trend of the universe of
mind. They are no longer accidents of the
individual, but are as much entitled to be
viewed as belonging to the nature of things as
the stars in their courses, or the law of
gravitation. They are no adventitious and fic¬
titious addition to reality; and no doubt can
be cast upon them without discrediting the whole
system of knowledge.1
This account describes the truth that everything in the
universe is a product of the universe in the largest sense, but
as a logical case for the rational character of beliefs which
are thus designated as natural products of the universe, the
argument is clearly a petitio principii. It assumes the
theistic position to validate theistic beliefs. Even if we
grant the theistic assumption, the argument affords no dis¬
tinguishing criteria, for all beliefs, true and false alike,
are similarly products of the universe.
By such means Bowne could hardly be said to establish
the rationality of the interests and feelings of the mind as
he described them. This would seem to be beyond debate.
Bowne's defense of moral and religious belief is no more con¬
vincing. It would seem that his attempt to argue for the
1 Bowne, "Faith in Our Immortality," Independent. *+8
(1896), p. Cf. Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 377*
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validity of such beliefs on the grounds that they satisfy
essential interests of the mind begs the whole question when
the rational character of these "essential" interests has
not been established. Likewise to argue on the basis of
results is to establish nothing in any final way.
The criterion of favorable results can readily
be used for beliefs that are actually contradic¬
tory. Nor does the criterion of survival help us
any more effectively in getting at the real truth
of a belief. It too can be used quite easily for
atheism as for theism.1
The main point of fundamental contradiction in Bowne's
thought, however, is in his failure to harmonize his doctrine
of belief with his doctrine of the speculative significance
of freedom. Bowne holds that the trustworthiness of the mind
presupposes its freedom. Error can be accounted for only if
the mind is free. "If the movements of the mind are mechani¬
cally determined then true and false ideas alike are products,
2
not conclusions." All rational activity, in so far as it is
truly objective, is essentially free activity. The mind dis¬
tinguishes without any sort of compulsion, except that of
reason itself, the true from the false. Only with such
freedom from mechanical or impulsive determination is the
search for knowledge possible. Bowne says "that the question
1
Ramsdell, ojd. cit., p. 33.
2 Ibid* * P. 3^.
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of freedom enters intimately into the structure of reason
itself. . . • The only escape from the overthrow of reason
involved in the fact of error lies in the assumption of
freedom."^" But how can we reconcile this theory of the spec¬
ulative significance of freedom with the doctrine of the
determinative character of the essential feelings. This
latter doctrine presented. This doctrine says that
... the fundamental outlines of human belief are
determined by various circumstances, chief of
which are the essential interests of the mind.
Mental activity runs in lines determined by our
fundamental interests, and all our theories are
adjusted to them.2
If Bowne were here describing simply the origin of
such beliefs, no contradiction would need to be involved, for
rational activity could still be considered as free in its
critical evaluation of the beliefs which had thus arisen.
Bowne, however, accepts the inevitable determination of cer¬
tain beliefs as their validation, in spite of an occasional
protest to the contrary.
All this makes the issue quite clear. In his meta¬
physics Bowne treats the mind as free in its rational activity,
but in his philosophy of religious belief, he treats it as
determined in its fundamental beliefs by its basic feelings
1 Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. p. 2^3.
2
IndependentT op. cit., 37 (January 8, 1885), p. 35*
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and interests. This left Bowne with a problem which he never
acknowledged nor solved. That problem is how to relate the
mind as a free-knowing subject to the mind as determined in
its primary beliefs.
Our study would reveal that Bowne!s twofold interest
in metaphysics and religion was never closely harmonized. He
himself assumed that there was no fundamental contradiction
finding the ground of harmony in the unity of personality.
But the problems of inconsistency still remain. The identity
of his doctrine with that of Kant could not be demonstrated;
the determining interests and feelings of the mind are not
established as rational; pragmatic method is not assimilated
to his otherwise rigid rationalism; determinism is not recon¬
ciled with freedom.
While these failures in consistency and the lack of
fundamental unity do not affect Bowne's contribution to the
metaphysics of personalism, they do indicate portions of his
work that are of unequal value with the rest. In his empiri¬
cal rationalism, Bowne was on substantial ground, but when he
ventured into pragmatism he was "confused, inconsistent, and
1
unconvincing•"
Ramsdell, oj>. cit., Personalist, p. 35*
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C. THE SOURCES OF BOWNE'S PRAGMATISM
We come now to the sources of Bowne's Religious Prag¬
matism. In the thought life of Borden Parker Bowne two
streams of influence appear in juxtaposition—German rational¬
ism and American pragmatism. The former was his inheritance
and the latter he acquired. Bowne's early training was largely
in the Kantian tradition, and his work in systematic meta¬
physics rested consistently upon the rationalistic method.
Early in life Bowne was attracted to the pragmatic point of
view and quickly adopted its humanistic method in the field of
moral and religious philosophy. Bowne used, as we have men¬
tioned, both rationalistic and pragmatic methods without
attempting to reconcile them. He simply moved from one point
to the other as the subject at hand required. In doing this
he was reflecting the two major interests of his life; specu¬
lation and religion. Wherever the two points of view seemed
to conflict, Bowne always gave the primacy to the religious
and pragmatic. For example, he says;
We do not ignore the facts which make against
the view (the religious view of the world); but
we set them aside as things to be explained, yet
which must, not in any way be allowed to weaken
our faith.
The main sources of Bowne's rationalism, as has been
1 Bowne, Theism, p. 23.
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fairly well understood, were his immediate teachers, Martin,
Lotze and Ulrici, and his study of Kant and Herbart.
While Borden Parker Bowne and William James have been
seen to approximate each other in their pragmatic method,
little has been done to show their relationship. William
James admits that he and Bowne are close together in their
pragmatic method. In a letter to Bowne from Haarlem, August
17, 1908, he gives his reactions to Bowne's volume, Personal-
ism.
It seems to me that you and I are now aiming at
exactly the same end, though, owing to our different
past, from which each retains special verbal habits,
we often express ourselves so differently. It
seemed to me over and over again that you were
planting your feet identically in footprints which
my feet were accustomed to—quite independently, of
course, of my example, which was what made the
coincidences so gratifying. The common foe of both
of us is the dogmatic-rationalist-abstractionist.
Our common desire is to redeem the concrete personal
life which wells up in us from moment to moment,
from fastidious (and really preposterous) dialectic
contradictions, impossibilities, and vetoes. But
whereas your 'transcendental empiricism* assumes
that the essential discontinuity of the sensible
flux has to be overcome by high intellectual opera¬
tions on it. quite a la Kant, Green, Caird, etc.5
my 'radical* empiricism denies the flux's discon¬
tinuity, making conjunctive relations essential
members of it as given, and charging the conceptual
function with being the creator of factitious
incoherencies. ... But the essential thing is
not these differences, it is that our emphatic
footsteps fall on the same spot. You, starting
near the rationalist pole, and boxing the compass,
and I traversing the diameter from the empiricist




James made two mistakes in this letter. Bowne did
not start from the rationalist pole and he did not get his
pragmatic method independent of James. In point of fact the
most decisive pragmatic influence upon the thought of Bowne
came from William James. This is to recognize fully the
importance of the general Kantian background of Bowne and of
other contributory influences, but it is especially to affirm
that the contact with the work of James was pre-eminently the
one that awakened his interest in the pragmatic point of view.
Research has revealed the fact that Bowne's first full-fledged
use of the pragmatic method in the field of moral and religious
belief coincided with an admitted reading of James's first
important, though somewhat nebulous, formulation of pragmatic
doctrine. Furthermore, there appears to be specific indebted¬
ness in that formulation.
The first of Bowne's writings to give evidence of con¬
tact with the pragmatic slant was an article published in
2
April, 1873, entitled "Moral Intuitionism vs. Utilitarianism."
Although Bowne accepted consequences as the test of conformity
Francis J. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne. pp. 277
278. The letter is given in full along with others in the
last chapter of the McConnell volume.
^ "Moral Intuitionism vs. Utilitarianism," The New
Enelander. Vol. XXXII (April 1873), PP. 217-2^2.
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to moral principles, he held to those principles as the
a priori product of the moral consciousness. In this early
article, therefore, consequences do not make an act right
or wrong; they only show whether there has been conformity or
lack of conformity to the principle involved. This contact
with Mill and the Utilitarian School, while clarifying Bowne's
conception of the importance of consequences in moral theory,
did not itself lead to the use of pragmatic method. It must,
however, be counted as a background influence.
Aside from this article of Bowne's published in 1873,
there is no other suggestion of the pragmatic method in
Bowne's writing until 1879. It is interesting to note, how¬
ever, that in Studies in Theism. published in 1879, he should
suddenly adopt an out and out pragmatic methodology in the
field of moral and religious belief. Bowne's pragmatic
methodology in Studies in Theism was not incidental to his
first treatment of religious belief. He had been writing on
religious questions since 1872. In that particular year his
article "Aspects of Theism" appeared in The New Englander.
Also it is clear that much of his criticism of Spencer was
done in the interests of religion. The sudden appearance of
Bowne's pragmatic method in 1879 demands a more probable source.
The most probable explanation for the sudden resort to
pragmatic method is to be found in an article by William James.
This particular article--"Remarks on Spencer's Definition of
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Mind as Correspondence"—appeared in The Journal of Specula¬
tive Philosophy in January, 1878.1 This publication preceded
Bowne's Studies in Theism, by almost a year and a half. The
subject of the article was sufficient to attract the attention
of Bowne, because Spencer had already received the attention
of Bowne's critical pen. This article by James proved to be
James's first important, though not yet fully articulate,
formulation of pragmatic doctrine. Professor B. B. Perry,
in his Collected Essays and Reviews of James, speaks of this
article as "of unique historical importance as perhaps the
key to all of James's later thought."^ We know that Bowne
was familiar with this particular article from his own refer¬
ence. The reference occurs as a footnote in the discussion
of the determinative character of interests and feelings in
the life of the mind, and reads: "This point has been very
happily put by Dr. James in the 'Journal of Speculative
Philosophy,' for January and July, 1878."
Two facts are now clear. First, Bowne read James's
article, and, second, the book in which he refers to it
Reprinted in: William James, Collected Essays and
Reviews, edited by Ralph Barton Perry, 1920.
p
The preface is dated May 5? 1879.
3
Perry, op. cit., pp. vii-viii.
^
Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 66.
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contains his first use of pragmatic method. Furthermore,
certain parallels between Bowne's treatment (in the Chapter
on "Knowledge and Belief") and the article by James would
seem to indicate specific indebtedness. Bowne's description
of the mind as a unity of vital interests and his doctrine
of the determinative character of these interests in mental
development have their parallel in James's treatment. For
example, in the article by James we read:
"Mind," as we actually find it, contains all
sorts of laws—those of logic, of fancy, of wit,
of taste, of decorum, beauty, morals, and so forth,
as well as of perception of fact. Common sense
estimates mental excellence by a combination of
all these standards, and yet how few of them corres¬
pond to anything that actually is—'they are laws of
the Ideal, dictated by subjective interests pure
and simple.
We are all fated to be a priori teleologists
whether we will or not. Interests which we bring
with us, and simply posit or take our stand upon,
are the very flour of which our mental dough is
kneaded.2
Bowne, dealing for the first time with the same sub¬
ject, writes:
When the human mind comes to self-consciousness,
it becomes aware of many interests. There are
practical, speculative, aesthetic, and moral
interests. These are the motive powers of the
mind, and outline its development.-*
Collected Essays and Reviews. op. cit., p. MS.
2
Ibid., p. 6l.
3 Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 69.
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The whole mental life . . . springs out of
feeling. It is extremely doubtful if a purely
perceptive being, without any subjective
interests, could attain to rationality, even
if its physical existence were secured. Indeed,
it is demonstrable that our sentiments outline
and control all mental development.1
Bowne's use of the "it works" criterion similarly has
its parallel. James wrote:
How shall I say that knowing fact with Messr.
Huxley and Clifford is a better use to put my
mind to than feeling good with Messrs. Moody and
Sankey, unless by slowly and painfully finding
out that in long run it works best?^
Bowne, using this criterion for the first time, states:
We conclude, then, that it is no objection to
a belief that its grounds do not admit of satis¬
factory formal statement, provided always that
it works well.3
Those views, therefore, of man and his rela¬
tions which must develop and dignify human nature,
and which work best, in practice, are at least
presumptively true.^"
Another close similarity between Bowne's treatment and
that of James is to be found in the notion of coerciveness as
a criterion of reality. Although not subsequently elaborated
by Bowne, the idea is worth noting here as one further indi¬
cation of the closeness with which he followed James's article.
^ Ibid., pp. 65-66.
a
Collected Essays and Reviews. op. cit., p. 66.




The only objective criterion of reality is
coerciveness, in the long run, over thought.
Objective facts . . . are real only because
they coerce sensation. Any interest which
should be coercive on the same massive scale
would be eodem jure real.1
Bowne, handling the same idea, remarks:
The final test of reality in perception is,
that it compels and coerces our sensations.
... If, then, there is any other element in
the totality of our experience which equally
coerces our belief, and which, when denied,
invariably comes back, then there is the best
ground for saying that in such experience, as
well as in sense-perception, we come in contact
with something not ourselves.2
We cannot eliminate the possibility that these parallels
might have come from a common source for the two writers rather
than indebtedness on the part of Bowne. The evidence, however,
does not substantiate that possibility.
There seems to be no work that could have
been a common source to the two writers for all
of the elements that are common to both. Thomas
Brown, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of the
Human Mind„^ and Shadworth Hodgson, in his Time
and Space.^ and Wilhelm Windelbrana, in his essay
1Ueber Denken un Nachdenken,'? had all been
^ Collected Essays and rieviews t p. 67.
o
Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 78.
3
Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human
Mind. Vol. II, Chap. 3^1
^ Shadworth Hodgson, Time and Space. 1865, Chap. 5»
J Wilhelm Windelbrand, Viertel iahresschrift fuer
wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie. 2 (TH78)T
pp. 265-297.
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investigating the influence of feelings and
interests in the mental life, but none of
these, even had they been known to both Bowne
and James, could account for all the elements
common to both.l
In addition, James specifically acknowledged Charles S. Peirce
as the one to whom he was indebted for the pragmatic view-
2
point. There is no indication that Bowne had any contacts
or acquaintance with the work of Peirce.
It is difficult to avoid the inference that James was
responsible for stimulating Bowne's interest in pragmatic
method, "if not actually furnishing the substance of the
3
method." Bowne's students in later years report that Bowne
was conscious of no indebtedness to William James, but such
a judgement on Bowne's part is probably explained by the fact
that he came to regard James' pragmatism as simply a restate¬
ment of Kant's doctrine of the primacy of the practical
if
reason.
When we consider other factors of influence we find
that Bowne thought of his pragmatism as continuous with the
1
Ramsdell, "Sources of Bowne's Personalism," The
Personalist, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (April, 1935).
^ Cf. "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,"
1898, in Collected Essays and Reviews. p. iflO.
3 Ramsdell, op. cit., p. 138.
1^
This was an inaccurate judgement as we have shown
on preceding pages.
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doctrine of Kant. In the Studies in Theism, in which we
found the parallels with James, he clearly implies the iden¬
tity of his doctrine of interests and feelings as deter¬
minants of belief with the teaching of Kant. In the course
of his treatment he writes: "It is not without ground, there¬
fore, that Kant insisted upon the primacy of the practical
reason, and the subordinate character of the speculative."^
As we have said in preceding pages, Bowne was not correct in
assuming the identity of his doctrine with that of Kant, but
once stimulated to pragmatic lines of thought, it is of course
clear that he may have found the phrase "primacy of the prac¬
tical reason" very suggestive. He was also probably impressed
with Kant's use of the term interests, but if he was he neg¬
lected the rationalistic qualifications imposed by Kant.
Bowne's doctrine of interests is more in line with the thought
of William James.
There is a point at which Bowne most clearly found
pragmatic inspiration in Kant. This is in Kant's treatment
of the primacy of the practical reason. It is evident that
that treatment suggests Bowne's statement of method in
religious thought. But the important fact is that this
particular influence of Kant did not show itself in any
writing of Bowne's until six years after reading the article
Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 7^.
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l
of James to which we have referred. In this particular case
Kant was defending the independent validity of the moral law
as an a priori principle of pure practical reason. Any
propositions inseparably connected with the moral law (as
such an a priori principle), as Kant believed the postulates
of God, freedom, and immortality to be, though not capable
of being established by theoretical reason, may be regarded
as sufficiently authenticated, provided they do not contra¬
dict theoretical reason ("indessen dass sie ihr auch eben
2
nicht widersprechen"). The similarity of Bowne's formulation,
while it neglects the a priori requirement emphasized by Kant,
is sufficiently striking to suggest its source: "Whatever
the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective
interests and tendencies may be assumed as real, in default
of positive disproof."^
Lotze's influence would never of itself have directed
Bowne to pragmatic method, although certain practical emphases
of Lotze are reflected in his thought. Lotze's insistence
that philosophy keep close to life and experience left its
•*" "The Logic of Religious Belief," Methodist Quarterly
Review. 66 (188^), pp. 6U-2-665.
p
Immanuel Kant, Saemtliche Werke, edited by Karl
Vorlaender (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1920-22), Vol. II, Kritik
der praktischen Vernunft, p. 155*
•2
Methodist Quarterly Review, op. cit.. 66 (188^),
p. 652. See also Theism, p. 18.
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mark on Bowne and strengthened the empirical element in his
rationalism. Lotze's dictum "reality is infinitely richer
than thought," though spoken against a distinctly rationalis¬
tic frame of reference, very evidently provided the source
for Bowne's remark that "Life is richer and deeper than
speculation.
The influence of Herbert Spencer would not alone have
led Bowne to pragmatism. No doubt the study of Herbert
Spencer gave him one of his first contacts with the evolu¬
tionary doctrine. "The influence of this contact, once Bowne
had been stimulated to an interest in pragmatic method, soon
2
reflected itself in his religious writings." One particu¬
larly striking indebtedness is to be found in the conception
of belief as a cosmic product. Spencer's view is stated in
the First Principles. (which Bowne reviewed in The New
Bnglander« January, 1872 as follows:
He [man] with all his capacities, and aspir¬
ations, and beliefs, is not an accident, but a
product of time. . . .He, like every other man,
may properly consider himself as one of the myriad
agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause; and
when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain
belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act
out that belief.3
^ Hermann Lotze, Metaphysics. English translation
edited by B. Bosanquet, 1887, Vol. I, p. 178.
2
Ramsdell, op. cit., p. l*+0.
^ Herbert Spencer, First Principles of a New System
of Philosophy. 186h-, p. 123.
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Bowne's later statement is much similar:
We do hold that a general belief renders a
corresponding reality highly probable, even when
no sufficient formal defense is possible. Such
a belief represents the total outcome of a race-
experience, the impression which the universe has
made upon us. ... It is the way in which reality
manifests itself in us. Our feelings are the sub¬
jective side of the universe. Upon this point we
are in full accord with the evolutionist.l
There were other influences which played their part in
the full development of Bowne's religious pragmatism, but the
main lines of that development came from the sources which we
have indicated. William James was the influence that awakened
Bowne to interest in the pragmatic method.
Before closing this section, since we have made Bowne
a debtor to James, it is appropriate to say a further word
regarding the relationship of James and Bowne.
They were unceasing in their fight against
the 'superstition of intellectualism'; both
insisted upon the volitional and practical
character of belief; both insisted that philos¬
ophy is more a formulation of life than mere
impersonal logic.2
Each insisted that the "comprehensible universe Is as pure an
assumption as the religious and moral universe"; and both
believed that Theism is "the implication of all our faculties,"
^ Studies in Theism, pp. 76-77* Cf. Theory of Thought
and Knowledge. 1897, p. 377.
2
Wilbur Harry Long, "The Religious Philosophy of Bowne
and James," The Personalis!. Vol. V, No. b (October, 1921*).
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and has "the warrant of the entire soul.""1"
James maintained that the differences between them
were mainly matters of terminology and Frank Wilbur Collier
of American University says that Bowne told him that this was
2
true, but in actual fact there are vital differences. This
is especially true in their religious faith and life. There
are vital differences in the positive and permanent value of
the respective doctrines and methods of Pragmatism and Per-
sonalism which should be clearly understood. You cannot equate
Pragmatism and Personalism. They are as wide apart as the
religious life of James and Bowne and that is a considerable
distance.
The genius of Borden Parker Bowne, as we have fre¬
quently indicated, was that he combined an uncommon specula¬
tive and critical excellence with a vital religious life and
faith. A product of the Christian, his approach to philosophy
was essentially religious, and this remained the cornerstone
both of life and thought. The influence of the Christian com¬
munity is significant, because it not only occasioned in him
a personal sense of religious consciousness, but it gave him
the idea of the solidarity of historic revelation, social
1
Bowne, Theism, pp. 13-20
^
Frank Wilbur Collier, "Personalism: A Vital
Philosophy," Personalist. Vol. I, No. 1 (April 1920), pp. 35-^3
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Institutions, and truth. The social and historic approach
rooted Bowne in a living faith which James, lacking, never
achieved. The great catholic interests and tendencies of
the race became significant for him. They "may well be a
good ground for belief"; he insisted; "for these reveal the
essential structure and needs of the mind, and have all the
logical significance of any great cosmic product.""** Bowne
was a product of the Christian Church, and he remained loyal
to it throughout his life. The key thought of his whole
religious philosophy is the inherent reasonableness and
rational superiority of theism over any competing system.
Theism "more and more appears as the supreme condition of
2
both thought and life." It "is the fundamental postulate of
our total life. It cannot, indeed, be demonstrated without
assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our
interests." Not only our moral and religious interests, but
also "our cognitive and speculative interests ... are so
3
bound up with theism as to stand or fall with it." Theism
gives the most rational account of historic instructions, of
religious experience, of the higher reality of values, and
even of theoretical speculation itself. "Religious philosophy
^
Bowne, Theism, p. 26.
2
Ibid., p. vii.
3 Ibid., pp. iv-v.
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does not need to ground in an arbitrary will-to-believe. It
stands justified before the bar of both theoretical and prac-
1
tical reason." Theism is the quintessence of the reflective
life; it is historical, social, humanistic, and at the same
time reasonable.^
In the sense that he recognized the validity of funda¬
mental human and social claims upon reality and truth, Bowne's
philosophy may be called pragmatic, but his thought runs much
deeper than that of James's pragmatism. Personalism does not
minimize history, institutions, or intellect, and thus grounded
is able to give belief and faith in place of mere hypothesis
and volitional assent for action.
This fact is revealed in the personal life of Bowne,
"which manifested that solidity, sense of finality, and certi¬
tude which comes from thought well-grounded in life and reason.
3
His life radiated with religious insight and power." Bowne
was a man of action and prayer, he knew at first hand the
intimacies of religious experience and faith. Hence his
1
Long, op. cit., Personalist. Vol. V, No. b (October
192b).
2 Theism, p. 9» "The needs of the intellect, the demands
and forebodings of conscience, the cravings of the affections,
the impulses of the aesthetic nature, and the ideals of the
will—all enter into the problem, apart from the words of
revelation, or any direct influence of God on the soul."
^ Long, loc. cit.
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religious thought and metaphysics do not hang in the air, are
not mere formal hypotheses. They involve a pungent finality
because they come from a deep experience and a penetrating
and critical reason. Bowne's fundamental interest lay in the
defense of a religious philosophy of the world, and in the
discovery of a substantial metaphysics upon which to build it.
While he was a friend of theism and the religious con¬
sciousness James himself was not gripped by religious faith.
Although his father was a religious man, his father's con¬
victions did not transplant in James. At the age of twenty-
five he wrote from Berlin to his father telling of his skep¬
ticism.^" James, unlike Bowne, did not come under the
influence of the religious community. His father, while a
religious man, was not connected with the Christian Church.
James's basic training was exclusively in scientific institu¬
tions and naturally prized only the opinions and styles of
belief favored by his instructors. He became hopelessly
engulfed by the iron-clad rigidity of scientism, but was
brought out of it by a great emotional experience in Germany
and by reading Benouvier's Essais de critique generale. But
one searches in vain through the published letters of James
for an evidence of a genuine religious spirit, of piety, or
mystical Erlebnis, or of any sense of the Transcendent, such
1 The Letters of William James« Vol. I, p. 96.
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as that exemplified in the life of Bowne. The sense of the
presence of God, the sense of divine commission, of personal
relationship, of prayer, are conspicuously absent. "I doubt
whether you will find any great harm in the God I patronize,"
he wrote to C. A. Strong in 1907? "the poor thing is so
largely an ideal possibility. . . Although willing to
admit Renan's dictum that "Tout est possible, meme Dieu,"
God remained for James a possible only. His Gifford Lectures,
Varieties of Religious Experience, has no other message to
offer: God is an hypothesis. Santayana put it well when he
observed that
. . • there was accordingly no sense of security,
no joy, in James' apology for personal religion.
He did not really believe; he merely believed in
the right of believing that you might be right
if you believed.
And he adds decisively that James "by nature was a spirited
2
man rather than a spiritual man." As Professor Long put it:
Although James defended joyfully the values,
theories and imperatives of human life, yet he
always spoke about religion from the outside.
Standing for hope, nevertheless it was the hope
stoically willed, not demonstrated in living
faith, mystic experience, moral calmness, or
rational certitude.8
1 Ibid., p. 220.
2
George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the
United States. pp. 77? 8^.
3 Long, 0£. cit., Personalist. Vol. V, No. b, p. 262.
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James's own theism is essentially the product of religious
dilettantism, and affords no stable basis for the religious
consciousness. It gives us an hypothesis where we need con¬
viction, without which is no permanent belief; and without
belief, in turn, there is no permanent religious dynamic.
Having said all this, we again repeat that it was con¬
tact with the work of William James that awakened Bowne's
interest in the pragmatic point of view. The basic differ¬
ence between the two men is that Bowne worked from a believing
base of operations while James worked from a skeptical base.
Bowne was captured by his beliefs while James was trying to
capture a belief. Bowne was stimulated by James, but he
never could be considered a follower.
CHAPTER V
THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BOWNE»S PERSONALISM
A. INTRODUCTION
In the narrower sense of the term, Borden Parker Bowne
was not a theologian. He was a philosopher. But neverthe¬
less he looked upon theological education as definitely
within the sphere of his university work. One main reason
for his refusing to leave Boston University was the large
number of theological students who attended his classes.
With him, religion was a primary concern both in his thinking
and in his personal life. In saying this we do not mean to
imply that he ever subordinated truth to religious faith.
This would have violated his whole mental tone and temper.
Perfect candor marked his entire intellectual life and was
one of the chief sources of his remarkable spiritual power.
It probably accounts also in part for his special interest in
theological education.
Bowne did not elaborate his theological views into a
detailed and systematic treatise. But in a general way he
expressed them openly in his lectures, magazine articles and
books, and in private conversations. While he did not deal
with his theological views in a technical way, we have suffi¬
cient material to know the main direction of his religious
thought. The ideas in this field which he especially
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emphasized have since his time continued to work as a powerful
influence in American Protestantism. The scope of this thesis
forbids a detailed presentation of Bowne's religious thought.
His main concern was his philosophy of personalism, and its
relationship to theism. Since we have dealt with these con¬
cerns, it is now our purpose to give a distilled account of
his theological views.
B. BOWSE'S APOLOGETIC FOR THE CHRISTIAN FAITH
Bowne's apologetic for the Christian faith departed in
several important respects from that of traditional Protestant¬
ism. Bowne rejected the crude realism commonly assumed by
earlier Protestant theologians and thus eliminated the tradi¬
tional sharp antithesis between the natural and the super¬
natural. In the preface to his Immanence of God, he writes:
The undivineness of the natural and the
unnaturalness of the divine is the great heresy
of popular thought respecting religion. The
error roots in a deistic and mechanical philoso¬
phy, and in turn produces a large part of the
misunderstandings that haunt religious and irre¬
ligious thought alike. To assist in the banish¬
ment of this error by showing a more excellent
way is the aim of this little book.
Bowne did not look upon nature as a self-running mechanism
but as the ceaseless product of the divine energizing under
the forms of time and space. It was, therefore, "supernatural"
^
Bowne, The Immanence of God, p. i.
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in its causation. But if the popular distinction between the
natural and the supernatural was to be retained, it was neces¬
sary to restrict the distinction to the phenomenal order and
to reinterpret the words natural and supernatural. This
Bowne did. He applied the word "natural" to the familiar
and the word "supernatural" or "miraculous" to the unfamiliar
modes of the divine activity. In this way he brought God
into a direct causal relation to the whole world and made
him real to the modern man as he had not been before. This
brought a profound change in the traditional apologetic, so
far as it had to do with the biblical miracles and with the
ideas of revelation and inspiration.
A second respect in which Bowne broke with the tradi¬
tional apologetic was in his theory of knowledge. In the
traditional Protestant theory, religious knowledge was
dependent for its certification and verification on the
authority of the Bible. This authority was regarded as
objective, as grounded in miraculous divine inspiration, and
hence as independent of validation by the human reason. But
authority of this kind found no support in modern epistemology.
The latter contends that there can be no purely external or
objective authentication of truth; the ultimate standard of
truth must be found in the mind itself. In addition to this
the infallibility traditionally ascribe to Scripture seem to
bring its teachings at many points into conflict with the
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conclusions of modern science. In order to preserve its
Christian status as the Word of God it was, therefore, neces¬
sary to reinterpret the nature and scope of its authority.
Bowne saw that it was necessary to conceive its authority as
inner and spiritual rather than external and coercive. He
limited the Bible to its basic and essential teaching. In
this manner brought Biblical authority into accord with the
free and advancing thought of modern man.
Another respect in which Bowne found the traditional
apologetics unsatisfactory, had to do with the philosophical
basis of religious faith. In the older view faith was based
on the Bible and to some extent on rational considerations of
general character. This made it dependent for its validation
on supports more or less external to itself. It was not
thought of as standing in its own right and justifying itself
and was thus assigned a secondary status. Its need for a
deeper ground was provided by Bowne who grounded it in accord
with the teaching of Kant, Schleiermacher, and Lotze. Bowne
maintained that religion is structural in the human mind,
that it is fundamental, independent, and trustworthy as are
the intellectual, moral and aesthetic interests of the human
spirit. He claimed that man has an innate capacity for
religious experience. This experience is coordinate with,
if notsuperordinate to, the capacity for sense experience,
moral experience, and aesthetic experience. This innate
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religious capacity spoken of by Bowne is called a religious
a priori by later scholars such as Ernst Troeltch, Rudolf
Otto, and Albert C. Knudson.Regardless of the name given
the epistemological theory which affirms it gives to religion
an impregnable position, grounding it as deeply and ineradi-
cably in the human spirit as science, morality, and art.
Speaking of this view, Albert C. Knudson says: "No profounder
and more vital contribution than this has in my opinion been
2
made to religious apologetics in modern times."
C. PERSONALITY OF GOD AND THE PERSON OF CHRIST
We now turn from Bowne's contributions to the general
defense of the Christian faith to some of the basic Christian
doctrines and his relation to them. We begin with two doc¬
trines which are closely related to each other—the personality
Cf. George Wobbermin, Die Religionpsychologische
Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie. pp. 858-858:
Ernst Troeltsch, "Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissen-
schaft," in Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Teil I, Abt. IV, pp. ^6l-
M-895 Karl Bornhausen, "Das religittse Apriori bei Ernst Troeltsch
und Rudolf Otto" in Zeitschrift fttr Philosophie und Philsophi-
sche Kritik. 1910, pp. 193-206; and "Wider der Neofriesianismus
in der Theologie" in Zeitschrift fttr Theologie und Kirche, 1910,
pp. 3^1-^05; Paul Spiess, "Zur Frage des religittsen Apriori,"
in Religion und Geisteskultur. 1909, pp. 207-215; D. C. Macin¬
tosh, "Troeltsch's Theory of Religious Knowledge," American
Journal of Theology. 1919, pp. 27^-289.
2 Albert C. Knudson, "Religious Apriorism," Studies in
Philosophy and Theology, edited by E. C. Wilm, pp. 93-127.
This volume is a memorial number to Bowne and contains
articles by his former students.
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of God and the Person of Christ.
As we have mentioned previously, Bowne laid primary
stress on the first of these doctrines. The personality of
God is fundamental in his philosophical theology. And in a
sense it was also the traditional teaching of the church. Its
God was manifestly a personal Being. Being or essence was
regarded as a deeper concept. Thus it has been frequently
said that what the church taught was personality in God rather
than the personality of God. There were three Persons in the
Godhead, and personality might consequently be attributed to
each of them. But the one God was not in his inmost Being
strictly personal. The language of the church, at least,
seemed to suggest this conclusion.
There was, however, much confusion of thought on the
subject. This confusion was due in part to a lack of uniform
and consistent terminology, but its deeper source was the
current concept of personality. At this point a marked
advance was made during the past century and Borden Parker
Bowne had a significant part in this advance. Profounder
philosophical reflection led to the insight that personality
and it alone is the key to the ultimate reality. This new
approach to metaphysics we have already treated in the
chapter, "Bowne's Philosophy of Personalism."
Another phase of Bowne's personalistic or idealistic
theism, worthy of mention in the present connection, is its
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activism or doctrine of divine immanence. Popular religious
thought has always had difficulty relating God in a satis¬
factory way to the physical or spatial world. In the pre-
Copernican period the idea of a special abode for Deity in
the highest "sphere" of existence helped popular thought to
some extent. This divine home was nullified by the
Copernican astronomy and now there is no "place" for God in
the universe. If he is to be brought into a vital and
rational relation to the world, if he is to bade truly "real"
to modern thought, it must be as the causal ground of the
universe. Bowne saw that only as its immanent, active, and
creative source can God satisfy the demands of both reason
and faith. With this in mind Bowne persistently stressed the
doctrine of the divine immanence and rendered an immense ser¬
vice to the theological picture of his day.
Bownefs emphasis on the unitary personality of God
has an obvious bearing on the traditional doctrine of the
Person of Christ. Bowne did not develop his thought along
this line as fully as might have been expected, but the direc¬
tion in which it logically moves is clear. It rules out the
traditional two-nature doctrine or at least insists on
reinterpreting it. It holds that a complete human nature
must include self-consciousness, a personal centre, an ego.
As A. C. Knudson points out, without this personal centre
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human nature would be a mere abstraction. Christ then must
have a human ego. And in order to avoid the hopeless dualism
of two egos, one human and the other divine, Bowne's thought
would logically lead us to construe his "divine nature" as a
symbol of his unique dependence on God and his unique endue-
ment with the Divine Spirit. This unique relation to Deity
had a metaphysical basis, but it is to be interpreted in
dynamic rather than substantistic terms. God was in Christ
not as a mysterious divine substance, but as a Spiritual
Power or Being upon whom he was uniquely dependent and with
whom he was in reciprocal interaction. His divinity, there¬
fore,
... is to be regarded as manifesting itself,
not in his possession of the absolute attributes
of Deity, but in his consciousness of spiritual
oneness with God and in his exalted character and
redemptive mission.2
D. DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT
In view of what has been said concerning the doctrine
of original sin, we can readily see Bowne's attitude toward
the traditional satisfaction, penal and governmental theories
of the atonement. These theories, he contended, may in the
^ Albert C. Knudson, "Bowne in American Theological





past have had some value as metaphorical expressions of the
divine grace and they may still be so employed. But as
literal descriptions of the meaning of the death of Christ
they are morally indefensible. Such ideas as ransom, appease¬
ment of the divine anger, vicarious punishment, and penal
example have no place in a truly Christian theory of the
Cross of Christ. Furthermore, Bowne claims that sin and
guilt are inalienable. It is impossible for them to be trans¬
ferred to an innocent person. Both merit and demerit are
inseparable from the persons to whom they originally belonged,
and cannot be imputed to others.
Bowne holds that this basic insight was overlooked by
the framers of the substitutionary theories of the atonement.
The result was, as he puts it, a series of "frigid juristic
speculations, lifeless and life destroying, the despair of
reason and the opprobrium of faith."1 The abstract theorists,
referred to, also failed to see that, as Creator of the world,
God "is the most deeply obligated being in the universe," and
that in his consequent task of redeeming sinful men he could
not resort to any mechanical or legalistic device. God's only
possible method as a moral Being was to make the unrighteous
righteous. This God sought to do through the perfect
1
Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 1^0. See also
account of his heresy trial in Appendix, p. 301.
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revelation of his own love and righteousness in the death of
Christ and through the profoundly moving example furnished
by Christ in his absolute faithfulness to duty. This inter¬
pretation is the well known "moral influence theory" of the
atonement, but according to Bowne, none other is needed.
In his little booklet on the Atonement Bowne writes
with a practical aim in mind. Many minds are troubled and
are unable to distinguish between the fact of the atonement
and theories of the atonement. "To help such minds, not to
instruct theologicans"^" is the aim of Bowne's study. We give
in full Bowne's summary at the end of his little book.
Thus I have sought to relieve the doctrines
of Divine grace from the verbal and mechanical
misunderstanding which infest popular religious
thought, and make the gospel itself a stumbling
block to many. In concluding I emphasize several
points:
1. We must distinguish between the fact of the
Saviour's work and the theological theory of it.
The latter is not of faith, but of speculation.
Moreover, the fact is the essential thing; and
the religious teacher must never allow any one to
think he has abandoned the fact because he is
dissatisfied with the theory.
2. We must note the instrumental and undogmatic
character of Scripture language on this subject,
and the resulting necessity of taking it in a free
and living way rather than as the language of a
dogma or a statute. A person who reads the
Scriptures with no aid but the dictionary, and
without knowledge of ancient life and custom,
1 Borden Parker Bowne, The Atonement. 1900, pp. 2-br
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and without diligently comparing Scripture with
Scripture, will certainly go astray in this
matter.
3. The Doctrine itself must be brought out
of the desert of abstract speculation, and be
constructed and interpreted in the light of life
and human experience. The ethical aim and aspect
of the doctrine must be emphasized; and whatever
conflicts therewith must be set aside. It is
God's aim to save men from sin, not in sin; to
save men from sin, not from penalty; to recover
men to righteousness, not plant them in heaven.
Forgiveness and salvation must be interpreted in
accordance with this fundamental fact.
In religious instruction the teacher must
put supreme emphasis on the fact of the Savior's
work. He must proclaim the love of God, the grace
of the Lord Jesus, the forgiveness of sins, and
must summon men to discipleship in his name. This
is practically the gist of the matter, and whatever
attention we give to theory, we must never allow it
to obscure this simple fact.
5. For practical purposes all we need is to
become the disciples of our Lord, trusting in his
promises and the Father whom he revealed. With
this practical discipleship we shall receive all
the benefits of the Savior's work without any
theory; and without this discipleship we are lost,
whatever our theory.^
E. THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
In much the same way, though less drastic, Bowne
sought to moralize the traditional conceptions of conversion
and the Christian life in general. He was not opposed to
1
Bowne, The Atonement. pp. 150-152.
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emotional and mystical experiences such as were cultivated
in American revival meetings. It was his opinion that they
had proved themselves of too much value and for that reason
should not be condemned. But when these experiences were
sought as an end in themselves or were represented as essen¬
tial to the Christian life, he branded them as evil. It was
Bowne's firm belief that the only thing necessary to Christian
discipleship was the changed heart and the obedient will. He
says:
We are willing, then to allow religious experi¬
ence to be anything whatever, within the limits of
decency and sanity: but when it comes to giving
it a divine significance, we insist on applying
the rule, 'By their fruits ye shall know them';
and we further insist on rejecting as mere delu¬
sion everything whatever that will not stand this
test .-1-
F. DOCTRINE OF REVELATION
In Bowne's mind, activity, is the clue to the connec¬
tion between God as personal and all that we know of him in
revelation. God is the acting one. In his metaphysics he
equates activity and Reality. At this point Bowne is in
harmony with the modern idea of revelation, i,.e., that revela¬
tion is not the disclosure of truth about God so much as the
Bowne, Immanence of God, p. 135* See also Bowne,
The Christian Life. 1899.
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self-disclosure of God Himself. Bowne would say that
Revelation is the self-giving of God, the action of the
Supreme Self, and that faith is man's personal response.
These two go together; revelation as a thoroughly personal
happening between the Person and finite persons.
The significance of Bowne's stress on divine immanence
and its relationship to revelation is at once apparent. In
point of fact, Bowne deals with his views on revelation under
the title of The Immanence of God. This fact being true we
give a digest of his views on revelation in the volume men¬
tioned.
God reveals himself in nature.
In the new conception the supernatural is
nothing foreign to nature and making occasional
raids into nature in order to reveal itself, but,
so far as nature as a whole is concerned, the
supernatural is the everpresent ground and admin¬
istrator of nature; and nature is simply the form
under whichpthe supreme Reason and Will manifestthemselves.d
Bowne sets aside the self-running nature and the conception
of an absentee God. God is the ever-present agent in the on¬
going of the world, and nature is but the form and product of
his ceaseless activity. The cosmic order is no rival of God,
~
Emil Brunner, The Divine Human Encounter.
2
Bowne, Immanence of God, p. 17.
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"but is simply the continuous manifestation and product of
1
his divine activity." God's will is not back of nature "at
some awful distance of time and space, but is their present
living source; and they in turn are but the form in which
2
that will expresses and realizes itself." The presence of
God in nature does not mean that God intermittently performs
miracles, but that the whole cosmic movement depends con¬
stantly upon the divine will and "is an expression of the
3
divine purpose." Bowne, in Barkeley's language, makes nature
speak a divine language.
God reveals himself in history. Not in signs upon
occasion, but in the great historical movement and working
his will therein. The great proof of God's presence in
history, and the sole significance of that presence lies in
5
the mental and moral realm.
The slow moralization of life and society, the
enlightenment of conscience and its growing empire,
the deepening sense of responsibility for the good











gradual putting away of old wrongs and foul
diseases and blinding superstitionsr—these are
the great proofs of God in history.
Life itself, with all its normal forms and interests, repre¬
sents the divine will and purpose, and from it God is never
absent. His will is being done in and through the laws and
movements of humanity, as it is through the laws and move-
2
ments of nature. A divine purpose, a moral development in
humanity, is the essential meaning of God in history. This
history, says Bowne, is the unfolding and realization of the
divine purpose.
God reveals himself in the Bible. It should be men¬
tioned that Bowne's aim in his volume The Immanence of God is
to banish the error which asserts the undivineness of the
natural and the unnaturalness of the divine. He contends
that this error roots in a deistic and mechanical philosophy,
and in turn produces a large part of the misunderstanding that
haunt religious and irreligious thought alike. He proceeds
to say that the supernatural features of the Bible history
are no more divine in their causality than the routine events
of every day. They are simply extraordinary events which,
from their form or circumstances of their occurrence, make
the divine presence and purpose more manifest than is the case




with familiar matters. They are signs or calls for atten¬
tion, which is made necessary by the mental and spiritual
dullness of men.
Bowne believes in miracles and argues for their reality
by the concrete results which followed. He says:
St. Paul may have had a fit on his way to
Damascus, but it is the only fit that had such
mighty consequences. The vision of the Risen
One may have been an illusion, but when we see
that it is the greatest event in all history,
we begin to wonder whether illusions can be so
potent. In that case, surely, things that..are
not are mightier than the things that are.1
Furthermore, if for us God is a personal and moral being, and
if his supreme aim in human creation is a moral one,
... we shall have no apriori hostility to mira¬
cle. If we believe in a God in whom we live and
move and have our being, and if we believe that
we may and do enter into fellowship and communion
with him in prayer and holy living, it will seem
to us the most natural thing in the world that
there should be tokens of his presence.^
Everything, says Bowne, depends on our presuppositions.
For Bowne the important thing is that Christianity is
a revelation from God. It is humanity's supreme treasure. It
tells us about God, "what he means, what he has done and is
3
doing for us, what life means and what our destiny is to be."





3 Ibid.. p. 8*f.
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whatever in that history is necessary for its understanding,
be it miracle or what not, we must retain. But we must take
a long range view of history. History must be studied as a
whole and not merely in its crude beginnings or in its
miraculous attendants. Special attention must be given to
the moral and spiritual grandeur of its outcome. The most
important miracle is the "spiritual miracle of God's life in
the soul and the realization of his kingdom on the earth.
This "spiritual miracle is the only thing really worth while,
or worthy of God."^
The discussion of revelation as it is reflected in the
Bible must be presented from the standpoint of the divine
immanence. When the false naturalism of unbelief is eliminated,
supernaturalism will be less disturbed if historical criticism
should cast doubts on the details. It is no longer a question
of divine causality but of method.
Belief need not fear evolution, or development,
or natural agencies, when it is seen that the
divine will and purpose underlie them all, and
that they are really nothing but the form of the
divine working. And unbelief, on the other hand,
must not be thought to have triumphed because
natural methods are traced in the supernatural
revelation.^






can be studied from the natural standpoint; that is, we may
seek to trace the familiar laws of life and thought and his¬
tory and human development in the progress and unfolding of
the movement. "In God's world the teachings of history and
the indications of experience are as truly a revelation as
1
any series of texts or any voice from the skies." While we
admit, however, that the naturalistic study of revelation can
show important preparations, historical continuities, psycho¬
logical uniformities, rational harmonies"; we reach nothing
2
final until we come to the immanent, self-revealing God."
As against false naturalism, Bowne insists that the fact of
natural methods in God's self-revealing work in no way dis¬
penses with the fact of the divine purpose and presence. As
against false supernaturalism, he insists that God may be as
present in his orderly methods and the steadfast ordinances
of the world as in any or all miracles whatsoever. In any
case, he says, "the important thing is not to find miracles,
3
but God and learn his will and do it."
Bowne dispenses with all dictation theories of inspira¬
tion. In their place he substitutes the conception of a his¬
torical and gradual unfolding in accordance with God's general
1 Ibid., p. 90.
2
Ibid.. p. 91.
3 Ibid., p. 9*+»
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laws in life, history, and humanity. This change does not
lessen his belief in the revelation of the Bible. He says:
"It seems to us diviner than ever, now that it has become more
human; and more supernatural than ever, now that we trace
1
God's universal natural methods in it."
In summation of Bowne's view of revelation in the
Bible we can do no better than give his own words:
This only is of faith concerning the Scriptures,
that God has revealed himself through them and the
history which they record as a God of righteous¬
ness and grace. And this only of faith respecting
Christianity, that it is God's great and supreme
revelation of what he is and what he means for
men. To depart from this faith is heresy. To
live and work in this faith is to be a child of
the kingdom.2
There is a divine immanence in the Word as well
as in the Work, which makes it 'The fountain light-
of all our day, a master light of all our seeing.
God reveals himself in the human soul. As God reveals
himself in nature, history, and the Bible, so he reveals him¬
self in the soul. God does not work against the laws of the
mind, but through them, that he might realize his purpose in
us. Bowne says that this is an absolute condition of our
mental and moral sanity. He says that if we are to lead a






moral and rational life of any sort, there must be an order
of life on which we can depend. God's revelation in the
human soul is best understood in connection with his belief
in the religious apriori which we have previously discussed.
For Bowne, revelation is the cosmic activity of the
divine, and nature, history, the Bible, and the working of
the soul are expressions of that immanent activity."1"
G. DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM
The speculative significance of freedom is a regulative
doctrine in the writings of Borden Parker Bowne. It constitutes
an essential part of the substructure of his system of thought.
Bowne regarded freedom as a persistent problem of philosophy;
he appreciated the value of the history of philosophy as a
means of preventing needless repetition of errors of thought.
This critical attitude led him to recognize a positive con¬
tribution to the problem of freedom made primarily by modern
philosophers. Hildebrand points out that
... from the determinism of Leibnitz, the con¬
cept of noumenal freedom as expounded by Kant,
the absolute doctrine of Hegelian freedom and the
determinism of Herbart, Bowne found little more
For further study see Bowne, The Christian Revelation.
Note in index Studies in Christianity. Chapter II, and the




But from Berkeley, Lotze, and, more in particular, from Ulrici
and Renouvier, he found much in accordance with what he
regarded to be the essential nature of freedom, and a direct
contribution to his own thought. Even Ulrici and Renouvier,
however, apparently failed to expound the nature of freedom
so that it would be the regulative and fundamental postulate
of their systems that it clearly is in Bowne's philosophy.
It is Bowne's contention that the most productive study
of freedom is made when it is investigated in connection with
reason. The doctrine of the speculative significance of
freedom, then, shifts the venue of the problem from ethics
to a study of freedom from point of view of its implications
for the rational life. He says:
I am persuaded, therefore, that one wishing to
find his way into the problem will do well to con¬
sider, first of all, the question of freedom in
intelligence itself and the collapse2of rationality
involved in the system of necessity.
While this method was not entirely original with Bowne, the
truth to which it led was, in his opinion, a matter that had
never been sufficiently recognized by philosophers in general
Carrol Dewitt Hildebrand, "Bowne's Doctrine of
Freedom," The Personalist. Vol. XIII, No. 2 (April, 1932).
2
Bowne, Metaphysics. rev. ed., p. H-OS; Personalism.
pp. 201-202; "The Speculative Significance of Freedom,"
Methodist Review. 77 (1895), pp. 683-689; Studies in Theism,
p. 58; Theory of Thought and KnowledgeT p. 293.
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and by necessitarians in particular.
Bowne's method of discussing freedom and reason has
the advantage of avoiding those ambiguities and partisanships
with which much historical discussion of freedom and ethics
has embrangled itself. "The speculative significance of
freedom undertakes rather to adduce the epistemic value of
freedom through a more satisfactory understanding of the
nature of both knowing and being."1 More specifically, free¬
dom must be studied in connection with the self and causality
in such a way that personality emerges under the aspect of
dynamic or volitional causality conceived as the constitutive
notion of the truly real. Bowne's own method in treating
freedom reflects his logical and mathematical mind. His
approach is not intuitive, it is rather a rational, scientific
investigation properly described as empirico-inductive. In
Bowne's mind coherence rather than intuition is the implied
criterion by which freedom is Judged to be true or false. We
must use the word "implied" because Bowne regarded academic
discussions of the possibility of criteria of truth as barren
2
of any valuable result. Bowne says: "The argument, then,
must be somewhat apagogical, that is, it must consist, not so
Hildebrand, op. cit., p. 101)-.
^
Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 58; Theory of Thought
and Knowledge, p. 293•
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much in direct appeal to consciousness, as in showing that
freedom is involved in facts which all admit."'*" Freedom
then becomes a deduced necessity, to be sure, but it is an
inference from the facts of experience which rests upon
coherence as an explanation of an area of personality which
remains less intelligible of any other hypothesis. When we
have any experience, an interpretation of that experience is
necessary before it has any meaning. This method reveals
that freedom is the most coherent hypothesis available to
rationalize certain patent facts of our experience. The
purpose is not to demonstrate a theorem but to solve a prob¬
lem, and freedom, like mechanism, constitutes an ideal explan¬
ation. Bowne, like Renouvier, considered it impossible to
prove freedom a fact from a strictly demonstrable point of
view. "We may not view it as absolutely proved; yet it is
certainly a necessary postulate of reason and conscience and
2
as such we hold it." Freedom, therefore, does not admit per¬
fect induction, but it is a necessary postulate of rational
existence. It is possible for us to have some experience of
freedom but the possibility and origin of it lie beyond our
comprehension.
Bowne, Methodist Review, op. cit.. 77 (1895)» P« 682.
^ Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory,
pp. 231-232.
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The nature of freedom stated in connection with the
category of causality utilizes the Lotzean dictum that
"every cause infallibly has its effect" and that this term
of the proposition must be stressed rather than that which
affirms that every cause is itself an effect, which, to say
the least, has never been demonstrated. We find that freedom
lies in a new beginning. A free act is not represented prior
to its occurrence by anything that must lead to it. In both
personality and nature the universal course of things lies
open momentarily to the possibility of innumerable beginnings
whose origins lie outside them but, when once they are
originated, must continue within them. This provides for
contingency in the world and, therefore, precludes knowledge
of when and where new points of departure occur. Bowne
believed the indications that the events of external nature
are effects rooted in antecedent facts, does not exclude the
possibility of the inner mental life being free from an abso¬
lute mechanism bound by necessity. The inner mental life may
possess a limited power to evolve from itself decisions and
resolutions constituting self-originated, self-commenced
activities none of which is determined by previous bodily
phenomena. Upon the occasion of the self-origination of any
act, however, the same at once flows into and becomes subject
unto the laws of a causality working out its consequences
under the limiting conditions of these established laws of
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universal being. That is to say, that "freedom may choose
the seed but it can neither determine nor escape the harvest."
Bowne defines freedom in its connection with speculative sig¬
nificance as follows:
By freedom I mean the power of self-control and
self-direction in an intelligent being. More
specifically, it is the power to form plans, pur¬
poses, ideals and to work for their realization.
Or it is the power to choose between competing or
conflicting possibilities and to realize the one
chosen. Whenever this power is present we call
the agent free.2
The relation of freedom and reason is the starting
point of Bowne's investigation of the problem of freedom. He
formulates his thesis by pointing out that in the field of
thought we are universally required to assume that reason is
a self-controlling force and that freedom of thought cannot
rationally be denied without, at the same time, being assumed.
It is in this way that we identify thought as a self-directing
activity, proceeding according to its own inherent laws and
ideals. Bowne defines thought as "that form of mental activ-
3
ity whose aim is truth or knowledge." And by knowledge we
mean the certainty that our judgments correspond to truth or
1
Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory. p. 23*f.
2
Bowne, Methodist Review, op. cit.. 77 (1895), p. 681.
Metaphysics. rev. ed., p. *+05: Personalism. pp. 199-200.
^ Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 9.
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reality. Reality refers to all matters of fact of the inner
and outer world. Truth means a system of rational principles.
We are certain, then, that it can be no product of thought¬
lessness; it must rather consist in the results of cogent
inference. V/e can now show that, in the processes of reason¬
ing, there is no proper distinction made between truth and
error if freedom is denied. This, says Bowne, is the precise
meaning of freedom.1 Bowne formulates the argument both
negatively and positively in such a way that it exhibits a
defensive and offensive form respectively.
First, the negative argument as Bowne gives it. The
negative argument for freedom is created by the dilemma of
determinism arising in connection with the problem of error.
We are required by rationality to postulate the essential
trustworthiness of reason. Regardless of this postulate,
however, it is a patent fact that a large part of human
thought and belief finds itself involved in error. We locate
the antinomy of thought in the attempt to reconcile error
with the trustworthiness of reason. We find that every form
of necessity proves to be an incompetent hypothesis to remove
this antinomy. Necessitarianism claims that universal law
and necessary causation of the mechanical type completely
invade both the personal and the impersonal worlds. But
1
Bowne, Personalism. p. 200; Metaphysics. rev. ed.,
p. 1+06.
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where everything is equally determined, true and false ideas
alike are effects of antecedents equally necessitated so that
the distinction between truth and error is unintelligible.
"'Except the rational life be divested of its last remnant of
integrity, a criterion for judging between truth and error
must be forthcoming.""'" There is very little possibility of
achieving such a norm on the necessitarian plane. Further¬
more, however imperative a criterion in order to differentiate
truth from error, granting that it were possible, the appli¬
cation of such a criterion would, on the necessitarian plane,
be impossible. Therefore, freedom enters intimately into the
structure of reason itself and any denial of this fact is
equivalent to the denial of the possibility of knowledge.
Borden Parker Bowne seems to never tire in his relentless
criticism of Spencer's nescience which grew out of the latter's
necessitarianism. Hildebrand states it well when he says:
The insolubility of the problem of error on
every such scheme consists in the fact that error
becomes cosmic in character and, therefore, con¬
stitutional to reality. Where this is true,
epistemology ends in skepticism and every moral
ontology is repudiated.2
As we have said, Bowne states the argument positively
as well as negatively. The argument for freedom stated
"*•




positively starts from the postulate that "the trustworthi¬
ness of reason and the validity of knowledge are the pre¬
suppositions of all science and philosophy,"^ and that, "The
general trustworthiness of reason presupposes that thought
2
is a free activity based on rational insight." There are,
it is true, mechanisms within consciousness analogous to the
uniformities in external nature but these do not unerringly
make for truth. If they did, error would not exist. But it
does. According to Bowne, truth requires a standard or
ideal in the mind and the capacity for self-direction in our
rational activity in order to assess and evaluate judgments
and to replace the psychological associations of consciousness
with the transparent order of logic. Where rationality and
freedom are united, a criterion for truth is not only possible
but it can be applied, because, once in possession of its
inherent mechanism, "the mind is able to interpose a demurrer
in the interest of coherence as opposed to the irrational
character of such uniformities as those captioned habits and
instincts.""^ But the admission of error in human reason does
not deny the possibility of truth. Freedom cuts the Gordian
Bowne, Theism, p. 1^6.
2
Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge. p. 296.
^ Hildebrand, op. cit., p. 108.
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knot of this dilemma by allowing the postulate of the univer¬
sal trustworthiness of reason while providing, at the same
time, for the misuse of our faculties of reason through
failure to do persistent thinking or by carelessness, wilful¬
ness and the refusal to accept responsibility for discriminat¬
ing judgments. Bowne thus makes freedom become the source
of our discovery of both truth and error, and being as neces¬
sary to moral action. Bowne did not ignore law within the
realm of the mind, but regarded it as a discovery of the first
magnitude that, "Freedom and uniformity must be united in
rationality, and neither can dispense with the other.""*"
The speculative significance of freedom is, in its
scope of application, coterminous with reason itself. Bovrne
contends that all rational ideals, including those of science,
philosophy, morality and religion, are, in their formulation,
appropriation and realization, conditioned by freedom. Free¬
dom enters into every structure of our reason and, as is not
evident, is the source of the discovery of both truth and
error in knowledge. Science itself becomes one of the great
achievements of human freedom, for freedom and the uniformity
of law are seen to unite in rationality. Freedom guarantees
the perpetuity of science. The significance of freedom as a
philosophical principle is apparent in its solution of the
Bowne, Methodist Review, op. cit.. 77 (1898), p. 687.
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problem of error, in its conditioning of any real explanation,
in its solution of the problem involved in reconciling the
categories of change and identity, in the achievement of the
rational demand for unity providing at the same time for the
pluralistic aspect of experience and, finally, as condition¬
ing the unification of a system of things with a common source
into a plan of purposeful activity. When we consider the sig¬
nificance of freedom ethically, Bowne contends that moral
responsibility is meaningless where freedom is denied. And
in the religious field, which is our specific interest, free
creation offers the only solution of the problems of good and
evil, for knowledge, omniscience and omnipotence. In fact,
"apart from freedom, all our rational ideals collapse, as
does the whole career of reason, falling into innocuous
desuetude.""*" Our conclusion is, then, that it is the notion
of freedom and not that of necessity of which we can form any
clear idea since, without it, the categories of thought and
being are plunged into insoluble antinomies before which
reason is impotent. The root notion of Bowne's doctrine of
freedom consists in showing that it is a necessary postulate
of the mental life apart from which reason is unable to func¬
tion significantly. But in connection with freedom, the
career of reason is, from the finite point of view, unlimited
1 Hildebrand, ojd. cit., p. 109.
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and one of the most valuable attributes of personality, human
or divine.
The epistemological significance of freedom in con¬
temporary thought reveals Bowne's superior insight in formu¬
lating the problem of freedom so as to reveal the true
antithesis to exist between determinism and indeterminism
rather than between determinism and freedom. Hildebrand
points out Bowne's superiority over other writers in the
notion of freedom:
In this respect, Bowne's notion of freedom is
superior to that of Henri Bergson, James Ward,
Charles Peirce and William James. In fact, the
epistemological significance of freedom is not
developed in the works of James, Royce and
M. Bergson although its historical roots may be
found in Saint Augustine and Descartes and, in
more recent times, especially in Lequier and
Renouvier. Excepting in those present writers
such as W. E. Hocking, Louis Arnaud Reid,
E. G. Spaulding and W. E. Johnson, and Bowne's
disciples where the doctrine has been recog¬
nized as having peculiar significance, we do not
find freedom and reason acknowledged by contem¬
porary philosophers in general to the extent
that it deserves in view of its significance as
a principle of investigation.1
A summary of Bowne's doctrine of Freedom reveals its
theological implications. There is nothing more essential
to personality than freedom or the power of choice. Without
this power man would not be a person. He would be an animal
or a mere thing. It is certain that he would be a non-moral
1 Ibid., p. 110.
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being. His conduct would have neither merit nor demerit. He
would be incapable of either guilt or virtue. He would be
neither saint nor sinner. He would be neither responsible
for what he did nor for what he did not do. Responsibility
could not have rational meaning for him because strict deter¬
minism is logically fatal to the moral life.
As Bowne says, however, such a theory is pure abstrac¬
tion. No rational human being can wholly divest himself of
his own moral nature. "Determinism as a philosophy exists
only by the grace of inconsistency."1 The professed deter-
minist assumes the freedom which he denies. In practical life
the only serious question with respect to freedom has had to
do with its nature and the range or scope of moral responsi¬
bility.
After a true individualism had been established in the
civilized codes of mankind, we find the primitive idea of
solidarity persisting as a theological theory, called the
doctrine of original sin. According to Bowne, this doctrine
does not have its sole source in the individual will. There
is such a thing as super-individual or racial sin, sin which
is inherited or which somehow irresistibly invades the life
of the individual. Those who hold this view claim that the
1 Albert C. Knudson, "Bowne in American Theological
Education," The Personalist. Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (July, 19^7),
p. 252.
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universality of sin can not be accounted for without it5
that there is ground for believing that the redemption from
sin lies beyond all human effort and is necessarily the work
of divine grace. The basic assumption underlying the theory
is that sin is basically unavoidable and yet that we are
responsible for it.
Bowne firmly believes that this traditional doctrine
manifestly violates the dictates of an enlightened conscience.
It demoralizes the concept of sin and irrationalizes Christian
theology. Bowne was a vigorous critic of this traditional
view. In opposition to this traditional view he advocated
a consistent freedomism and a thoroughly moralized conception
of sin. But he does not minimize the gravity of sin nor the
need of divine grace. He emphasizes both in a genuine evan-
gelical spirit, and gives powerful support to the freedomistic
wing of Protestantism, which had been rapidly spreading over
the English-speaking world since the Wesleyan revival of the
eighteenth century.
It is Bowne's type of philosophy which is the bulwark
against the current revival of the doctrine of original sin.
What would Bowne's attitude be toward the revival of this
doctrine? Albert C. Knudson, one of his former students,
presumes to give Bowne's attitude;
To the religious earnestness underlying this
revival Bowne would have raised no objection.
He would rather have encouraged it. But he would
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have insisted that its present irrational
grounding is destined to have evil consequences.
It is meet, right and our bounden duty, he would
have said, to take a serious view of sin, but a
grave mistake to make it dependent on subvolitional,
subethical and subspiritual concepts, as is being
done by the so-called neo-orthodox. There is a
more excellent way to promote true Christian piety,
one that does not do violence to conscience and
reason.1
H. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Bowne's personalist assumptions compel him to assert
that God is immediately operative in all things and that his
will finds immediate expression and realization in all events
2
of nature. What, then, is to be said in answer to the prob¬
lem of natural evil that will neither ignore such evils nor
lessen God's goodness?
Bowne approaches the problem with his eye to the lot
of the individual and does not dodge the ugliness of the world.
The solution which sees only the general outcome of society
and overlooks the fate of individuals is unrealistic to
Bowne. While he is personally convinced that the divine
person is absolutely good, Bowne concedes that we cannot
argue to the righteousness of God on the basis of empirical
Knudson, o£. cit., pp. 253-25^. The writer of this
thesis discussed the same problem with Dr. Ralph Tyler
Flewelling, Editor of the Personalist and received much the
same reply.
2 Bowne, Theism, p. 228.
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facts alone. A great deal depends on how we pick our facts.
Some may see only the good while others may see only the
evil.1 In this way Bowne disparages the views of those who
claim to know God's purposes of detailed events. Bowne,
however, still insists that all that happens, happens because
it is part of the divine purpose. The important question for
Bowne is: "Are the facts of nature and life inconsistent
2
with the belief that God is good?" He answers that there
is no logical basis for the faith that the world is ulti¬
mately good, or that God is perfectly righteous. We find
marks of wisdom in the world but not perfect wisdom, so we
find marks of goodness in the world but not perfect goodness.
To follow a purely objective procedure would demand that we
take all the facts into account, both good and evil, and then
strike a balance. Bowne states that this would result in
great uncertainty. If we view the world from the point of
view of inductive reason, we are torn between considering it
as the result of supreme wisdom and as the product of a blind
demiurge.
The outcome would probably be the affirmation
of a being either morally indifferent, or morally
imperfect, or morally good but limited by some
1 Ibid.« pp. 266, 262-263, 270. Cf. Bowne, Studies in
Theism, p. 356; "The Design Argument," The Independent.
XXIX (July 5, 1877).
p
Bowne, Theism, pp. 228, 239; Personalism. pp. 187-
188; Studies in Theism, p. 356.
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insuperable necessity which forbids anything
better than our rather shabby universe.1
Such a collapse of its ideals the mind is not content to
allow. Instead, the mind maintains its faith in the ideal
and acknowledges its own limitations, assuming that underneath
all the conflicts and evils there is perfect harmony. Bowne
defends this attitude of the mind. He says that the mind does
this in both the cognitive and moral realms, and not due to
compulsion. The validity of the argument, he adds, cannot be
estimated in passive contemplation or speculation, "but only
2
in moral action." The general issue between optimism and
pessimism admits of no decisive demonstration either on the
basis of induction or speculation. The problem must not be
dealt with in the abstract; all such abstract and a priori
discussions of the subject Bowne labels futile.
Reflections on the best possible universe, the
infinite gradations of beings, the necessary sub¬
ordination of all finite things in the scale of
boundless existence are both theoretically and
practically barren. The question so far as we
can deal with it is one of experience rather than
of argument.3
In brief, it is a question of the value of life and each
individual must answer it for himself: "living men must come
Bowne, Theism, p. 258.
2 ££• ibid.. pp. 258-260. R. T. Flewelling, Personalism
and The Problems of Philosophy.
3 Bowne, Theism, p. 266.
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forward and testify.""*"
Consistent with his rejection of all speculative
solutions to the problem of evil, Bowne directs his criticism
specifically against the Leibnitzian solution. It is usually
said that we cannot maintain that God is both almighty and
good. If the pfoblem of evil is to be solved, it is alleged,
we must surrender one or the other of these contentions.
According to Bowne the Leibnitzian theodicy set the fashion
in this regard and seeks to rescue the divine goodness "by
saying that God could not help the evil that is in the world."
Leibnitz claimed that "all possible systems existed in the
divine mind, each of which must logically lead to one certain
outcome." Although an infinite number of systems are possi-
2
ble, their consequences are all determined. God chose the
best possible world but any government by general laws was
bound to include individual hardships. "The eternal truths
of reason and the invincible might of logical sequence forbid
3
the system being other than it is."
This "Leibnitzian logical determinism" Bowne rejects.
The nonexistence of pain cannot be shown to run counter to
1
Floyd Hiatt Ross, Personallsm of Evil,
p. 9.
2
Bowne, Theism, pp. 26m- ff.j Bowne, Studies in Theism,
pp. 3^0-356.
3 Ibid., p. 3^0.
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some eternal truth.
So far as rational necessity, the only neces¬
sity of which we know anything, goes, the entire
order to the world, for good or evil, is purely
contingent. Whatever good purposes toothache,
neuralgia, and pestilence, fang and venom and
parasites may serve, there is no proof that any
eternal truth is to blame for their presence,
or would be damaged by their absence.
Floyd Hiatt Ross feels that Bowne is quibbling over
words at this point. He points out that Bowne is technically
correct in claiming that there is no proof that these appar¬
ently contingent facts go counter to any eternal abstract
truths, but at the same time, the deeper issues involved have
escaped him. Bowne has failed to see that
. • • any determinate, i.e., finite, situation
carries with it certain indispensable conditions
which give the finite situation its definiteness
and existence and also, consequently, its limi¬
tations, since to exist at all evidently means to
be bounded in some sense or other.2
Out of such accompanying conditions or limitations might well
arise what from the human point of view are real evils.
Leibnitz's phrase, metaphysical evil, to describe these indis¬
pensable conditions of any-world-whatsoever may be poorly
chosen;
... but it stands for what seems to be
undeniable fact—that any existent situation
Bowne, Theism, p. 265. Gf. Bowne, Studies in Theism.
p. 3*+0.
2
Floyd Hiatt Ross, Personalism a,nd the Problem of Evil.
p. 10.
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must be bounded, have 'limits,' and that such
limits may involve what from the organic point
of view are evils.1
But this would imply that in a certain sense God was limited
in creating, and Bowne avoids using such terms or making such
a concession.
Since according to Bowne the notion of a best possible
world involves a contradiction akin to the notion of a largest
possible space or number, no theist is under obligation to
prove that the present system is the best possible "for the
simple reason that there is no best possible finite," "every
finite must be definite both in intensity and degree of perfec
2
tion." In saying this, however, Bowne seems to admit an
essential point in the Leibnitzian position which he pre¬
viously condemned because of its logical determinism, i.e.,
that any finite situation must be less than perfect, must
have limits.
Bowne is willing to admit that very conceivably this
is the best kind of world for the purposes which God has for
men. He points out that goodness may be interpreted
abstractly or instrumentally. If God did less than the best,
abstractly, his will would be imperfect which is not to be
3




Bowne, Theism, pp. 3^1, 358.
3 Ibid.. p. 265. Cf. D. C. Macintosh, Reasonableness of
Christianity, pp. 90-93.
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system must be instrumental,
... in which case its goodness would lie in
its fitness for its work. ... The order of
things might be highly imperfect as an end in
itself and at the same time perfect as an
instrument for the development of a race in
character and intelligence.1
This means that "the imperfection of the physical world in
itself is its perfection, considered as an instrument for the
upbuilding of men." There must be mountains to climb and the
only demand we have the right to make is "that the system
2
shall respond to the labor with adequate returns." Thus
it is possible to regard many of the evils of life as instru¬
ments of good in disguise.
To the specific objection that the existence of pain
of any sort is inconsistent with the divine benevolence,
Bowne replies that pain has in general a double function. In
the first place, it serves as a warning or incentive to
development; and in the second place, it comes as the conse¬
quence of transgressing some condition of existence. The
pessimist may object that God should have made things perfect
from the start, but Bowne has nothing but contempt for this
view. Such a system to Bowne would be "a universal nursery
3
for the perpetuation of helplessness and incompetency."
1




Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 3&5«
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The unrelieved physical evil in the animal world seems to be
necessary and "is far enough from warranting a denial of the
divine benevolence," With man "the higher manifestations of
character spring almost entirely from the soil of sorrow.""1"
When the human mind is in its normal and healthy condition,
the goods which most crave "are not passive pleasures of any
sort, but goods of the active nature, and the very notion of
these implies obstacle, resistance, and hardship, as their
2
necessary condition." Man is willing to climb the mountains.
The best possible kind of world for human beings such as we
are, then, includes individual hardships—and the disagreement
between Bowne and Leibnitz lessens considerably.
Bowne does not stop with this optimistic view. He is
willing to admit that viewing the many evils as instruments of
good does not solve the problem. He is amazed at the slow
history of the organic world. Nor can he discern purpose in
such things as parasites, fever, germs, etc. Even when pur¬
pose is to be found at times, matters seem to be made worses
"The arrangements for propagating disease are exquisite. The





3 Bowne, Essence of Religion, p. ^8.
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forms of life often succumb to the lower. Facts of this kind
Bowne admits constitute a real problem. "Men have made very-
great efforts to explain them, but with very little success."^"
Even if we accept the evolutionary argument, the question
still remains why "this progress might not have been accom-
2
plished at less cost of toil and struggle and pain." To
the question: How can these things be—these mysterious
excessive evils of life which seemingly have no place in the
scheme of things—Bowne replies that there is only a prac¬
tical solution. "The justification of the world must be
found in experience rather than in speculation, in life
rather than in the closet." While admitting that the
general considerations which he has brought forward may cast
some light on the system as a whole, Bowne adds that so far
as the vicissitudes of the individual lot are concerned, they
remain as dark as ever. This means that "we must fall back
on faith and some sense that our lives are in the hands of
him that made us, and that he can be trusted though we do not
if




Loc. cit.: Theism, p. 269.
^ Ibid., p. 282. Cf. Bowne, Essence of Religion.
P« ^5; Studies in Theism, pp. 3555 37^.
k
Bowne, Theism, p. 282.
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assurance that this life is a period of probation and a time
of abnormal moral adjustment but that in the future life men
1
will take their places according to their moral character.
From the foregoing it is clear that Bowne's solution
to problem of natural evil is a purely practical solution.
"It ends in a confession of ignorance and a profession of
faith."2 He says:
Questions why everything is not different or
why everything is as it is, we pass by, as is
most meet, in reverent silence. . . . And when
we consider the enormous complexity of the
universe and also Its illimitable extent, and
remember our own brief life and scanty insight,
there is almost an air of grotesqueness in the
thought of our assuming to criticize the Creator
at all; as if he should apologize to us for not
having made the world more to our mind and liking.-3
From the standpoint of reflection it would be valid to
say that such an appeal has as much value as any argumentum
ad ignorantiam or argumentum ad verecundiam. Nor does Bowne's
appeal to quantitative considerations carry weight in the
if
matter. His acceptance of an intellectual impasse in this
fashion seems highly unsatisfactory even to one in his own
1
Ibid. T pp. 282, 28>f; Studies in Theism, p. 371*.
Cf. Bowne, Essence of Religion, pp. 5*+ ff.
2
Bowne, Theism, pp. 272-273.
J Ross, op. cit., p. 13.
L.
Cf. Brightman, "Religion as Truth," Contemporary
American Theology. I. 75; Finding of God, pp. 118-119;
Problem of God, p. 9o.
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tradition, E. S. Brightman, who feels that the reflective
life deserves more consideration.Ross feels that Bowne
rejects the demands of reflection too readily and thus opens
the door to general scepticism on other problems. In fair¬
ness to Bowne it must be said that it is unfair to assume
that his confession of ignorance is a lack of reflection.
Quite often the "demands of reflection" demand a learned
ignorance.
It is true that Bowne's conclusions on the problem of
evil are somewhat inconsistent with one of his basic meta¬
physical postulates, i.e., "the intelligibility of the uni-
2 ~~
verse." One may ask why this opacity to human reason is
confined to the problem of evil. We are faced with the facts
of evil and suffering that simply are not intelligible but
are definitely admitted to be unintelligible, opaque. The
axiom of the complete intelligibility of the universe seems
to shrink considerably. To this Bowne replies that the prob-
3
lem of evil is in no sense a speculative problem. But the
problem has a speculative aspect if no further than the
1
E. S. Brightman, The Problem of God, p. 36.
2
Cf. Bowne, Studies in Theism, pp. 118-119; Theory of
Thought and Knowledge. p. 35: "What is Rationalism?" op. cit.,
p. 99; "The Design Argument," The Independent. XXIX (July 5>
1887), p. 2.
^ Bowne, Theism, pp. 258, 266-267, 271-273.
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demand that the theist think badly of evil without thinking
badly of God. Thus Bowne exposes himself to the charge of
going counter to his own basic principle of the complete
intelligibility of the universe and thereby undermining the
validity of his solutions to the various metaphysical prob¬
lems interpreted in idealistic terms.
Regardless of the criticisms that may be leveled at
Bowne, for the most part, he has carried the Boston personal-
ists with him in his conclusions. The most prominent excep-
1
tion is E. S. Brightman, and Brightman has troubles with
E. S. Brightman, Finding of God, pp. 118, 169-170.
In his earlier writings Brightman advocated essentially the
same view he now reacts against so strenuously (cf. Brightman,
An Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 295-297'• "The problem of
evil admits of no final, no completely enlightening solution.
. • • Our partial knowledge of purpose implies larger purposes
of which we are ignorant"). In his Philosophy of Ideals
Brightman offered a "different suggestion" as to a solution
of the problem of natural evil, anticipating his later,
developed view: "The struggle which we find in ourselves
between nature and ideals is in some way a consequence of a
struggle within the divine nature." (pp. 90-100).
For convenience, criticism of Brightman may be classed
under four heads. (1) Objections claim that Brightman's solu¬
tion is no solution at all. G. W. Beiswanger, "Review of
Brightman's Problem of God," Journal of Philosophy. XVIII,
No. 16 (1921), Mf6. "None of the antinomies disappear, their
locus is merely shifted—this time to a place within the
psychic life of deity. The philosopher is still confronted
with the insoluble problem of assimilating within the Supreme
Personality that which is categorically antithetical to per¬
sonality—the irrational, the material, the gross, the
impersonal." (2) Criticism especially from the point of view
of religious consciousness. Knudson, Doctrine of God, p. 366.
"In the last analysis all faith in God rests in the ideal,
and nothing short of the highest will satisfy this faith.
If the existence of evil requires us to affirm either the
(Continued on the following page)
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his finite God.
I. THE CHURCH AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD
All of Bowne's writings are shot through with an
unbounded optimism. This is probably occasioned by his con¬
ception of man, his conception of the kingdom, Hegel's
philosophy of history, the theory of evolution, and the mani¬
fest practical development of the sciences. The atmosphere
of America in Bowne's day, as we have shown, was characterized
by a cheery optimism. While Bowne uses scripture to substan¬
tiate his views of the Church and the Kingdom, it is difficult
1 (Continued)
divine impotence or human ignorance, and if one theory is
logically as tenable as the other, faith will have no hesi¬
tancy in making its choice in favor of the latter." (3) Gen¬
eral objections swinging around the person and unity of God.
D. C. Macintosh, "What Has Brightman Done to Personalism?"
Religion and Life, I, No. 2 (1932), 305. Macintosh questions
how Brightman "finds it possible to worship what may be still
called God, but what turns out to be, albeit a person, a com¬
plex God and devil in one." (*+) Criticisms of Brightman's
dualism. Weiman, Review of Brightman's Is God a Person.
op. cit., pp. 120^-1205: "All I can say is that when I love,
serve, and adore God, I do not love, serve and adore that
unspeakable horror of evil which is the Given nature of God.
The line of demarcation which distinguishes God for me must
exclude that. But then you really have two beings, the good
will which is God, and the evil nature which is the Devil. In
some abstract metaphysical sense the two may be treated as one.
But religious devotion cannot treat them as one. For moral
religion they must be two. When they become two, the premises
which Mr. Brightman is trying to defend become impossible."
For a full discussion of Brightman's Given see F. H. Ross,
Personalism and the Problem of Evil.
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to shake the impression that his basic authority stems from
other factors.
With this background in mind we can understand why
Bowne makes the Church subordinate to the kingdom. Churches
are many; the kingdom is one. Churches at best are instru¬
mental only, the kingdom is the supreme end itself. If the
kingdom were here, we might not need the churches; but the
churches without the kingdom would be a barren mockery.
"Hence it is," says Bowne, "that the conception of the kingdom
is so fast replacing that of the church in the Christian
1
thought of today."
What is the kingdom and what does it aim to do? Bowne
replies:
In our unspiritual way of thinking we are apt
to fancy that the coming of God's kingdom would be
some sort of spectacular manifestation in the
heavens above and the earth beneath, with all manner
of scenic glories for the delight of wonder-loving
minds, and with complete cessation of all need of
labor. But such a performance at best would be only
a celestial circus, and would be unworthy of God and
damaging to men. The real coming of the kingdom
would mean that men were loving God with all their
hearts and their neighbors as themselves. This is
what it would mean in principle. In application to
this life it would next mean that this principle of
love was being specified into the highest and com¬
pletest forms of human life upon the earth, until
man and society and all social and political forms
and agencies and activities had been made perfect
and brought into ideal completeness. Perfect love
within must find perfect expression in the human
Borden Parker Bowne, The Essence of Religion, p. 101.
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world without. The principle of the kingdom is
love, but the field of this love's manifestation
is life; and this life must be built into ideal
form. Mere good intentions alone would not
suffice; for they might be thwarted by ignorance,
disease, social and industrial inefficiency, and
a low grade of development in general. Love must
be guided by right reason, and both must have a i
vigorous life behind them, or under their control.
The aim of the kingdom is to realize the will of God.
It is built upon the good news of God which Jesus proclaimed.
This conception gives rise to the vision of
... a great spiritual society, transcending
earthly distinctions and above all political
organizations, a society whose citizenship is
forever in the heavens, being hid with Christ in
God, yet whose present sphere of activity is upon
the earth, and whose members are united in the
high purpose of doing the will of the Highest,
and thus bringing in the divine kingdom.2
We next inquire as to who are members or subjects of
the kingdom of God upon earth. Bowne rejects the idea that
membership in the kingdom comes by performing certain rites
or ceremonies. Even a knowledge of Christian truth is not
enough. Membership in the kingdom depends "upon the attitude
3
and affinities of the spirit." Bowne claims that knowledge
of the Gospel is necessary for perfect spiritual living, but





3 Ibid.. p. 105.
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apart from knowledge of the Gospel.
Surely, [he says], the Good Samaritan was a
member of the kingdom. Of course he knew nothing
of Christ, but Christ knew something of him. And
with equal certainty the priest and the Levite
were not members of the kingdom. . . . One must
be mentally and morally debauched by a mechanical
theology who can doubt that the Samaritan belonged
to the kingdom and the others did not. It is the
glory of Christianity that its spirit is trans¬
cending its own formal institutions. . . . Thus
the leaven, according to the promise, is leavening
the lump.1
While Bowne grants membership in the kingdom to all who
are doing good in the world, he does not minimize the import¬
ance of the Church. The Church is a necessary fellowship for
those who have individually related themselves to God by faith
and obedience. This real and vital communion experienced by
individuals can best be nurtured and expressed in the cor¬
porate fellowship of the Church.
The kingdom came with Jesus Christ; "for in comparison
with his work and revelation the kingdom had not come before;
and it comes now with any richness and fullness only in
2
connection with him." Likewise in the individual life, while
all goodness is divine and a mark of the spirit's presence,
life must become reflective and rise into self-conscious






and "this again is possible only in connection with the king¬
dom as our Lord has revealed it."1
In extending the kingdom to take in goodness every¬
where, even its embryonic and unconscious forms, Bowne does
not intend "in any way to deny the supreme pre-eminence of
our Lord, or the importance of a knowledge of the Gospel for
2
the development of the life of the kingdom."
What of the visible church and its relation to the
kingdom? Basically, as we have said, it is instrumental.
As the political individual in isolation could
never put forth those great activities needed for
the development and triumph of humanity, so the
religious individual in isolation would be utterly
inadequate to the great efforts needed for the con¬
quest of the world for righteousness. For this
there is needed organized and corporate work for
massing the isolated forces of individuals, and
bringing them to bear in joint and abiding witness
for truth and righteousness and in joint and abid¬
ing effort against untruth and unrighteousness in
the world.3
The church is the ground and pillar of the truth. In
his conception of the church, Bowne reveals the affection
which tied him to the church for the length of his days. We
cannot resist giving another long quotation at this point:
It is the institution which brings the individ¬
ual out of his isolation and weakness, and re-enforces
1 Ibid., pp. 112-113.
2
Ibid.T p. 113.
3 Ibid.. pp. 116-117.
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him by all those forces which root in the social
nature. It is the perpetual testimony to the
spiritual nature of man and his divine affinities,
a relationship which the sense life is perpetually
obscuring. It is the great teacher concerning the
things of the spirit. Here the divine tradition
of divine love is cherished and made credible.
Here the high and the low, the rich and the poor,
the wise and the ignorant meet together in the
love of one Lord who is the Maker and Head of them
all. Here too the spiritual forces of humanity
centre. Here is a great universal confederation
for spiritual purposes, and, through them, for all
other purposes that look to man's upbuilding, freed
from limitations of race and nation and condition,
and bound by a common love to a common work toward
a common aim, and that the highest. Surely this
institution is rightly called the pillar and the
ground of the truth.1
For Bowne, the true church on earth does not consist
of the various denominational bodies, but of the spiritual
disciples of Christ, whether in these bodies or outside of
them. It is Bowne's conviction that human nature as revealed
in history makes it very dubious that all Christendom will
unite under one ecclesiastical dominion. The main thing is
that there will be a growing unity of the spirit.
Bowne has an exalted vision of the invisible church.
Let us raise our thought to the church invisible,
the kingdom in its glorious majesty, including not
only the faithful living but also the faithful dead,
the general assembly and church of the first-born,
and the spirits of the just made perfect, freed from
all earthly limitations and weakness, and set for¬
ever in the midst of the unwearying activities, the




ineffable, and divine revealings of the life
immortal,
J. THE CHURCH AND THE TRUTH
Bowne indicts the church because it has lagged behind
the intellect of the time. So much that has gone for ortho¬
doxy "has been a synonym for ignorance, dullness, narrow-
2
mindedness, and narrow-heartedness generally." While grant¬
ing the fact and value of conservatism and progressivism,
Bowne feels that the Church has vitiated its influence by an
unintelligent conservatism. This conservative attitude,
reflecting itself in science, sociology, economics, Bible
interpretation and theology, has brought disrespect of the
Church. Bowne pleads for a more progressive attitude in all
of these fields and especially in the field of Biblical inter¬
pretation and theology. But the fact remains, and the scandal
remains, that the Church has blockaded both truth and progress.
To put it in Bowne's words:
If the Church could have had its way, modern
civilization would never have developed, and
humanity would have been ruined. We should have
been living in filth and squalor and superstition
and intellectual abjectness of every kind. The
Church saves the world; and the world saves the
Church. Only the instinctive and irresistible
impulse of human nature, whereby it has vindicated
1
Ibid., p. 123.
2 Borden Parker Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 359.
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its own rights, has saved humanity from destruc¬
tion by religion. This intellectual backwardness
of the Church is nothing less than a calamity
to religion, because it begets and continues the
notion that religion is essentially a thing of
inferior intellect, and that it is afraid to come
out into the open field of the world where plain
secular daylight shines, and be tested.1
Bowne contends that much can be done to remove this
scandal by simplifying Christian teaching. This he would do
by reducing the fundamental Christian doctrines to a state¬
ment of what we conceive the essential Christian facts to be.
The statement he suggests runs as follows:
I believe in God the Father Almighty, and in
Jesus Christ his Son our Lord. I believe in the
Holy Spirit, in the forgiveness of sins, in the
kingdom of God on earth, and in the life everlast¬
ing. Let this be the Christian platform; and for
our programme let that run, Thy kingdom came. Thy
will be done on earth as it is in heaven.
Bowne is very confident that this statement represents
the true Christian orthodoxy, and that it provides a solution
to the abnormal conservatism of traditional orthodoxy.
Historically, however, orthodoxy has been of another
sort. It rises this way: There is a natural desire to formu¬
late Christian doctrine so as to show its philosophy. We seek
to pass from the revealed facts of God's grace to a theory






Of course this formulation must take place
in accordance with the reigning philosophy of
the time; and when the progress of thought dis¬
places the philosophy there is a conflict of
reason and faith.1
Again, the Christian facts cannot lie in the mind unrelated
to all its other beliefs, but is spontaneously adjusted to
them. Thus it becomes complicated with the science of the
time; and when the science progresses, we have a conflict of
science and religion. "Further," says Bowne, "Christianity
tends to adjust itself to existing social customs, and views
2
any departure from them as dangerous and irreligious." When
society progresses the Church is left behind, vainly protest¬
ing against the "spirit of the times" as the "spirit of the
Antichrist," "itself appearing meanwhile as the foe of
humanity.""^ In this way orthodoxies arise in every field.
Bowne pleads for a body of scholarly investigators to
do the Church's intellectual work. These men would "formulate"
the spiritual life so as best to express it and keep it from
losing its way in swamps of ignorance and superstition. They
will also have to adjust religious thought to the ever-








needless misunderstanding." Bowne does not mention how he
would get his unintelligent and imately conservative Church
to willingly listen to the novel statements of his religious
intelligencia.
At any rate, he is convinced that if we had had such
a group of men the Church would have been spared the scandal
of being opposed to truth. It is his opinion that if
. . . our churches in the last generation had
real leaders, who were equal to their position,
and who commanded the respect of the churches by
their scholarship and their character, to speak
about the disturbing religious questions of our
time and to say to the churches: These questions
at best are only of subordinate importance and do
not affect the fundamentals of the faith, we
should have been saved much confusion, friction,
and disgrace.2
The Church, Bowne concludes, must get a deeper sense of obli¬
gation to the truth. "Only thus can this age-long scandal of
a church hostile to the truth and perpetually compelled to
3
surrender with dishonor be done away."
This chapter has not attempted to present all that Bowne
said on religious subjects, but it does in substance represent








THE WORTH AND INFLUENCE OF BOWNE'S RELIGIOUS THOUGHT
Like Creighton and Howison, Borden Parker Bowne was
very influential as a teacher. Edgar Sheffield Brightman,
one of Bowne's students, says that
. . • everyone who sat in the classroom where
Borden Parker Bowne lectured was conscious of
being in the presence of greatness. His dignity,
his sheer power, his comprehensive grasp of
philosophical issues, and his lucid exposition ^
of personalism made him seem almost a superman.
During the period of his professorship in Boston University,
from 1876 until his death, many students who later became
teachers of philosophy or allied subjects came under his
tutelage and carried away a deep impression of both the man
and his vision. Bowne's students included such men as
Dean W. M. Warren, Dean Albert C. Knudson, Professor G. C. Cell,
Professor F. L. Strickland, G. A. Coe, G. A. Wilson,
R. T. Flewelling, H. A. Youtz, L. R. Eckardt, H. C. Sanborn,
I. R. Beiler, and many other men prominent in the thought life
of America.
Bowne's voice was potent in the councils of his own
religious communion, and his writings had considerable effect
on leaders in other religious creeds. "He played a large part
^
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Bowne: Eternalist or
Temporalist," The Personalist. Summer 19^7» p. 257•
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in keeping his denomination from yielding either to fundamen¬
talism or positivistic humanism.1,1 Dr. Carl F. H. Henry
writes of Bowne's influence on Augustus Hopkins Strong, the
leading Baptist theologian of America.
In 1891*- Strong contributed three articles to
The Examiner. tentatively adopting "ethical
monism"—a metaphysical monism—a metaphysical
monism and psychological dualism of the Lotzean
kind, as he called it. The chief American influ¬
ence in this direction appears to have been the
writings of Borden P. Bowne, so that Strong
became, in intent, a champion of qualitative
monism and quantitative pluralism.2
Other prominent men in religious circles influenced by Bowne
include the names of such men as Bishop Randolph S. Foster,
Bishop Francis J. McConnell, Lynn Harold Hough, S. Parkes
Cadman, Charles E. Jefferson, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Dean
Charles Brown, John Wright Buckam, and John H. Snoden.
Bowne's influence was not restricted to America but
include the British Isles, Europe, and Japan as well.
L
Dr. James Iverack in a letter to Dr. James Hastings writes
A.
of his estimate of Bowne:
In 1880 a volume of Professor Bowne came into
my hands and interested me so much that I kept a
Brightman, "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne,"
Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy.
1926, p. 161*-.
2
Carl F. H. Henry, The Influence of Personalistic
Idealism on the Theology of Augustus H. Strong (Abstract of
the Dissertation), p. 2. "
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sharp lookout for any further writings from
his pen. The title of that volume is the
Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. It was the
fullest and most able of the criticisms of
Spencer which I have met, and it still occu¬
pies the first rank. ...
He has written also an Introduction to
Psychological Theory, a Treatise on Bthics.
both of which I highly value, and which have
proved exceedingly useful in my work. After
many years of reflection on philosophical
questions, Bowne in 1898 published a revised
edition of his Metaphysics. in which he dealt
with metaphysics proper, leaving out epistemolog-
ical questions. ... He dealt independently
with Epistemology in the Theory of Thought and
Knowledge. and this is perhaps the greatest of
his works. It was very helpful to me when I
was writing "Epistemology" for you in the
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. There is
also the volume on Personalism which you your¬
self reviewed.
I have not time to give you an estimate of
the value of Bowne's contribution to Philosophy
and Theology. He is of all one of the foremost
American thinkers of my time. I have known
Royce and James and I have read for many years
the Philosophical Review, and from it have
learned much of present tendencies in Philosophy
in the States, but in my judgment Bowne is the
equal of any other thinker in his knowledge of
the history of philosophy, in the keenness of
his intellectual grasp, and in the clearness of
his exposition. His contribution to Theism is
of the highest value.1
Rudolf Eucken declared that Bowne was "distinctly
America's first philosopher" and said that his writings "are
pervaded by an energy and manliness which show no fear, either
Letter is printed in The Personalis!. Vol. I, No. 1
(April 1920), pp. 32-33.
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of criticism on the part of the haIf-enlightened, or the
1
dictum of those assuming to be in authority."
Morris Cohen in the Cambridge History of American
Literature calls Bowne "one of the keenest of American Meta-
2
physicians."
Professor William Ernest Hocking of Harvard speaks of
Bowne as
... a leader of critical thought in metaphysics,
a master of the weapon of Kantian analysis, and
at the same time a man of strong and earnest
creedal affiliations—an institutional man. This
was an achievement of exemplary importance to our
American community of scholars.
Hocking also praises
. ♦ • the consistent dignity of Bowne's writing.
There is nothing in it, [he says], that is
trivial, nothing that is not thought-filled and
thought-provoking. It is throughout the work
of a man of distinction and power. Its affect^
and also its intrinsic interest are permanent."3
Professor George M. Duncan of Yale says that Bowne
"was a decidedly original and independent thinker who had a
b
clearly thought-out philosophy of his own."
Edgar L. Hinman, former Professor of Philosophy at the
Quoted by President Marsh in his Founders' Day
Address at Boston University, and published in Bostonia.
April 1937, p. 3.
p
Morris Cohen, Cambridge History of American Litera¬
ture. Vol. Ill, p. 2b0, n. 2.




University of Nebraska, says: "I know of no book superior to
Bowne's Metaphysics." Concerning Bowne's treatment of Spencer,
Professor Hinman says: "It appeals to me as the most service¬
able assemblage of fair and analytical criticism of Spencer's
position which we possess.""*"
Weber and Perry's History of Philosophy, calls Bowne
"the most influential exponent in America" of the Lotzian
theory.2
President Marsh of Boston University begins his
Founders' Day Address with the statement that
... Professor Borden Parker Bowne of Boston
University was the greatest philosopher America
has yet produced. Most teachers of philosophy
acquaint their students with the history of
philosophy and with the various systems of
philosophical thought, but are not themselves
original producers in the field of philosophy.
Boston University from its beginning to the
present moment has furnished a stimulating
exception to this rule.3
Since Bowne was the first professor of philosophy at Boston
University, the implication is obvious.
In this same Founders' Day Address, President Marsh
challenges his audience to refute his claim that Bowne was
America's greatest philosopher. He says:
^
Weber and Perry, History of Philosophy, pp. 651-652.
2
Marsh, op. cit., p. 5.
J Loc. cit.
2Gb
You may be willing to concede that Bowne was a
profound philosopher and yet may take exception
to my naming him as America's greatest philosopher.
But whom would you put ahead of him, Emerson?
Emerson was a poet and essayist more than a philos¬
opher. John Dewey? But Dewey's fame is in the
field of educational psychology. William James?
But James was a psychologist, not a philosopher.
James and Bowne were reciprocally appreciative
personal friends. In trying to arrange for Bowne
to lecture at Harvard, James assured him that
"the Harvard philosophers are all filled with
admiration" of his talents. In 1901 when James
was in Rome he wrote to Bowne for a copy of The
Christian Life, a new book that Bowne had written,
saying, "I need it for my work." When James
received it, he wrote a letter of thanks, in which
he said, "The book seems to me an admirable piece
of clearness, compactness and good practical
sense." ... In 1908, when Bowne's work on
Personalism appeared James read it and declared
it to be "a very weighty pronouncement, and form
and matter taken together a splendid addition to
American philosophy." After James had lectures at
Oxford University, the Oxford Professor of
Philosophy, J. Cook Wilson, wrote to Bowne a
letter in which he spoke critically of James's
service, and expressed the hope that Bowne would
come to Oxford to lecture. On another occasion,
Wilson pronounced Bowne "the most important of
modern American philosophers.1
We have mentioned that Bowne's influence extended to
Japan. In 1905-1906, when he made his world tour he received
an enthusiastic reception in that country. His passage
through the streets of the leading cities of Japan
... was a procession through triumphal arches
with showered flowers and cheering throngs. Ee
lectured almost every day to vast crowds that 2
received with eagerness every word he uttered.
^ Ibid., pp. 5-6.
2 Ibid., p. 6.
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President Marsh's statement that Bowne is America's
greatest philosopher receives support from one of the leading
contemporary philosophers in the United States. In a monu¬
mental work entitled, The History of Philosophical Ideas in
America. W. H. Werkmeister declares that
. . . the first complete and comprehensive system
of philosophy developed in America which has had
lasting influence and which still counts some
of our outstanding thinkers among its adherents,
is the 'Personalism' of Borden Parker Bowne.1
Bowne is mentioned in the article on "Personalism" in
Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language.
He is given good treatment in Ralph Barton Perry's Philosophy
of the Recent Past. In 1933? a philosopher who does not
belong to the Bowne school of thought, G. Watts Cunningham,
drew a full length account of Bowne and his work in The
Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy.
Professor Ralph Tyler Flewelling, a former student of Bowne,
not only wrote the article "Personalism" in Hasting's Encyclo¬
pedia of Religion and Ethics. but he also edits The Personalist.
a quarterly magazine which carries on the Bowne tradition. In
1928, Professor George Croft Cell wrote an excellent exposi¬
tion of Bowne's system in an article on American Philosophy in
Uberweg's Geschicte der Philosophie and a few years later
W. H. Werkmeister, History of Philosophical Ideas in
America, p. 103•
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Professor Brightman contributed, by request, a study of Bowne
for the international quarterly, Idealismus. published in
Switzerland.
A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, professor of Logic and Meta¬
physics in the University of Edinburgh had high regard for
Bowne. After reading Bowne's Personalism he wrote Bowne a
letter of appreciation.
It is long since I read a volume with whose
arguments I more fully sympathized. I admire
very much the clearness and simplicity with which
you have stated the main contentions and the
felicitious illustrations by which you sometimes
help them out. In fact, I do not think I have any¬
where seen the case of "Personalism" as you fitly
call it, so broadly and victoriously stated. Your
happy use of Comte's scheme, your "transcendental
empiricism," which refuses to try to explain the
explanation, your demonstration of the objective
reference in knowledge and the necessity of mind
at both ends, and the whole of your admirable dis¬
cussion of causation are some of the points to
which I refer. . . . Your proof that mechanical
causality does not provide for change at all is,
I think, most useful, and among minor matters I
may be allowed to say that your illustration of
the dream space and time (p. 130) is both happy
and useful.1
Typical of Bowne's influence on thoughtful men in the
Church is reflected in the writings of Lynn Harold Hough and
Washington Gladden. Hough says:
Professor Borden P. Bowne in his personal
idealism rendered a service to the Christian
1 Written August 17, 1908 and quoted in a footnote by
Albert C. Knudson in his Philosophy of Personalism. p. 63.
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thinking of our time of the utmost value. His
trenchant, critical mind bombarded ancient
fallacies with a sureness and skill of the most
extraordinary character. And his constructive
work offers a view of the universe where person¬
ality in God and man, moral freedom and responsi¬
bility, the dominance of the spiritual, and
coherence of physical, rational, ethical, and
religious in a rich and roomy monism, with an j
ultimate person on the throne, are all secured.
Washington Gladden, a prominent leader in the church,
likewise testifies to Bowne9s influence on religious thought:
I have been interested in Borden P. Bowne from
his college days; I have followed his brilliant
career with the keenest interest; I have found
much help in his stimulating thought, and I have
greatly enjoyed the freshness and pungency with
which that thought is expressed. My belief is
that he has done for his generation, and especially
for the church to whose fellowship he has lent
honor, a most important service. His posthumous
essay, printed in the last number of The Hibbert
Journal. entitled, "Gains for Religious Thought,"
is an admirable resume of recent progress in
religious thinking. To those gains he has himself
been a large contributor.2
Bowne's influence on the Methodist Church in America
is unmistakable. Speaking from the vantage point of a
philosopher gave him an authority he would not have enjoyed
as a minister or a religious teacher. It gave his teaching
and writing a sort of unbiased scientific objectivity and
seemed to suggest that he had come to his religious
Lynn Harold Hough, The Quest for Wonder, pp. 69-70.
p
Washington Gladden, in the Introduction of
Charles Bertram Pyle's The Philosophy of Borden Parker Bowne,
PP. 3-^. ~
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convictions by the way of science and philosophy. He became
the intellectual champion of the Church at a time when that
institution was being jarred by the theory of evolution,
naturalism, and higher criticism. While he was viewed with
suspicion by the fundamentalists and uneducated, he was
eagerly listened to by the younger men entering the ministry.
As we have already mentioned throngs of ministerial students
made their way to Boston University to study under Bowne.
The result was that in a few years his influence had permeated
not only the Methodist Church but had spilled over into many
other communions as well.
Bowne's main contribution to religious thought is his
criticism of naturalism and his presentation of Personalism.
Bowne first came into prominence as a critic of Herbert Spencer.
Something of Bowne's role as a critic of Spencer is dramatized
by Charles Bertram Pyle:
Because of dizziness induced by the new facts
and discoveries and mutual misunderstanding? science
and religion stood opposed like hostile armies. "The
Philistines stood on a mountain on the one side and
Israel stood on a mountain on the other side; and
there was a [great] valley between them. And there
went out a Champion [a Goliath] out of the camp of
the Philistines [named Spencer of Derby] whose
height was six cubits and a span." And he had a
helmet of brass upon his head and he was armed with
a scientific coat of mail "whose weight was 5j000
shekles of brass." And he had greaves of brass
upon his legs and a target of brass between his
shoulders and the "staff of his spear was like a
weaver's beam," and one by the name of Darwin,
"bearing a shield went before him." "And he defied
the armies of Israel" and called for a man to come
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out and fight him. And the armies of Israel were
dismayed and greatly frightened so that their
knees smote together, "And all the men of Israel
when they saw the man fled from him and were sore
afraid." And every man who hated religion leaped
out of a dark ravine or cavern and pelted them as
they fled. In the midst of rout and consternation
Borden Parker Bowne, the young David, appeared.
With a sling of profound insight and a few smooth
stones of sharp criticism he confronted the giant
and slew him.1
Bowne's philosophy of personalism is the heart of his
thinking and contains the religious concepts which were pumped
out into the religious and philosophic arteries of his day.
In point of fact, it is impossible to tell where Bowne's
philosophy ends and his religion begins. It is all religious.
This probably accounts for the fact that Bowne was never fully
2
accepted by the family of technical philosophers. The fact
that he did not join any philosophical society and rarely
quoted from others no doubt had some influence at this point,
but in all probability the main reason was that they considered
him more of a theologian than a philosopher. This assumption
finds partial justification at least in Bowne's not infrequent
impatience with views opposed to his own and his manifest
preoccupation with vivid and fixed religious convictions
1 C. B. Pyle, The Philosophy of Borden Parker Bowne,
1910, pp. 17-18. See Appendix B, p.~~3l7*
p
Woodbridge Riley omits Bowne entirely from his
American Thought and A. K. Rogers in Bnglish and American
Philosophy since 1800 barely aBides to him. He is seldom
quoted in philosophical discussions or monographs. See also
F. J. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, pp. 270-27^.
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which often seem to color his considerations of technical,
philosophical issues. But regardless of the technical
philosophers, Bowne's philosophy of personalism was readily
accepted by the thinking men of the Church. After the depres¬
sion of the greater human values which had accompanied modern
science, Personalisra reinstated man in his true place in the
cosmos, not the regal one which he held in the old anthro-
pocentric universe, but a truer and worthier, because less
detached and more congenital one. Men had gone through the
harrowing experience when it seemed as if man had been swept
away by the tides of natural science to the verge of the
universe, at the very time of his conquest of nature bereft
of all his spiritual acquirements and kinships.1 But with a
deeper insight into the meaning of evolution and the nature
of selfhood, Bowne seemed to have brought man back to his own.
John Wright Buckham says: "It is fitting to rejoice over his
recovery, for he was dead and is alive again; he was lost and
2
is found." Buckham continues:
Yet though Personalism restores man to his true
place in the universe, it does not necessarily
leave him unrelated to his world but rather makes
him brother as well as lord of all creation, true
lord only as he is true brother. Man finds in
1
Appendix B, p. 317.
2
John Wright Buckham, "Borden Parker Bowne: Person
alist," The Personalist. Vol. V, No. 2 (April 1927).
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himself the key to his world and only as he
reverences and understands himself can he
reverence and understand nature. Such rever¬
ence and understanding are impossible, however,
if he is his own source and end. Personalism
does not leave him thus alone and unexplained
with no personal source to whom to refer his
being and his end. It recognizes Original and
Infinite Person, not only as World-Ground but
as source and goal of existence.1
In a day when man was a victim of Hegelian logic,
religious predestination, and Spencerian necessity, Bowne
successfully fought to re-instate personality, freedom, self-
determination, and moral responsibility. He emphasized the
existence of real evil in the world and the reality of a per¬
sonal God who struggles and strives with us for the overcoming
of evil.
One aspect of Bowne's personalism that has had tremen¬
dous influence on religious thought has been his personalistie
view of nature. He contends that nature is phenomenal reality
and that it finds its metaphysical source in the volitional
causation of a Supreme Person. This contention has given
rise to a number of influential religious implications. With
the establishment of this view Bowne has achieved the main
purpose of a philosophy of religion, that of subduing the
physical and making it the instrument of the spiritual.




an instrument of the Divine Will. The phenomenality of
nature according to Bowne carries with it the ideality of
space and time, which is a devastating argument against
mechanism as a world view. It also overcomes the standpoint
of metaphysical dualism, making possible the unity of an
ultimate metaphysical monism. Bowne's personalism, in order
to be complete, requires the postulate of a theistic monism
[God] as the mediator or necessary ground of all interaction
in the system of created persons and things. This offers a
most important theological aspect of personalism, i.e., that
all knowledge or persons and things rests on a theistic faith.
Bowne's view of nature removes forever the possibility of con¬
flict between science and religion. Science may proceed
without encroachment upon metaphysics. Bowne denies ultimate
reality to nature which is the realm of science; thus, at a
time when the progress of science was such as to absorb and
preoccupy human thought so as to create the contemporary
secularism, it reminds us that the world is of instrumental
and secondary importance, rooted in an ultimate and spiritual
order of truth and value. This has provided a much needed
antidote for the anthropocentric magnification of this world.
Bowne's theory of nature, in Berkeley's language, makes nature
speak a divine language. As human reason is the condition of
our knowledge of nature, so a Supreme Reason is the meta¬
physical cause of nature's real existence. The personalistic
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interpretation of nature involves the principle of teleologi-
cal explanation. Nature is discovered to be a product of the
Supreme Person willing according to a rational moral plan or
purpose. Since God, whose willing is the immediate cause of
nature, is a person supremely free, nature is contingent upon
free will working out a moral plan through law and cosmic
process. Furthermore, finite persons, through limited free¬
dom, may discover and co-operate with the divine plan. God's
free relation to history provides a much needed religious
philosophy of history. By making the personalistic theory of
nature find its metaphysical cause in God, the home of all
value and the one who conserves and creates values, Bowne
makes nature a form of divine activity working for the produc¬
tion of values. Thus Bowne makes nature serve a spiritual
purpose. In this way, conscious experience beyond man becomes
the foundation of human values and guarantees their objectivity.
Bowne's view of nature reveals the impersonal finite to be the
product of divine energizing; it is, therefore, shot through
with morality. The Personal Infinite and the personal finite
constitute ontological reality. This asserts the eternality
of the Personal Infinite and the immortality of the personal
finite. By asserting the phenomenality of nature, Bowne rids
religion and ethics of all illusionistic conceptions of nature
with their pessimism and their teaching that nature is evil.
On the other hand, Bowne's view regards nature as being
27^
instrumental to moral and spiritual ends. It is nature's
abuse, not its use, which is the great evil.
Against materialism, naturalism, empiricism, sensism,
and positivism, Bowne has rightly insisted that man's per¬
sonal unity and identity, his free and rational will, his
religious experience, his spiritual and ethical ideals are
not merely illusions or the mere sum of interacting, material
forces. These are facts of experience for which the lower-
category philosophies have been unable to account. To say
that they are but the results of matter in motion is to ignore
their uniqueness; to look upon them as something less real and
less ultimate than matter is to accept a view which is woefully
partial and in no sense a Weltanschuung. Bowne has done yeoman
service helping to expose the inadequacy of such theories.
On the other hand, in his attack on absolute idealism
Bowne has benefited philosophy and religion. Hegel's influ¬
ence has always been strong in America. While rejecting
Hegel's absolute, or even Lotze's improved absolute, Bowne
consciously or unconsciously utilized the Hegelian dialectic.
His philosophy all the way through is a philosophy of media¬
tion. So while attacking materialism on the one hand and
absolute idealism on the other his synthesis was not entirely
free from Hegel's influence. Bowne was in the idealistic
stream but he strongly protested against the engulfing charac¬
ter of the Absolute of absolute idealism. Bowne was
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essentially correct in refusing to submit to such a system
and in his appeal to empirical fact for his justification of
the unity, individuality and freedom of the finite person.
Logically he has pointed out that an idealism, which makes us
all one with the Absolute, cuts at the roots of true religion
and morality by its denial of the reality of the finite self
and the fact of the self's freedom. Furthermore, Bowne has
clearly shown that a vague, impersonal, absolute experience,
which may be identified with the world, cannot be the personal
God, whom we serve by worship and love. Bowne's whole
philosophic thrust insists that God must be conceived as a
personal, intelligent and free Being. It cannot be doubted
that Bowne, by his emphatic opposition to absolute idealism
and materialism has rendered sound service to religious
thought.
In endeavoring to appraise Bowne's legacy to American
thought it is necessary to consider his conception of the
nature and function of philosophy in relation to religious
thought. On the one hand he tries to simplify philosophy and
on the other hand he tries to intellectualize religion.
Bowne's conception of the immediate function of philosophy is,
as related to life, positive, clear-cut, and simple. It may
be termed the theory of philosophy as the interpretation of
experience. It is an appeal for the recognition of the whole
man, as concerned with the truth that he needs for the best
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and fullest life. By simplifying philosophy, however, he
does not mean to surrender intelligence, but rather to vindi¬
cate it, as that which summons the whole of our nature to
the rational discovery and application of truth to life.
Philosophy aims at a rational and systematic interpretation
of experience."'1' By means of this conception of philosophy,
Professor Bowne is enabled to make an adjustment and harmoni¬
zation of those three too often conflicting viewpoints-
common sense, science, and philosophy. In Bowne's adjustment
the three co-operate. In resorting to experience as the road
to truth and interpretation as its goal, the claim for demon¬
stration must be frankly abandoned. This is true of all forms
of truth. Science is as far from the ability to demonstrate
its assumptions as is philosophy.
Bowne's dedication of philosophy to the interests of
the whole man has approved itself to many minds as fundamen¬
tally sound and pertinent. It provides as healthy a revolt
from a dry scholastic idealism as does James's Pragmatism.
Often in his writings Bowne harks back to the wan spectre
which the eighteenth century raised and upon which, in spite
of its inadequacy, Bishop Butler relied so completely. It




science and even in practical affairs, but it will not sup¬
port conviction in the realm of the ultimate and spiritual.
It is too easily swept away by some new form of experience or
interpretation.
Furthermore, a philosophy of our undifferentiated total
nature is too heavily weighted on the side of the temporal,
physical and practical. It says too little of the principle
of values, upon which Bowne seems to have laid comparatively
little emphasis even though it holds a prominent place in
Lotze's philosophy. It is too oblivious to intuition. The
validity of intuition is, of course, open to question.
Although Bowne might have challenged it as he did the validity
of demonstration, he simply left it on one side. In ignoring
intuition, his restriction of philosophy to interpretation is
left without sufficient warrant. It leaves the content of
experience undifferentiated and hence unappraised. This is a
weakness not only in Bowne's philosophy but in Bowne the man.
"He was too much the practicalist and too little the mystic."1
He spoke with too slight respect of "the affirmation of a
transcendental something above thought and extention as the
2
well worn phrase to which there is no responding thought."
1
John Wright Buckham, "Borden Parker Bownei Personal
ist," The Personalist, Vol. V, No. 2 (April, 192!*), p. 93.
But he writes of experiences that seem to refute this criti¬
cism. See Appendix C, p. 320.
2 Borden Parker Bowne, Theism, p. 156.
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Another friend of Bowne and his philosophy, Lynn Harlod Hough
makes the same criticism:
With all his services perhaps Professor Bowne
had one limitation. He does not give you the
sense of a triumphant experience of his own
philosophy. It is splendidly effective in its
critical aspects, nobly adequate in its construc¬
tive work, but it remains objective. It does
not become a subjective passion in the mind and
the heart of the author. It is correct rather
than in the highest sense kindling.1
Interpretation is the chief aim of philosophy but it falls
short unless it goes back of experience to that intuitional
truth which lies at the root of both religion and philosophy
and which enters into experience itself, giving it not only
depth but anchorage.
Bowne's philosophy transcended its earlier limitation
when it advanced beyond interpretation to the interpreter and
came to focus upon personality. Experience meant nothing
except as the experience of a person. As his thought
developed he came to the insight that we are in a personal
world from the start and the first, last and only duty of
philosophy is to interpret this world of personal life and
relations. Philosophy for him took the form of personalism.
The interpretation of experience might have led him to pure
empiricism, as it has often done, if he had lost sight of
the experiencer in the experience. But he did not make this
1 Hough, ojd. cit., p. 70.
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mistake, and as a result, he came to conclude that the self
is the key to knowledge and reality.
The previous pages have mentioned and shown the inte¬
gration of Bowne's philosophy and his religious thought. He
was one of the few American philosophers who moved naturally
and without effort, bringing his philosophy with him into the
sphere of theology and the Church. Here he exercised a most
salutory influence. From the year 1898, when he wrote The
Christian Life, until his death in 1910, Bowne gave himself
to the task of reconciling the conservative views of the
Church with the progressive views of science and Biblical
interpretation. His volume The Atonement. (1900), the
Immanence of God (1905), and Studies in Christianity (1909)
had tremendous influence, especially on the Methodist Church.
The Social emphasis of the Methodist Church in America is
largely due to Bowne's insistence that the Church must be at
the head of all the forces of life that make at once for
social permanence and social progress. From the vantage
point of fifty years after, however, we can see that Bowne's
religious teaching is quite typical of religious liberalism
at the turn of the century and that this social emphasis is
part of the optimistic view of man, and with it, the progres¬
sive view of history. But as we have previously said, Bowne's
unique position gave his words added authority.
Borden Parker Bowne was a man with a genuine Christian
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experience. This experience was jeopardized by the claims of
science, philosophy, and higher criticism. In order to defend
his religious experience, Bowne developed a philosophical
apologetic which has its basic ground in his philosophy of
personalism.
This contribution has stood the test of time and is
1
very much alive today. Edgar Sheffield Brightman in his
address to the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy
said:
His thought moved in the regions where the
central and inevitable problems of philosophy
are located. His personalism, therefore, is a
way of understanding experience which will always
have to be reckoned with, and which opposing
views will have to consider.2
It is not within the scope of this dissertation to
discuss Bowne in relation to Barth and Brunner, but it is
difficult to escape the thought that the neo-orthodox critical
thrust is for the most part aimed at the religious formula¬
tions represented by Bowne. Compare for example Bowne's
religious thought with the following statement by Brunner:
Protestant theology of our day is in a state
of rapid dissolution. . . . The religious con¬
victions and values, which still play a great
part in it, are not the necessary consequences
1 See Appendix D, p. 322.
2
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Proceedings Sixth Inter
national Congress of Philosophy, p. 167.
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of the self-communication of the transcendent and
super-rational God but the implications of a
religion based upon the conception of the imma¬
nence of God. . . . Gradually the Biblical
dualistic concepts were replaced by a progres¬
sive, monistic, and optimistic idealism; the
Biblical doctrines of salvation and revelation
by Stoic and Platonic ideas. ... Salvation
was identified with religious behavior and
ethical betterment; judgment and forgiveness
were resolved into subjective values of a sen¬
timentally religious kind. From the year 1700
A.D. to 1900 A.D. Christian theology changes
its distinctively Christian bearings, and drifts
with an idealistic-faith into theological liberal¬
ism. The year 1900 marks the approximate date
when it begins to sink into a sea of relativistic
scepticism.1
There is little doubt that Bowne, with robust force-
fulness, contributed much in weaving the fabric of the later
nineteenth century liberalistic synthesis. This synthesis
has become the antithesis of the contemporary neo-orthodox
theologians. But it would be a myopic view which failed to
see the worth of Bowne's religious thought, not only for the
day in which he lived, but also for our contemporary scene
today.
1
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APPENDIX A
THE HERESY TRIAL, 190*1-*
I am indebted to Dr. George Elliott for the following
statement of the charges and the essential portions of Bowne's
testimony. The statements are taken from the Methodist Review.
May-June, 1922:
In the spring of 190*f at the session of the New York
East Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, of which
Doctor Bowne was a member, charges of heretical teaching were
brought against him by a member of another Annual Conference.
These charges were wholly based on passages taken from several
of his published works. He was charged with teaching:
1. Doctrines which are contrary to the Articles of
Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
2. Doctrines which are contrary to the established
standards of doctrine of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
First Specification. He denies the Trinitarian concep¬
tion of the Deity and also the moral attributes of the Deity
as set forth in the first and fourth Articles of Religion of
the Methodist Episcopal Church.
(This specification was followed by extended quotations
from Bowne's Metaphysics and Philosophy of Theism.)
Second Specification. His teaching on miracles is such
as to weaken if not destroy faith in large portions of the Old
and New Testaments. His views on the inspiration of Scripture
are contrary to the teachings of the Scriptures themselves,
contrary to article five of the Articles of Religion of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, and tend to destroy faith in the
authority of the Bible in matters of faith and practice.
(Quotations from Bowne's booklet on The Christian
Revelation.)
♦
All the material in Appendix A is quoted from
Francis John McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne. pp. 189-201.
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Third Specification* He denies the Doctrine of the
Atonement as set forth in the second and twentieth Articles
of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church and as taught
by our established standards of doctrine.
(Quotations from Bowne's booklet on The Atonement.)
Fourth Specification. He teaches such views of the
divine government and of the future of souls as to destroy
the force of Christ's teaching about the future punishment
of the wicked and the future reward of the righteous.
(Quotations from The Atonement and Metaphysics.)
Fifth Specification. He teaches views on the subject
of Sin and Salvation, on Repentance, Justification, Regenera¬
tion, and Assurance of Salvation through the Witness of the
Spirit that do not represent the views of the Methodist
Episcopal Church as expressed in our standard works of
theology.
(Quotations from The Christian Life and the Philosophy
of Theism.)
The Conference session was held in Simpson Church,
Brooklyn, N. Y., under the presidency of Bishop Cyrus D. Foss,
April 6-12, 190*+. The Select Number appointed to represent
the Conference in the trial was made up of fifteen of the most
distinguished names in that body, many of them outstanding
leaders in the church at large. Here is the list: J. E. Adams,
D. W, Couch, John Rippere, Francis B. Upham, Herbert Welch,
J. 0. Wilson, A. H. Wyatt, Francis L. Strickland, George
Preston Mains, C. H. Buck, S. 0. Curtice, David G. Downey,
Charles L. Goodell, J. Wesley Johnston, William V. Kelley.
The Rev. Dr. Frank Mason North was appointed to represent the
bishop in presidency at the trial. Dr. James Monroe Buckley
appeared as counsel for the defendant. The prosecution was
represented by A. C. Eggleston, B. F. Kidder, and Arthur W. Byrt,
by appointment, whose function was chiefly to secure for the
complainant, who was a member of another Annual Conference, his
full legal rights at the trial.
The First Specification
After the alleged evidence against him had been pre¬
sented Professor Bowne took the stand.
Mr. Chairman and Brethren: I am astonished with a great
astonishment to find these things brought forward as proofs of
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a Unitarian view. They really have no more connection with
the specific doctrine of the Trinity than they have with the
binomial theorem, or the Roosevelt administrative policy of
the Panama Canal. Those propositions would prove me guilty
of stealing horses just as quickly as they prove me guilty of
Unitarianism. I simply cannot make any reply whatever to
these first pages. I can make no reply because there is abso¬
lutely no occasion. I was arguing in a general way some points
in epistemology, etc. And as I go along, I make these state¬
ments with as utter innocence of any thought or bearing on the
Trinity as could possibly be. That I must simply rule out.
In the next place, a statement is made here as to the
relation of the world to God. I say the world is neither in
nor out of God in a spatial sense, and that God is neither in
nor out of the world in a spatial sense. That is, God is not
a great circumference with the world inside of him. Nor is
God a spatial circumference here with the world outside of him
in picture form. In thinking in these regions, thought carries
us at once beyond the regions of spatial picturing. The world
depends unpicturably upon the divine power. We do not think of
the thoughts of the mind inside of the mind in the spatial
sense. Thoughts are not in the mind spatially. Neither are
they out of the mind spatially. But thoughts are in conscious¬
ness. We think and we know that we think. That's the end of
it. The world is not in God spatially, and God is not in the
world spatially.
As to pantheism, the essential distinction between pan¬
theism and the idealistic Theism which I hold is found in the
freedom and self-hood of mind. Now, we have this measure of
self-hood, this measure of self-direction whereby we are con¬
stituted persons with the power of self-control, to some
extent, constituted moral persons, subjects of a moral govern¬
ment. This is not pantheism. And that is my view. ... As
to this other question, all that that statement means is that
by way of speculation we should not get very far into the
nature of God.
The Second Specification
After many extended quotations from his works had been
made and interpreted by the complainant, Professor Bowne con¬
tinued his testimony.
Mr. Chairman: It hardly seems worth while to take up
your time. You know very well that these biblical questions
have been burning questions of late years. There has been a
great deal of uncertainty in popular thought, especially among
3Oil-
educated people, graduates from our high schools and colleges,
and those who have been familiar with the literature there,
and when I wrote this book, or these books rather, I meant to
meet difficulties which are in the minds of those persons.
Philosophy is not everybody's affair, and so biblical discus¬
sion is not everybody's affair; and this is so in the religious
use of the Bible and biblical questions. There is many an old
saint whose reading is "The Lord is my Shepherd, I shall not
want," and there is a religious use and a great use of the
Bible by a great majority of people. But then there are these
other questions which belong to scholarship and which, in the
long run, are very important. In the confused condition of
things it has seemed to me very desirable to reach some point
of view which would serve as a kind of modus vivendi, and so
I have raised the question, What is the central thing in
Revelation? and I have said it is the revelation of God. It
tells us what God is, what he means, what his relation to us
is, what is his purpose concerning us, what he is going to do,
and what the meaning of life is. Now I consider we get through
Revelation certain ideas which I call the "Christian Revela¬
tion," the essential thing, and I believed it was important to
fix our thought upon these central things in order that we
might have the great value of Revelation. For, really when we
take the book from many a point of view, and look around for
specific treatises in speculative theology, it does not seem
that we have much of value, and when you look upon it as a
Revelation of God we see the significance of it. We as
Christians are living in the light and power of certain great
Christian conceptions which are here, have been here, are
believed here, and will be here as long as the world endures.
. . . If we hold these central ideas, we are Christians. I
think you will admit that I affirm nothing here. I affirm
nothing as to the composition of the Pentateuch or the Second
Isaiah. A great many scholars at least agree concerning the
Pentateuchal question; that we find something originally
written by Moses, but also redactions and additions. Let that
turn out as it may, they still have the Christian idea. Or
"The Second Isaiah." They still have the Christian idea. Now,
these are questions for expert scholars. I do not claim the
ability to decide them, and I know very well that many cannot;
they are questions for expert scholars, and will be decided by
expert scholarship, and nothing can be settled by hue and cry.
Those must be settled by scholars, and we must be perfectly
assured that, in the long run, the truth will make its way—
truth will make its way. In the meantime, we fall back on the
great essential ideas of God, what he is, what he means, and
we live in those ideas, and we rule our lives by them. It is
a modus vivendi which I conceived, and to secure such, I wrote
the book.
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Now, concerning page 65: "However we insist on the
presence of mythical and unhistorical matter in the Bible, it
has not prevented God's highest revelation of himself. . . .
All we can insist upon is, that the record, the legend, the
myth, if there be such, shall not obscure the purpose of the
whole, the Revelation of God."
My thought is that the revelation of God is the great
central thing. There are persons who say it is a myth and
unhistorical matter; and I say, well, suppose that is so?
nevertheless, it does not obscure the great thing, the great
revelation of God; the important ideas concerning God, what
he is, what he means—these come to us along the lines of
revelations in the Scriptures.
Doctor Buckley: The complainant in this matter has
mutilated the passage and withheld from the church and the
committee a very remarkable passage which runs in the other
direction. I will read from the book and request the com¬
mittee to compare what I read with what is presented in the
charges: "However we insist on the presence of mythical and
unhistorical matter in the Bible, it has not prevented God's
highest revelation of himself. This is the treasure which the
vessel of Scripture, however earthen, demonstrably contains.
What the Christian thinker should maintain is the divine
presence and guidance in the rational movement as a whole.
He need not concern himself about details whether for better
or for worse." Why that was omitted in the affirmative
proposition concerning nature or revelation I do not know,
but that was omitted.
Professor Bowne: Now, with regard to the remarks on
pages 79 and 80. I think that there is no question that the
Jews spoke of the supernatural in a way that showed that God
was the agent in all things, and they referred things to God
without reference to a secondary, intermediate causation.
The Lord said this, the Lord said that, etc., in which case
they may have been entirely correct in the standard of causal¬
ity. In other words, had we seen anything that looked divine,
it would have looked as the plague of locusts looked, or like
the plague of grasshoppers in Kansas now. The locusts flew
very much like as they do in the West. This does not seem
like a divine power in the matter. As I said in the book,
suppose an Armada should be sent on the coast of Palestine,
and one of the old prophets had described it, he would have
described it in the form of a divine standard: "The Lord
sent out his lightnings and he blew upon them and they were
scattered," etc., etc. But if you had been there, and had
seen just such a blow and a scattering you would have believed
that the Lord directed them and not angels flying about and
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raising a wind. That is all that means.
Now, with regard to this other passage: "When we come
to the distinctively miraculous, to that which breaks with the
natural order and reveals the presence of a supernatural power,
we may still look for some of the familiar natural continui¬
ties. Miracles which break with all law would be nothing
intelligible." While we believe in a good deal that is super¬
natural without affirming that it is miraculous, we believe
in the Divine Presence in our lives, but we do not mean by
that that we have angels or anything of that kind coming and
directing us. But we believe that our times are in God's
hands. And so our lives go on, and we still believe we are in
God's hands. There would be a supernatural guidance without
anything miraculous grating with the laws of life and psychol¬
ogy. I believe that all the processes of nature are super¬
natural. They obey the divine will and are carried on with
the ever-living will in which we live, and move, and have our
being. I do not think everything is miraculous. On the con¬
trary, there are other ways of doing things.
But, suppose we come now to the distinctly miraculous.
How think of it? It would be no more divine than the outdoings
of the world; no more dependent upon God than the sparrow which
does not fall without the Father. What is the meaning? Why,
it would be necessary to attract sense-bound minds who would
otherwise be immersed so that they might know God as theirs.
4. C. Eggleston: Do you believe that?
Professor Bowne: I am a crass supernaturalist.
Doctor Buckley: Speak of the resurrection of Christ.
Professor Bowne: "Miracles which break with all law
would be nothing intelligible." That sentence as it stands
is not very clear. It means this: that when God works mira¬
cles, still there is a great body of law, and that, connect¬
ing the miracle with these other things through that body of
law, there is no break. Suppose God wrought a miracle and
enlightened a common person. We can imagine a distinct break.
Take Saint Paul's case. Law was such and held in such a way
that God did not make Paul a new being without some reference
to the old body. When he wanted to work a miracle he worked
for us. God might have performed the same miracle in the mind
of Peter and James as in the mind of Paul. The miracle was
wrought on the foundation of law, and Paul was able then to go
on with all that back-lying amount of law and nature and
developing into something which, without a miracle, James or
Peter could never have reached.
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4 Voice: Do you apply that to the resurrection of
Christ?
Professor Borne: I believe in the resurrection of
Christ. I believe in it.
A. £. Eggleston: You say, "With this view you can
dispense with everything else." What does that "everything
else" convey? Is it a general feeling that whatever was
said—
Professor Bowne: Of course the language must be
applied to the subject under discussion. If we are able to
hold the Christian view concerning God and man; and if we are
Christians and have that, we are Christians. We can let
everything else go that need be. It must apply to a great
many persons. Many are not sure of this or that. But I say
if you can hold on to God and Christ and to the view of the
relation of God to us, with the Christian view of what God is,
and the meaning of life and destiny, leave out other things.
A. W. Bvrt: Let other things go.
Professor Bowne: It is unessential for Christianity.
I do not hold that in order to be a Christian one must believe
that the ax swam.
D. G. Downey (Quoting): "When we consider it as a dog¬
matic treatise in abstract speculative theology, or as a text¬
book in ethics, or as anything but a revelation of God, it is
easy to doubt whether it has any special and abiding religious
value." The Professor does not intend to teach that the Bible
is not a good textbook in ethics.
Professor Bowne: It is a question what we shall put
first. It used to be a good way on works apologetic to begin
with the supreme difference in Bible teachings in ethics.
There were deep and profound essentials found in the sacred
books of the East. And the answer was always then, People
have to rummage about among other sacred books to find some¬
thing as good. They made a good talk about the Golden Rule.
They said they could not find anything like that anywhere, and
they rummaged about in the works of Confucius and pre-Christian
writings, and there were a lot of books and a lot of talk, but
I have said the important thing is the Doctrine of God, and
out of that comes the very important theological teaching.
But the central thing is the revelation of God. Dr. Harris'
book, in which he makes the whole discussion of revelation,
turns on the title, The Self-Revelation of God. That is the
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new form which Apologetics has taken on with all those whose
writings command much attention now. The central thing is
Godi There is a very excellent little book, now out of print,
entitled The Chief End of Revelation, much better than recent
works. In this the especial emphasis is the revelation of
God. All the ethics and theologies are important. I do not
think with regard to abstract theology that that thought leads
into the ground, but I remember this, that there was a theology
which taught that in God there was one essence, two processions,
three persons, four relations, five notions, and a circumces-
sion.
Doctor Kidder: In the passage referred to, pages *fl
and *f2, as a quotation you say: "This conception of a dic¬
tated book has always ruled popular theological thought, and
for manifold reasons. The notion of a revelation through
history, through the moral life of a community, through the
insight of godly men, is comparatively difficult and uncer¬
tain." Do you give these two as the only interpretation of
inspiration of God's revelation to man as recorded in the
Scriptures or out of the Scriptures? Do you mean that the
revelation through history through the moral life of the com¬
munity, comparatively uncertain though it be, is the better
revelation or the more accurate revelation of God?
Professor Bowne: I think that is the way revelation
has been made. Revelation has been made in that way, and
that the Bible has not come through such dictation. There may
be passages, here and there, where it says, "The Word of the
Lord came to me."
Doctor Kidder: Then the conception of a dictated book
you rule out?
Professor Bowne: I lay that aside.
Doctor Kidder: Then we have no other alternative
except this: "through the moral life of a community, through
the insight of godly men." If that is the only other alter¬
native, does your conception of the Bible mean that God is
still making a progressive revelation of himself with equal
authority by which he made it through Isaiah, Paul, and John?
You say there is a middle ground that is not defined. In
other words, as Bishop Foss said, referring to Doctor Horton's
lectures at Yale, does God still reveal himself to us in pre¬
cisely the same manner as he did to Isaiah and Paul? Or did
those men have the inspiration of the Holy Spirit of God
revealing himself to them, so that they spake with authorita¬
tive utterance?
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Professor Bowne: It would depend altogether upon the
contents of the revelation and the cogency with which they
appealed to Christian thought. As a matter of fact, the
Christian Church has agreed that we have received a revelation
through those men which outranks the revelation in any other
way. If anyone should start up with a revelation that was
distinctly contradictory to the revelations which came through
those men, we should think this new revelation was a mistake.
At the same time it is also perfectly clear that the subjects
which they had have been brought out in their meaning in the
light and life of the church, as the Spirit was promised to
lead us into Truth. The early Christian Church accepted the
germ, had no such clear ideas as we have. I say nothing at
all about it, but there is a question whether Saint Paul him¬
self had as clear a conception of what was meant as we have
now. We cannot separate the authority of the Bible from the
authority of the church and the authority of the Christian
consciousness that would set up one as independent of the
other. This question of authority is something which can
never be settled except in practice. To attempt to discuss
authority in an abstract way and get it drawn out in logical
formulae always ends in confusion. Precisely the same thing
you have in the general question of certainty. How do I know
that I am saved? The next thing is to plunge into the very
depth of uncertainty. I fall back upon the use of our facul¬
ties, and reach such certainty as experience gives. And so
with regard to the Bible and religious certainty in general.
There is a great blunder that the churches largely make.
First, we have churches resting on the authority of the church.
It is a perfectly easy thing to explode. Then we have the
Protestant Church with the authority of the Bible, and it is
perfectly easy to take that abstract thought and make it
uncertain. We have the authority of the church and the Bible,
the authority of the religious community, all the work of God,
including great conflicts, vital functions, but there is no
possibility of separation. I do not believe, for instance,
that any church would long consent to accept statements in the
Bible which were agreed upon as distinctly contradictory to
reason and conscience. On the other hand, I do not believe
that reason and conscience would very long support themselves
without the use of the Bible. I do not think that either one
of them would support itself without the Christian community
in which the Christian life were going on.
Doctor Kidder: The point has not been quite reached.
We will set aside the "dictated" conception of the book, and
we accept the manifestation of God's presence to the human
mind and heart in spiritual relationship now. But Jesus said,
"Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal
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life, and they are they which testify of me," and Paul said,
"All inspiration, given of God, is profitable . . . for
reproof," etc. ... In another place, "Holy men of God
spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The point is
this. The church at large has held that through the writing
contained in the Scriptures there is a special concentration
of light touching man's relationship to God that does not
come with equal authority through any inspiration that a man
may receive directly from and now apart from those sources.
And in these statements here there does not seem to me to be
any necessary acknowledgment of that fact, although there
would not be any necessary denial of it. And I would like an
interpretation, whether this "insight of godly men" is equally
authoritative as that of the prophets.
Professor Bowne: One cannot say everything at once.
I have said elsewhere that this knowledge of God, which I have
spoken of as of exceeding value, a great source of light and
inspiration, "The light of all our day"—that this comes to us
along the line of God's revelation to man through his Son.
If any modern prophet arises I should be willing to listen to
what his revelation might be, and probably discount it.
A. C. Eggleston: Where do you make a difference or
distinction between the "insight of godly men" and "man's
invention?"
Professor Bowne: Insight is one thing, and invention
is another. . . . Revelation leads to insight.
A. C. Eggleston: How did Moses come upon that wonder¬
ful characterization of God, "long-suffering, full of compas¬
sion, and that will not acquit the guilty?" Did he get that
from his insight?
Professor Bowne: God gave him the insight. That is
the way I should put it. I suppose he had the insight that
God was there.
A. C. Eggleston: I suppose that, too. But now about
this "inerrancy of the Bible." "And thus it appears how barren
and practically irrelevant is the abstract question as to the
inerrancy of the Bible" (page 57)* How does that come in
there? "The doctrine is of no practical interest."
Professor Bowne: Well, it is not. Let me talk about
that for the moment. I am speaking of the "absolute inerrancy
of the Bible," the technical inerrancy, such absoluteness of
statement as forbids the notion of mistake. ... For instance,
the inscription on the cross in several forms; there is a high
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probability that one was not exactly so. Then you have thou¬
sands of different readings in the manuscripts, and it is
plain that there cannot be absolute equal inspiration in
everything. The great thing is to obtain its general trust¬
worthiness. One says, "If you admit inerrancy at all, how
can you be sure of anything?" I say, that is an abstract
question which does not admit of answer and which doesn't need
any.
Doctor Buckley; I would ask, Doctor Bowne, whether you
believe that the revelations in the Bible have come with abid¬
ing power and definiteness in the world's thought and life,
only along the line of God's revelation of himself and God's
providence.
Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.
Doctor Buckley: I am asking whether he believes cer¬
tain things here; I would like to find out whether he believes
these things. Do you believe that when you compare Christian¬
ity with outlying religions we feel its measure of superiority?
Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.
Doctor Buckley: When we compare it with the revelation
of nature, etc?
Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.
Third Specification
The charge as to heresy on the doctrine of the Atonement
was wholly based on extracts from Professor Bowne's little book,
The Atonement« in which he criticizes substitutionary, commer¬
cial, and governmental theories as being based on excessive
literalism.
Professor Bowne: Our wheels drag heavily. My purpose
in writing this booklet was as in writing the other. However
clear theologically that may be in itself, there is certainly
a great deal of misunderstanding among many thoughtful young
people who are trying to consider this question on the basis
of their good sense, and view of right and wrong, etc. I had
a letter from a woman in Washington which was an attack on
the doctrine of the atonement as a rational doctrine. She
set forth all the difficulties that were in her mind. I refer
to that as an illustration of the kind of cases that I meet
very often—young people in colleges especially. And it was
to help them, not to instruct theologians, that I wrote it.
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Now, first of all, as I think I have said here, I have
declared the Christian Church has always held that the great
work of divine grace has been wrought for the salvation of
men. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten
Son." "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto . . .
but to give himself a ransom for many." I could give you
many quotations. I believe most emphatically, without any
reservation of any kind, in the great redemption wrought by
our Lord. And, as I have said here in another passage, in my
thought there is nothing beside. The great work of grace has
been wrought. The Father gave the Son for the salvation of
men. That is what I consider to be the fact of the atonement.
There is nothing which demands theorizing. It is the expres¬
sion of the divine love for the blessing and the salvation of
men. Up to this point we have a fact. But then the rational
nature always insists upon rationalizing, systematizing its
views, and, of course, that demands thought. Now, out of that
come the various theories of the atonement. The church has
always held to the fact. It always will. The fact given up,
there would be nothing distinctively Christian, nothing left
worth preaching. The incarnation for the purpose of atonement
to mankind is the very gist and evidence of Christianity. But
then as to the theories. Now, you know what very crude theo¬
ries were held at an early date. The mind of the race went
into eclipse brought about by having heathen notions thrown
upon the Christian mind; there were a great multitude of these
which were pagan notions. The Christian thought remained in
that condition and then they began to rationalize in theory,
and from that time it has gone on down to the present day and
we have had a great many theories, and we have still many now.
Doctor Miley, in his book, on the Atonement, quotes somewhere
one who says, "There are thirteen theories of the atonement."
But Doctor Miley thinks that some of these do not so differ
as to be separated. And the end is not yet. What have these
men been trying to do? To form a theory of the atonement.
These theories of the theologians have been in the highest
degree unsatisfactory, and I have sought in a fashion to say
things, not to give an entirely new interpretation, but an
interpretation of the atonement which is in entire harmony
with the Scriptures, more in harmony with the present type of
Christian thought, with all the enlightenment there has come
to it in the illumination of the Spirit and of experience,
more in harmony than the theories which have hitherto obtained
among us. And a good many of the Bible students find what I
do not find. There is not an entirely satisfactory theory.
The work of grace is set forth in a variety of ways in the
Temple service and Roman law. Paul gives no consistent view.
He says a good many things, all of which are significant and
of value, but we have not a perfect system in the Scriptures
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and not in theology. Neither have we in our Methodist teach¬
ing. Our Methodist teaching was originally somewhat a satis¬
faction view. It remains a modified satisfaction view in the
Southern Methodist Church still. In our own church it has
gone over somewhat to the governmental view, set forth by
Doctor Miley, but that by no means commands the acceptance of
all the members of the church.
Doctor Couch: Do you urge the governmental view?
Professor Bowne: I reject anything which needs to be
carried forward. It was carried forward from the things
behind it, but we are compelled to go on.
Doctor Couch: "That God might be justified, and become
the justifier of him that believeth."
Professor Bowne: All these expressions I accept. It
is a matter of interpretation of what these things mean. I
myself use the Scripture terminology with great freedom. I
have no difficulty with using such a hymn as "There is a foun¬
tain filled with blood." I can sing it with great zeal, but
after you have said that, how do you interpret it? It is an
adumbration with a great meaning behind it. We try to get
the meaning into the minds of men. I do accept and use the
language of the Scriptures. It has never occurred to me to
find the least difficulty in them. I do not butt against
analogy. I am after meanings.
Now it is said that I have spoken against "satisfac¬
tion." That term—satisfaction. We have a satisfaction and
a substitution theory, and when I speak of satisfaction it is
not satisfaction I am speaking of. I am speaking practically
of that doctrine of penal substitution, penal satisfaction,
which our church rejects. And when I say, "It is a satisfac¬
tion that does not satisfy," it means that. If that view were
true, perfectly true, exactly correct, then it would follow
that since the work of Christ all for whom Christ died would
be necessarily free from the consequences of sin. The Calvin-
ists always drew that conclusion, and the Calvinistic Univer-
salists always draw that.
Now, I use the term "satisfaction" with regard to that
theory. Doctor Miley draws himself that conclusion, and makes
it one reason for setting aside that view. And I found him
drawing precisely the same conclusion; and I say a great many
times—unfortunately expressed perhaps—that we are having a
satisfaction that does not satisfy, and an expiation that does
not expiate, because we are left to bear the visible
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consequences of our evilaoings, and that leads to the suspi¬
cion that on this view some of the unseen consequences may
come around to us.
We are setting forth simply the logic of the doctrine.
Various views are given and finally we must interpret this
work of God and his grace in accordance with our ethical
ideas. We cannot interpret it satisfactorily on the forensic
plane.
Fourth and Fifth Specifications
On these final charges much less time was taken in the
trial and Doctor Bowne was called upon for but little testi¬
mony.
Here is a short statement as to the defendant's views
on future punishment:
Professor Bowne: The only force of this charge is
that I am a Universalist. I am not. I would like to be if I
could, but I am not.
Doctor Couch: Would you like to be?
Professor Bowne: Only in this sense; I should like to
believe that it was God's purpose finally to bring all souls
into obedience unto himself. I should like to have that faith
if I could. I am not a Universalist. As to these remarks
about metaphysics and the light, I have said simply that, left
to metaphysical reasoning, we should not get very far concern¬
ing the future of the soul. That is all. Any positive convic¬
tion we have depends on our moral nature or some word of
revelation.
Doctor Buckley: I ask him whether he believes that
there will be any probation after death for a person thoroughly
instructed in the gospel of Christ in this world?
Professor Bowne: I do not know of any such thing, and
I should feel perfectly unjustified in telling anyone, "You
shall have another chance."
The Verdict
After two hours of argument by the prosecution and the
defense, the full Select Number of Fifteen being present,
votes by ballot were taken on each of the Five Specifications.
The result in each case was the same: Sustained, none; not
sustained, fifteen.
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The verdict of the Committee was expressed as follows:
The Select Number, to whom were referred the charges
against Borden P. Bowne for "disseminating doctrines contrary
to the Articles of Religion and our Standards of doctrine,"
report:
That all the evidence and testimony offered by com¬
plainant and defendant in this case have been received and
carefully considered, and that counsel for each has had ample
opportunity for the presentation of arguments.
That the Select Number, by unanimous vote taken by
ballot, find and decide that of the five specifications none
are sustained, and that the charges are not sustained.
(Signed.) Frank Mason North, Chairman.
Wm. H. Burgwin, Asst. Secretary.
APPENDIX B
BOWNE'S CRITICISM OF HERBERT SPENCER
APPENDIX B
BOM'S CRITICISM OF HERBERT SPENCER
As to the part Bowne played in helping to clear the
mind of his day of its confusion between evolution as a final
theory of the universe and a theory of causes and progress,
let his "enemies themselves be judges."
James M. Cain in an article on "The Pathology of Ser¬
vice" in The American Mercury of November, 1925, writes a
typically American Mercury article—typically American Mercury
of 1925. He lampoons, denounces, condemns, and ridicules the
idea of service. He intimates that American society is
pathological in respect to service. In the course of this
extraordinary article he credits Bowne's treatment of
Herbert Spencer's philosophy with being the bacillus of "ser¬
vice." He says that Spencer "announced the thesis that
society is itself an organism, and that is in process of
evolution exactly like a biological organism." Spencer's
theory, in his own hands, "produced no godly results at all,
but appeared to lead straight to atheism and despair. Pur¬
suing his studies in the evolution of moral ideas, he was led
to the conclusion that there can be no such thing as an abso¬
lute standard of human conduct." According to Cain, this
"was equivalent to giving the Summum Bonum a kiss on the head
with a potato masher." That is a rather inelegant way of
saying that if Spencer's theory had been allowed to go
unchallenged, it would have dealt a quietus to any ideas of
moral purpose or of truth, beauty, and goodness in human
society, or in the universe. He deplores, however, that this
was not the result; for something happened that endowed
Spencer's writing with "evangelical overtones." Then he asks
how this philosophical basis for service was accomplished,
and answers his own questions by saying.
"My guess is that it came about through the writings
and speeches of Borden P. Bowne, who, during the closing years
of the last century, was professor of philosophy at Boston
University. Although forgotten by the laity, Bowne enjoyed
tremendous academic prestige in his day, and his influence
must have been considerable. His specialty was examining the
arguments as to whether there is or is not a God, and his bias
was in favor of God. Writing at a time when evolution had
rocked men's faith, he did much to hearten them for another
try at the trail. Atheists confronted him, demanding proof
of God, and he had back at them by demanding proof that there
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was no God. If a burden of proof lay on believers, he said,
an equal burden lay on non-believers; here were phenomena
which could be explained two ways, and neither side could
claim exemption from logic. Having thus cleared his decks
for action, he opened up his guns, and he had pretty good
guns. It is absurd, he said, to hold a mechanistic view of
life and the universe. Matter could not spontaneously have
sprung into life, and life could not mechanically have
developed into Man. We must have another conception of causa¬
tion and teleology. We must get away from that theory of
causation which regards the cosmos as a series of pool balls
in a row, with the No. 1 ball in the side pocket. Rather we
should regard the cosmic process as a great musical composi¬
tion, wherein each part has a separate existence taken by
itself, and yet fits into a planned and logical whole, and
wherein all the parts move toward a preconceived goal. Thus
he took the small orchestra of Spencer, the orchestra of the
flora and fauna, and augmented it by adding an infinite number
of pieces; he set planets and fixed stars to banging great
instruments in the heavens, and earthquakes to rumbling down
in hell. And above all, he said, it is unthinkable that all
this fuss could have been set going as mere caprice; there
must have been some reason for it, and all of it must be mov¬
ing toward some goal worthy of it." (See Bowne's Theism)
"It was a fine cacophony, and even the professors could
catch a little of it. The orchestration was beyond them, but
the main tune they could hear, and this they fashioned into a
stave of their own.
"Such is the opinion of a man not friendly to the very
things for which Bowne stood; but, in spite of himself, he
pays a real compliment to the cogent, kindling work of Bowne.
He lists nine different books written by such persons as
Muirhead, Hobhouse, Dole, Van Ness, Myers, Everett, Coffin,
Kimball, Drake, and others—books that have been commonly used
in college classes, and which according to the American Mercury





In a letter v/hich bowne wrote a member of the family
he said: "At Copenhagen we went to the Thorwaldsen Museum
and to the Church of Our Lady where his famous group of
Christ and his Apostles is found. No other Christ compares
with this. Christ seems so majestic yet so tender, so regal
yet so winning, removed by such infinite-heights yet so con¬
descending as to be infinitely near. Thorwaldsen seems to
have aimed to unite both the invitation and the benediction.
When I first glanced at it I said "that is the way Christ
must have looked when he said, 'Come unto me.'"
Again I thought that the attitude was one of blessing
and underneath I found the words "Lo, I am with you always."
The pierced hands and side show that the moment is that of
the Ascension and of his final benediction on the disciples.
But the other text shows that the other moment was in his
thought also. I looked at the marble for a long time without
noticing the text, and when I was almost filled and almost
overwhelmed with its presence I read below "Lo I am with you
always." It almost seemed to me as if He spoke himself to me.
I could not keep back the tears and could scarcely refrain
from sobbing aloud. I wanted to kneel down and pray, it
would have been a joy and a relief. But there were others in
the church, so I entered into the closet of my own heart a£d
having shut the door I prayed to Him who seeth in secret."





Bowne's continuing influence is reflected in the
Personalistic Creed of President John A. W. Haas of
Muhlenberg College, Pennsylvania.
Personalistic Creed
"I believe that the energy of the universe demands will
as its solution.
"I believe that the order of the universe calls for
intellect and purpose.
"I believe that the beauty of the universe implies
supreme feeling.
"I believe that the moral implications of life indicate
ultimate goodness.
"I believe that the progress of history points to final
righteousness.
"I believe that a sound theory of education must posit
universal freedom.
"I believe that the best philosophy of religion ends
in the axiom of God as Spirit and Love.
"I believe that all these claims are best united in a
doctrine of personality, divine and human, individual and
social."
*
President John A. W. Haas, Muhlenberg College,
Pennsylvania, in The Personalist (January 1922), p. *f.
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